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Abstract 
The argument for this thesis is that patterns of past engineering and operational 
development can be used to support the creation of a good, robust strategy for future 
development and that, in order to achieve this, a corporate understanding of the history of 
the engineering, operational and organisational changes in the business is essential for any 
evolving railway undertaking.  
It has been the objective of the author of this study to determine whether it is essential that 
the history and development of a railway undertaking be known and understood by its 
management and staff in order for the railway to function in an efficient manner and for it 
to be able to develop robust and appropriate improvement strategies in a cost-effective 
manner. The above argument was advanced because of various widely published and well-
known problems in the industry where projects have failed to be completed, where there 
have been long and unnecessary delays to work or production or where accidents and 
incidents were caused by a lack of experience, knowledge or understanding of staff. 
In this thesis, it is shown that a railway is a complicated and complex system, being an 
entity that combines staff and a fixed infrastructure and moving components and 
equipment, all of which are expensive to install, operate and maintain. Since the 
operational life of much of the hardware is greater than the time employees spend in 
service on the railway, it is common for the origins and reasons for systems developed and 
/ or installed on the railway to be forgotten. Knowledge of the reasons for retaining or 
changing processes and systems can be lost when staff retire or leave the employment of 
the railway and newcomers rarely appreciate the background and purpose of some of the 
systems still in place when they join the organisation. Generally, little attention is paid to 
history and development during training; indeed, such knowledge may not even be 
considered necessary or relevant. 
The writer of this thesis uses London Underground as a case study to show how the 
engineering and operational development of the system has impacted on the design of 
rolling stock. The objective of the work is to show how the development needs arose, how 
they were addressed, what were the outcomes and what lessons were (or were not) learnt as 
a result. The rate of progress is discussed, as are the reasons for that rate. There are also 
suggestions for the reasoning behind the evolution and how these led to the specific 
solutions. The author offers suggestions as to the way in which development might be 
managed in the future and what the risks might be. He suggests that, in systems 
engineering terms, railways must generate rich requirements and use rich traceability in 
order to establish a process of learning from history that is not entirely dependent on 
knowledge being retained and long serving staff. It should be noted that this is not a 
historiographical study and, whilst it draws upon academic literature on corporate memory 
loss, it is also not intended as a contribution in this field. 
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The author of the thesis concludes that it is essential for railway engineering and operations 
managers to understand the way in which technical systems and operational arrangements 
have evolved on a railway during its history, both as a result of conscious decisions and 
happenstance. The case study shows how its development history has shaped the current 
London Underground system and is still shaping it today. In fact, the author proposes that 
the railway is vitally dependent on an understanding of its past if it is to succeed in 
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AEG Allgemeine Elektricitäts-Gesellschaft - the German company that had the early 
licences for the sale of Thomas Edison’s products in Germany. 
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ECEB Electrical Control of Emergency Braking – introduced for the 1973 Tube Stock 
to replace the Westinghouse brake as the on-board safety brake system. 
E.P. (B.) Electro-Pneumatic (Brakes/Braking) 
FA Fault Annunciator – electronic system first introduced on 1973 Tube Stock. 
GB Great Britain (England, Scotland and Wales) 
GE General Electric – The American company, originally founded by Thomas 
Edison, which was reformed when Edison’s company was absorbed by the 
Thomson-Houston company. 
GEC General Electric Company – The British company founded in 1886 that first 
supplied the Underground with electric traction equipment only in 1923. 
GNPB Great Northern, Piccadilly & Brompton Railway - the official company title of 
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control. Also used on mainline railways for AC power control. 
GWR Great Western Railway 
h.p. Horsepower, a unit for power. 1 h.p. = 764 W 
HSCB High Speed Circuit Breaker. 
IEP Intercity Express Project – the replacement train for the high-speed diesel train. 
IGBT Insulated Gate Bipolar Transistor - now a common component in electric 
traction power circuits. Replaced thyristors and GTOs. 
LER London Electric Railway - A company formed in 1910 by amalgamation of the 
Baker Street & Waterloo Railway (the Bakerloo line), the Charing Cross, 
Euston & Hampstead Railway (the Hampstead line) and the Great Northern, 
Piccadilly & Brompton Railway (the Piccadilly line). 
LTE London Transport Executive, 1948-1962. Replaced the LPTB (q.v.). 
LNWR London & North Western Railway - The name of the company that owned 
(amongst other routes) the West Coast main line route from London Euston to 
Watford, Birmingham and northwards to Carlisle. 
LPTB London Passenger Transport Board, 1933-1948 - the statutory organisation set 
up to take over London’s underground railways and bus companies in 1933. 
LT London Transport - the brand name for London’s public transport services 
between 1933 and 2000 when it was replaced by Transport for London (TfL, 
q.v.). 
LTB London Transport Board, 1963-1970. Replaced the LTE (q.v.). 
LTM London Transport Museum 
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Term Explanation / Meaning / Definition 
LU London Underground 
M Motor car 
MA Motor Alternator 
MAR Motor Alternator Rectifier 
Met. Rly. Metropolitan Railway – the original owning company of most of today’s 
Metropolitan line. 
MDR Metropolitan District Railway - the original owing company of today’s District 
line. 
MG Motor Generator 
MM Middle Motor car (only used on the District). 
MTR Mass Transit Railway Hong Kong (the heavy metro serving Hong Kong) 
MTRCL Mass Transit Railway Corporation Limited of Hong Kong. 
MU Multiple Unit - A train using a system for controlling distributed power and 
other equipment from a single driving or control position. 
MV Metropolitan-Vickers - A company formed from the original British 
Westinghouse company and Vickers that supplied electrical equipment to the 
Underground. 
NDM Non Driving Motor (car) 
NAO National Audit Office 
NR Network Rail 
NTfL New Tube for London - The design proposals for new tube rolling stock 
published by TfL in October 2014. 
OMO One Man Operation - used until replaced by the more politically correct OPO. 
OPO One Person Operation - first introduced in 1984 to reduce train crew from two 
to one person. 
PEA Passenger Emergency Alarm 
psi Pounds per square inch - a measure of pressure. 14.5 psi = 1 bar. 
PPP Public Private Partnership. 
RoSCo Rolling Stock (leasing) Company, as set up under British railway privatisation 
in the mid 1990s. 
SAPB Spring Applied Parking Brake - an automatic parking brake used on 
Underground trains built from the late 1970s. 
SCAT Speed Control After Tripping  
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Term Explanation / Meaning / Definition 
SSL The sub surface lines of London Underground, marketed as the Metropolitan, 
Circle, Hammersmith & City and District lines. 
T Trailer car 
TCIC Trip Cock Isolating Cock  
TEP Train Equipment Panel - Successor to the FA (q.v.) on the 1973 Tube Stock. 
TfL Transport for London - the current public sector owners of the London 
Underground system. 
TOC Train Operating Company - for a main line railway operating franchise. 
TPWS Train Protection & Warning System - audio frequency based intermittent 
automatic train protection system installed on most British main line railways. 
UERL The Underground Electric Railways of London Ltd. - the holding company set 
up in 1902 to finance the electrification of the District Railway and the 
completion of the Bakerloo, Piccadilly and Hampstead tube railways then 
under construction. It became known as ‘the Underground Group'' and it later 
absorbed some London bus and tram operations. Also known internally as ‘the 
Combine’. 
UK United Kingdom (Great Britain and Northern Ireland) 
V Volt, unit of voltage. 
W&C Waterloo & City Railway - built by the London & South Western Railway as a 
tube connection between its main London station and the City. Opened in 1898 
and absorbed into London Underground on 1st April 1994. 
WCML West Coast Main Line 
WJS Watford Joint Stock - a Tube stock fleet partially owned by the LNWR and 
partly by the LER. It was delivered in 1920 to work the Bakerloo service to 
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This thesis originates in the author's observation over more than 20 years that there 
have been regular instances of serious project failures in the railway industry, due to 
inadequately competent management. The study therefore looks to the past to find 
why in recent decades mature organisations like Network Rail and London 
Underground (LU) have tried to introduce inappropriately radical technologies, with 
the consequence that major projects have overrun in time and cost. These historical 
insights are then used to suggest ways in which future projects can be better 
developed, planned and implemented. 
The focus is on LU because, as a former employee, the author has a deep knowledge 
of that railway's engineering development. Many years ago, he noted a long-standing 
pattern: many standards and methods adopted in the early 20th century were still 
considered fit for purpose in the 21st century. Indeed, through what we should now 
call incremental development and recycling, very old and technically outdated 
equipment was still being successfully used. He thus wanted to find out if the 
knowledge of this combination of technological change and stasis might help present-
day engineers and managers come to a better understanding of railway systems, form 
better strategies for future enhancements, and thus aid effective planning for project 
development and management. 
The writer of this thesis argues that observed patterns of historical engineering and 
operational development do indeed have the potential to suggest robust strategies for 
future technological development on LU and other railways. The successful evolution 
of railway engineering systems will depend on railway managers developing training 
and knowhow preservation programmes that ensure that historical knowledge is never 
lost at the corporate level and is always passed on to current and future generations of 
engineers and engineering managers. 
1.2 Context 
A railway is a transport system that uses a fixed guideway on or in a purpose-built 
civil engineering structure and that is designed to carry passengers and/or freight in 
trains of specially designed coaches or wagons. As an integrated system, the railway 
requires constituents with a high level of engineering and operational integrity in 
order to provide a reliable and safe service for its customers. This high level of 
integrity is achieved only if the design, procurement, installation, control and 
maintenance of the system are carried out by companies and personnel with the right 
level of education, training, expertise and experience. The railway also requires the 
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support of society, government and local authorities. All this creates a diverse set of 
stakeholders. 
The railway system is made up of a number of diverse subsystems and components, 
each of which has an interface and interactions with one or more of the other 
subsystems and components. In broad engineering terms, the main constituents of a 
railway are civil engineering structures, mechanical, electrical and electronic 
engineering elements (for power supply, traction and signalling control purposes), 
telecommunications equipment, data management and building management systems, 
as well as emergency and evacuation systems. Each of these main constituents 
contains several more subsystems that, equally, must interface with each other within 
their own host and often, with other main components.  
The complexity of the railway system and its need for high integrity engineering leads 
to high construction and equipment costs but these are mitigated to some extent by 
many of the assets having a long life. Thus, civil engineering structures may last for 
100 years and longer, buildings for 60 years or more and rolling stock for 40 years or 
more. This longevity results in a need for good asset management and for a thorough 
understanding of the original concepts for and subsequent changes to the assets and to 
their operation. In the past, there had been a culture of career-long service for staff 
within the railways which aided the development and retention of experience over 
long periods. Almost fortuitously, this resulted in a body of tacit corporate knowledge 
that allowed an informed management of assets and their replacement. Such life-long 
commitment to a single industry has ceased to be common and, thus, corporate 
knowledge is no longer created by default.  
In Britain, there are two principal railway networks, namely, the main line system 
managed by Network Rail as an arm of the Department for Transport (DfT) and the 
London Underground (LU), managed within Transport for London (TfL). When the 
main line railways were de-nationalised in the mid-1990s, what had been a holistic 
system was fragmented and train service operators were separated from infrastructure 
managers. Mainline operations were broken up into separate commercial franchises 
while the infrastructure manager acted as the railway system’s landlord. As a result, 
there were many changes to management and personnel across all disciplines within 
the business and many experienced staff left the industry or took on new roles that did 
not align with their experience. A similar loss of tacit corporate knowledge befell 
London Underground because of the failed Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) and 
subsequent reorganisations, aimed at reducing the cost base of the organisation. 
In addition to the loss of experienced personnel on the railways over the past 20 years, 
there has been a shift in employment expectations, as mentioned above, away from 
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long service with one company towards employees spending relatively short periods 
in one job in an industry or with a single company. This has led to much movement of 
staff into and out of the railway industry and between companies within the industry. 
The apparent result has been a loss of corporate knowledge and experience and this 
may have contributed to some major project failures (Elliott, 2014). 
Even day to day operations have come in for regular criticism. Chris Green, a well-
known, long serving, professional railwayman and former chief executive of Virgin 
Trains, quoted by Strangleman, said: “The collapse in professional delivery has been 
the biggest surprise in rail privatisation. Simple things that railway people once did 
without thinking have now become a major crisis.” (Strangleman, 2004, p. 164). In 
this statement, Green expresses a perception commonly held amongst experienced 
and long-serving railway professionals in Britain that, since privatisation, the quality 
of railway management has been diluted by the influx of a new breed of ‘business 
managers’ most of whom have no railway experience or training (Strangleman, 2004 
pp. 164-167). As a result, simple mistakes are being made that have caused and still 
cause serious problems for railway system performance and that, in some cases, have 
led to the deaths of passengers or staff, e.g., in the Hatfield accident of 17 October 
2000 (ORR, 2006) and the Grayrigg derailment of 27 February 2007 (RAIB, 2011). 
Whilst the views of Green and others might be viewed as confirmed by incidents like 
Hatfield, in reality, it is likely that there were other forces at work that were equally or 
similarly to blame, e.g., commercial priorities in the case of Hatfield and increased 
service levels in the case of Grayrigg. What is widely held, however, is that existing 
corporate or tacit knowledge is often seen by new or incoming management as ‘old 
railway’ or ‘not the way we are going to do things now’ and, as a result, it is ignored 
or allowed to fade away, only to be found to be essential again shortly thereafter 
(Strangleman, 2004, p 144 et seq.).  
1.3 Project Failures and their Consequences 
This section briefly reviews some of the more egregious project failures of the last 
thirty years, where it is plausible that a loss of corporate memory was at least partly 
responsible. 
1.3.1 Mainline Example 1: WCML Modernisation 
In comparatively modern history, the West Coast Main Line (WCML) upgrade 
project is perhaps the worst example of railway management failings arising from a 
lack of experience, knowledge and knowhow that resulted in a lack of control. The 
upgrade had its roots in a pre-privatisation understanding that the line, running 
between London (Euston) and Glasgow and electrified in stages between 1966 and 
1972, was in urgent need of rehabilitation and greater capacity. Much of the 
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infrastructure was approaching 30 years in age and, for many years, insufficient 
funding had been provided to allow adequate maintenance (Butcher, 2010). 
Privatisation of the railways in the mid-1990s had led to the formation of Railtrack in 
1994 and this organisation took over responsibility for the WCML modernisation. In 
their first appraisal of the upgrade needed to provide replacement of the power supply, 
track improvements and new signalling of the ‘moving block’ type, Railtrack 
proposed, in 1997, an initial budget of £750million (Butcher, 2010). The planned 
adoption of the ‘moving block’ train control system had been promoted by a senior 
engineer who expected cost savings and a significant increase in capacity by doing 
away with lineside signals. 
In 1998, an agreement was reached between Railtrack and the Virgin Rail Group 
(VRG), who operated the privatised West Coast passenger franchise. It included the 
introduction of the new signalling and new trains running at 140 miles per hour (the 
Pendolinos). The budget was now set at £2.5billion, a demonstration that the 
£750million of the previous year had been seriously underestimated. By 2001, it was 
obvious that neither the infrastructure modernisation nor the new trains would be 
ready for delivery in 2002 as set out in the agreement (NAO, 2006). Interestingly, 
VRG, managed by experienced railway staff, had insisted on a very high level of 
damages when it agreed to the upgrade contract with Railtrack.  
Alongside the totally inadequate management of the aftermath of the Hatfield 
accident, also caused by a lack of expertise, Railtrack’s failings in this project played 
a significant part in the government’s decision to force the organisation into 
administration in October 2001. At this point, cost estimates had risen to more than 
£10 billion and the project was two years behind schedule (Crompton and Juke, 2007). 
By May 2002, Railtrack’s projection of the programme’s final cost had risen from 
£2.5 billion to £14.5 billion, with the first stage of implementation due in May 2006. 
The scheme for moving block signalling had been dropped by now, but it had already 
cost £350 million. Eventually, upon completion of a substantial part of the project in 
December 2008, the final cost was stated to be £8.8billion but another £1billion of 
electrification works was needed to complete the power upgrade (Butcher, 2010). 
The project governance of the WCML upgrade had failed because there was little 
engineering expertise at board level, the company had believed in outsourcing 
everything, including technical advice, and its project management capacity proved 
inadequate for dealing with the additional interfaces caused by the need to co-ordinate 
multiple levels of consultants, contractors and subcontractors. Another element was 
the need to make compensation payments to TOCs. By the end of its existence, 
Railtrack projects were costing two to three times as much in real terms as BR had 
paid.  Even today, in 2017, the lack of railway experience and knowledge which 
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caused this collapse has not yet been properly overcome. 
1.3.2 Mainline Example 2: GWR Main Line Electrification 
In 2009, the UK Department for Transport announced that the Great Western main 
line (GWML) would be electrified between London and Cardiff and that this and 
other routes would be operated by a combination of electric and bi-mode high speed 
trains. The original cost for the electrification of the route was widely reported as 
£874 million. By 2016, this had risen to £2.1 billion (NAO, 2016, p. 4). A wide range 
of reasons for the increase were listed in the NAO report (2016) and can be 
summarised as follows: 
• Lack of integrated planning by the DfT; 
• The Network Rail schedule was unrealistic; 
• Absence of allowances for planning permissions; 
• The decision to redesign the overhead line system; 
• Lack of bottom up estimating of costs;  
• Lack of integration for new technology, (NAO, 2016). 
In this example of management failings, the absence of the correct type of expertise at 
middle and upper management levels and the lack of engineers and planners with 
sufficient experience was given as the main reason for the huge increases in costs, an 
extension of the project’s duration by several years and curtailment of the extension 
of electrification from Cardiff to Swansea.  
The failings of the GWR electrification have caused a significant change in 
government policy: in July 2017, it was decided to use bi-mode trains over many 
miles of route that would no longer be electrified. Thus, managerial failings led to the 
abandonment by the UK government of their electrification policy in favour of diesel 
traction. This cannot be acceptable in an era when there is a world-wide commitment 
to the reduction in fossil fuels and it is essential that lessons are learned from the 
history of projects like this. 
Although London Underground (LU) was not moved out of state management at the 
same time as the main line railways, a Public Private Partnership (PPP) engineering 
and maintenance contracting arrangement was introduced in stages from the late 
1990s and the resulting changes to management and the effects on personnel and on 
the LU system were very similar to those experienced on the mainline network. The 
PPP system collapsed in 2008 and, since then, LU has brought its engineering back in 
house. Two specific examples of LU project failure are introduced here. 
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1.3.3 London Underground Example 1: Jubilee Line Extension 
In February 1990, after several years of political and financial manoeuvring, work 
was started on the extension of the London Underground Jubilee line from Green Park 
to Stratford, involving 16 km of new railway construction, mostly in deep level tube 
tunnels, new stations, new trains and a new train control system. The story of the 
extension and its construction are ably described in the book, ‘Jubilee Line extension, 
from concept to completion’, by Bob Mitchell (2003) so it will suffice here for the 
author to reveal that he was involved with the project and the later issues resulting 
from it. 
The project started well, according to Ove Arup, (cited in Allsop et al. 2008) with a 
budget of £2.1 billion and a timescale of 53 months but it ended after 74 months in 
December 1999, having cost £3.5 billion. The problems were largely related to the 
mechanical and electrical installations and, in particular, to the integration of the new 
signalling intended for the line with other technical systems.  
The LU engineering director of the time insisted that the whole line should be 
equipped with ‘moving block’ signalling, at that time an untried and untested system, 
which was to rely on radio transmission of movement authorities and train based 
navigation and positioning. The proposal was aimed at a 100 second headway at peak 
times, something the Underground had wanted to do but had not achieved 
successfully with modern train control techniques1. Westinghouse Signals Ltd. had 
persuaded the engineering director that they could develop and deliver such a system 
and the author recalls heated conversations with him as to the wisdom of trying the 
system without “testing it in anger somewhere first”, whether it would offer the 
projected benefits and how it would be accepted by London Underground’s own 
signalling engineers from a safety perspective. Had the memory of the extensive pre-
service testing carried out in the mid-1960s, during the development of the Victoria 
line ATC system, been retained, a more rational approach might have prevailed and 
much money saved.  
Eventually, Westinghouse admitted that they were struggling with the technology and 
would not be able to deliver it in time for the line’s planned opening in December 
1999. A major contributing factor in this failure was the integration of more 
subsystems into the scope of the train control system than originally planned. 
Westinghouse provided a fall-back, fixed block system which gave a 212s headway or 
                                                
1 An 82 second headway was regularly timetabled on some lines using fixed block signalling in the 
1950s and earlier but was rarely achieved, the service at the end of the peaks invariably, in the author’s 
experience, running 5-10 minutes late. 
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17 trains per hour instead of the proposed 36 trains per hour.  
The 67% overrun in costs and the project delays were widely reported as contributing 
to the governmental view that LU’s management was incompetent (Wolmar, 2002) 
and it was said that this led to the imposition of the now collapsed Public Private 
Partnership (PPP) that handed the maintenance and rehabilitation of the 
Underground’s infrastructure and equipment, including rolling stock and signalling to 
the private sector. 
Ove Arup acted as Agent to the Secretary of State for Transport on the project. Their 
review of the project management of the JLE project was damning, declaring that 
London Underground Limited had failed to apply the proper level of robust and 
effective guidance to the JLE project. Arup’s End-of-Commission Report stated: “a 
client who does not have the experience, resources and capability to direct his project 
manager on a large, complex multi-disciplinary development needs to appoint a senior 
Board member to be responsible for the project. The board member should be 
supported and advised by a group whose members will be experienced in programme, 
progress and cost disciplines and have the authority of the Board to monitor, probe 
and challenge the project manager on detail and implementation.” (Arup, 2000, p15). 
The author agrees wholeheartedly with this assessment. 
It is worthy of note that the senior engineer who had espoused the moving block 
concept for the Jubilee line had moved from London Underground to Railtrack in 
1995 and, as related above (1.3.1), attempted to impose the technology on the West 
Coast Main Line as part of its upgrade programme.  
1.3.4 London Underground Example 2: Sub Surface Lines Resignalling 
The sub surfaces routes operate on the oldest part of London Underground’s network. 
In August 2015, after 12 years of work and a combination of delay, obfuscation, 
mind-changing, foolish optimism, displays of technical ignorance and seriously 
neglectful supervision, London Underground’s management finally agreed a contract 
with Thales for the re-signalling of the Sub Surface Lines (SSL). Thales is supplying 
a system broadly similar to the one they installed on the Jubilee and Northern lines 
with £761 million quoted as the contract price, albeit using radio transmission rather 
than inductive loop communication. Many railway professionals will be aware of the 
sad story that dragged on since the original contract for the SSL re-signalling was first 
signed in April 2003. The author was part of the process from the early stages. 
In April 2003, a contract had been signed between the PPP private sector contractor 
Metronet and a consortium of Bombardier and Westinghouse for SSL re-signalling at 
a cost of £755 million. This was for 200 km of routes on the District, Hammersmith & 
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City, Circle and Metropolitan lines, using the same technology as installed later on the 
Victoria line and now delivering 36 trains per hour. In 2007, Metronet went into 
administration and, after deciding that the price was too high, LU decided to drop 
Westinghouse and pay them compensation of £95 million (Bombardier, 2008). This 
was followed by three years of searching for a suitable system until LU decided, in 
June 2011, to award a new contract to Bombardier Transportation for the same work 
but at a price of £354 million. This was less than half the original £755 million cost 
and had a 2018 target date. It was widely viewed by the industry as impossible and 
undeliverable. The author, in an article for the July 2011 edition of the magazine 
Modern Railways, wrote, “Bombardier has a huge task ahead of it. Its signal 
engineers will not be familiar with the complex LU engineering philosophy and its 
rigid operating procedures and LU doesn’t know the ‘Ebilock’ interlocking 
technology (remember the aborted Horsham installation?) nor the train control 
system” (Connor, 2011, p.77). The Bombardier effort soon ended in tears. The author 
had received word in October 2013 that progress was slipping at a rate of six months 
every three months (Connor, 2014a) and that there was a move to get rid of 
Bombardier. This was publicly confirmed on 31 December 2013 when Transport for 
London (TfL) announced that the contract had been terminated with a £85 million 
pay-out to Bombardier (Connor, 2014b).  
By now, there was only one supplier left who had the capability or the desire to bid – 
Thales. Siemens (as Westinghouse has become) had declined to bid in a competition 
with Bombardier and there were no other bidders. This was “a chalice from which no 
one would swiftly drink” the author was told (Anon. 2013). After 18 months of 
fractious negotiation, Thales and LU announced a contract on 3 August 2015 at a 
price of £761 million with a completion date of 2023 (RGI, 2015).  
There was, externally at least, amazingly little fallout from what should have been a 
dismissal offence, for what the author considers to be gross negligence. Allowing for 
inflation, the original contract price was equivalent to £1.1 billion in 2017 so, at 
£761 million, it might appear that the new contract offers a good deal but it is not that 
simple. The project had already spent £180 million on Westinghouse and Bombardier 
in compensation and plus another £125 million of enabling works. This equates to 
£1.06 billion spent and, in addition, a nine-year delay to the completion of the 
improvements and loss of passenger benefits. 
The author contends that neither London Underground’s management nor its 
contractors had sufficient knowledge of the infrastructure and its operation to be able 
to appreciate the complication and complexity of the resignalling project. They 
expected that an off-the-shelf system could be adapted to handle movements across 
very constraining junctions and short interstation runs, with complicated service 
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patterns. 
London Underground’s network is a complex railway system whose successful 
operation depends on a variety of technologies, partly because it is an essential part of 
the capital’s infrastructure and needs to be cost effective and reliable and partly 
because the longevity of the equipment and infrastructure generally results in the 
systems outliving their management. The longevity often leads to corporate memory 
loss, aggravated in more recent times by the dispersal of railway management under 
privatisation and the splitting of infrastructure management from operational 
management. It is further aggravated by the changing social structure of work in the 
railway industry, where ‘a job for life’ is no longer the norm and job changes are an 
increasing occurrence in the life of an individual.  
1.4 Problem Statement 
Given the examples of the projects described above and other less than satisfactory 
projects, both from his own experience and his research into railway history, the 
author suggests that railway management is regularly failing to deliver engineering 
projects and solutions that are cost effective, that meet the stakeholders’ requirements 
and that are delivered on time. Not only that but managers also fail to learn lessons 
from previous successes and failures and sometimes carry their misconceptions or 
lack of understanding from one failed project into another. There is a real risk that 
such failures will be repeated. 
There are far too many instances of railway projects that are poorly specified, 
underestimated from a cost or time point of view, badly executed or that do not 
deliver the expected outcomes. Few people in the industry today have the experience 
or the breadth of historical and current knowledge and understanding that is required 
to inform projects where systems are being changed or developed. In addition, 
corporate historical knowledge is often ignored, even when it is retained within the 
organisation, because staff do not know it exists, they cannot find it or because they 
cannot see the need to consult it.  
The problem is that, since many railway organisations have become fractured and 
compartmentalised, historical data is fragmented and therefore difficult to locate. It is 
held in many places, it lacks continuity and, where it is available, it is often viewed 
out of context. As a result, it is rarely used and cannot underpin the project decision 
making processes, leading to failures.  
The problem gives rise to several questions: can one link project failures to loss of 
knowledge? Can one track the flow of corporate knowledge through historical data? 
Does the loss of corporate engineering and operations history exist in other fields?  
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This leads to the argument that an accessible historical narrative on past engineering 
and operational evolution is needed to support a good, robust strategy for the future 
development of a railway. In order to achieve this, the study considers whether it is 
possible to create systematically an accessible narrative of the history of the 
operational and engineering evolution of an organisation that includes the reasons for 
the associated decisions and the resultant learning. 
1.5 Aim and Objectives 
Given the questions above, the aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that, by 
understanding the history and evolution of a large and diverse technological and 
operational system, it should be possible to produce a useful historical narrative to 
support decision making in the future development and progress of railway projects 
and to reduce the risk of failures as described above. This historical narrative could 
then be used to aid planning for new systems or installations, guide the introduction of 
future technologies or the employment of new operational strategies for the railway, 
provide improved domain knowledge and provide useful information for the staff 
tasked with project development.  
This argument is developed through a detailed study of various aspects of the 
technical systems on LU's rolling stock between 1890 and 2015. The main aim is to 
understand how and why these systems evolved and then suggest how this historical 
knowledge might be used to improve future technological innovation on LU. The 
Underground's railways make a good case study because they represent a complex 
system, because the company has a high political and technical profile and because it 
has a history that is reasonably well maintained and it has infrastructure and 
equipment with a long life expectancy.  
In order to achieve this, the following objectives were developed, significantly 
focussed on a case study that draws on the author’s personal experience and 
knowledge gained within London Underground and his observation of the evolution 
of this major technical and operational system over a period of 50 years: 
1) To establish a view on the current knowledge of railway systems, corporate learning 
and organisational development; 
2) To locate repositories of information that relate to the way railway systems were 
developed; 
3) To review these sources and evaluate for relevance and context, identify trends in the 
ways in which systems were developed and the drivers of development and what the 
results were; 
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4) To determine whether corporate memory loss and path dependency experiences in the 
wider business and engineering worlds showed any similarity to those experienced in 
the railway industry. 
5) To demonstrate that it is feasible to produce a useable historical narrative that is 
continuous, sequenced, integrated, contextualised and is accessible. 
6) To show that the narrative can be used beneficially and profitably. 
In parallel, the author has also noted the results of changes to management that might 
have had an influence on the development of the London Underground and the 
progress of its projects and how these might have affected the corporate memory. A 
search was conducted for sources relating to the theory of technological history and 
the foundations of the theory of path dependency and how these relate to the case 
study.  
1.6 Overview of Work Done 
This thesis is based on research carried out on the history of 125 years of electric 
rolling stock development on London Underground. The primary source of 
information was the constituent companies’ records based at various locations around 
London. Some of these records included company board papers and minutes of 
meetings, engineering drawings, maintenance instructions, equipment records and 
rolling stock records. Secondary resources included books, photographs and published 
papers.  
Examination of the sources was carried out over a long period, starting with review of 
a number of books on the development of rolling stock design on London 
Underground and on the development of London Underground as a system. This was 
followed by researching the company records available in public records offices and 
by examining the internal records through the author’s employment on London 
Underground. 
The data from the research was divided into subject streams so that the evolution of 
particular rolling stock systems could be compared over the period of review, in order 
to detect and clarify trends. Three of these streams were selected for their diversity, 
namely, electric traction control, car body design and bogie design, in order to obtain 
a robust sample for the research. Based on this data, a useable historical narrative was 
produced along with recommendation for its use in managing the future development 
of the organisation. 
The author also discussed his research with many peers and colleagues, notably to 
identify how learning from history could be integrated into modern approaches to 
system operation, such as configuration management, rich requirements and rich 
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traceability. 
1.7 Overview of Methods Used 
The research for this thesis was exploratory and qualitative in nature, comprising a 
literature review, a case study and participant observation of practice. The literature 
sources included: 
• Books and reports from different sources; 
• Company records and archive information; 
• Academic journal papers; 
• Opinion pieces and articles in the railway press; 
• Monographs. 
The case study is based on London Underground and the development of its rolling 
stock and comprises a document analysis of relevant company board meeting minute 
books and reports, internal documentation from London Underground and its 
predecessors, project reports, workshop instructions, engineering drawings and 
photographs. Some of the company records were accessed from British Transport 
Historical Records and these include London Underground constituent companies’ 
minute books. 
Participant observation was provided through 25 years of the author’s direct 
employment on London Underground, employment with a manufacturer of LU rolling 
stock and six years as a consultant for LU projects. 
During the course of the research, a triangulation exercise was conducted as more 
information became available and a number of new books were published, thus 
covering a range of approaches to describing the history and evolution of London 
Underground. These were brought into the research and were used as a comparator 
against the sources already used.  
The data collected was analysed for patterns in the evolution of the rolling stock and 
for evidence of learning from experience. Changes in strategy were noted for each of 
the various railway companies that formed London Underground until 1933. 
Comparisons were made and trends noted. Various problems in rolling stock use were 
detected and further research was conducted to see if or how they were solved.  
As could have been expected, the author noted some discrepancies in the recorded 
descriptions of events or systems and, therefore, he compared different sources to 
reduce the risk of errors or to validate dubious statements. Photographs were included 
in the research to aid identification of designs and technical solutions. In all cases the 
author used his experience to judge reasonableness of statements or records read. 
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A review of the literature was also carried out to determine what had already been 
researched in respect of the use of learning and experience in the railway industry. 
The author also included literature relating to corporate knowledge and how it was 
managed. 
1.8 Overview of Findings and Conclusions 
The thesis demonstrates that a useable historical narrative can be produced. The 
principal contribution to knowledge is that the author shows clear examples which 
demonstrate how the use of domain knowledge and the history of development has 
provided useful guidance for new projects.  
This work is centred on a case study that describes the evolution of some of the 
systems used on the London Underground network during the 125 years of its electric 
traction history. It shows that this history has shaped the system and is still shaping it 
today. One example in the case study is provided by the development of electric 
traction control on LU where the investigation showed that, after 20 years of relying 
on a sole supplier, trials with alternative suppliers were undertaken. Unexpectedly, 
these demonstrated the superiority of the products of the original supplier and guided 
the procurement of new systems for the next 50 years. Another example concerns the 
evolution of the car body design and the associated features, such as the arrangements 
for seating and door positions and the operation of powered doors, where the 
experience of increasing traffic and the management of station dwell times showed 
the need for more doorways at the expense of seating. It also informed the approach to 
door safety systems. 
A third example is from the development of bogie design. The original cast steel 
motor bogies, designed in the United States and supplied for the District and tube 
railways in London in 1905-1907, survived for over 20 years on the tube railways but 
were quickly shown to be totally unsuitable for service on the District Railway. The 
majority of those on the District had to be replaced by a completely new design within 
five years of service. The conclusion is that the difference in performance was 
because the type of track construction in the tunnels of the tube lines was more rigid 
and robust than on the surface and subsurface routes of the District. This experience 
informed bogie purchase for the next 30 years. 
The case studies show that, because of the longevity of the infrastructure and systems, 
there is a need for an understanding of past development and experience and, 
therefore, the writer proposes that railway organisations should include in their 
business model a knowledge-based process that is used to inform the engineering (and 
other) decisions that are made during project development. This will require active 
development of an accessible historical archive and of a corporate development 
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process that requires project management to include reference to previous experience 
held in the corporate knowledge base. The discipline of systems engineering may well 
provide some of the tools to achieve this. 
1.9 Critical Reflection on the Study 
The author of this thesis recognises that a study of this type is bound by certain 
limitations, not the least being the reliability and details of the sources used. It is also 
necessary to allow for a degree of scepticism in considering historical data.  
“History” it is said, “is written by the victors”. These days, the phrase is regarded as 
axiomatic and, even in a study of the type presented here, dealing largely with 
engineering and operations issues and associated details, it is difficult to say exactly 
what has happened in the past because all that is left for the researcher is the 
paperwork recording the original authors’ version of the events.  
In this research, some of the company board minutes were noted to be at odds with 
what is recorded in the engineering data and there was at least one instance where the 
writer of the minutes appears to have transposed two digits in recording the number of 
vehicles involved in a modification programme. The author cross references research 
details as far as possible with available alternative sources, such as photographs and 
drawings. 
Consideration was also given to the differences between primary and secondary 
sources and debated as to whether photographs should be considered a primary 
source. The conclusion was reached that a photograph is not modified by evaluation, 
although it might be by alteration, and can thus be considered a primary source. 
In more recent times, some of the published accounts of previous projects show a very 
liberal interpretation of what the author had experienced as a participating employee 
and, therefore, he has attempted to find alternative sources on the historical details in 
order to improve the accuracy of the work. Some of the research has used confidential 
internal documents that cannot be published. Nevertheless, there is sometimes a 
degree of personal interpretation applied results, based on the author’s experience and 
his knowledge of the various sources used. 
1.10 Structure of the Thesis 
The structure of this research extends across a case study covering various aspects of 
the evolution of technical systems on the rolling stock of the London Underground 
over a period of 125 years, between 1890 and 2015. The work covers several 
examples of rolling stock developments, covered in individual chapters, where each 
chapter includes a summary of the development and the lessons learnt. At the end of 
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each chapter, there is a summary of the development process and its potential. 
Chapter 1 is this introduction; 
Chapter 2 is the methodology where the approach and the uses of primary and 
secondary sources are described. There is also an assessment of the use of personal 
experience in the research as applied to this thesis. 
Chapter 3 is a literature review. It is subdivided into 14 sections to discuss particular 
topics that flow into the case study and the recommendations. These range from the 
need for order and discipline on the railway because of the nature of the fixed 
guidance system, the low friction of the wheel rail interface and the need for military 
style governance in order to provide safety and reliability. The review also covered 
the move towards privatisation, the subsequent reorganisations, the reduction in 
management expertise and the resulting loss of corporate memory. 
Chapter 4 introduces ’The Heritage of the Tube’ in describing the background to the 
present Underground system and includes details of tunnel construction and the two 
sizes of trains. It also describes the original electric traction schemes adopted on the 
three pioneer tube railways in London. The purpose of the chapter is to set the scene 
for the research and to explain the origins of electric traction in London. 
Chapter 5 is called ‘Dreams & Wheelbarrows’ and is used to describe the inventions 
of American engineer F.J. Sprague relevant to the operation of electric traction 
systems in London and his desire to see the replacement of steam traction on the 
Circle line by electric traction. It shows how the development of multiple-unit control 
traction allowed the expansion of urban railway capacity. It also demonstrates the 
start of the corporate learning process as it affected rolling stock development. 
Chapter 6 covers the introduction of large scale electric traction in London and its 
subsequent technical development up to the present day. It shows how the experience 
of urban railway operation and maintenance in London was applied to rolling stock 
traction equipment development and how learning was applied (or not) and what the 
results were. 
Chapter 7 describes the evolution of tube car bodies. There have been some 
significant steps in the past that have shaped what is done today. The chapter shows 
how operational experience at stations drove the need for improved car body design 
and the arrangements for doors and seating. It also shows that the constraints of the 
tube tunnel dimensions have restricted the design options that have been the same 
since the early 1930s. 
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Chapter 8 describes developments in bogie design and the difficulties in getting a 
durable and reliable system to work on London Underground track. The different 
approaches are described and their performance is assessed. The resulting lessons are 
noted. 
Chapter 9 contains discussions on the literature reviewed and the various case studies. 
There is a discussion on some of the lessons learned from the case studies and the 
results of the research. There is a proposal to use of some of the formal tools offered 
by the discipline of systems engineering to create a methodology for implementing 
learning from history. 
Chapter 10 contains the conclusions resulting from the research and recommendations 
for railway projects and future research. 
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In this chapter, the research approach and the specific methods used are described. 
The research was exploratory in nature, using an inductive approach whereby 
information that had been collected was analysed critically in order to develop a 
theory. The researcher applied a mixture of methods using both quantitative (i.e., 
measurement of data) and qualitative (in depth analysis) information from different 
sources supplemented by the knowledge that the author had gathered during his 
employment. He used this experience to selection, assess and interpret information. 
The interpretative analysis revolved around the identification of patterns and themes 
from within both the quantitative and qualitative information and allowed an element 
of triangulation between the different sources. The intention was to create a usable 
history; to provide an analysis of past events with the intention of allowing it to 
influence current and future policy.  
The analysis demonstrated that a useable historical narrative can be produced for the 
London Underground context and showed with clear examples how the use of domain 
knowledge and awareness of the history of particular development provided useful 
guidance for new projects. The study also shows that similar approaches can be 
adopted for different contexts, whether relating to railways or other long-lived asset 
rich environments. 
2.2 Approach  
To develop a detailed understanding of the subject, the data search included publicly 
available literature and case study company documentation, engineering drawings, 
technical papers and rolling stock records and this was related to the author’s own 
experience of 25 years’ service with the organisation, much of it working with rolling 
stock, as an operator or engineer. The combination of these sources has been used to 
analyse how the management of the technical and operational requirements evolved 
and what factors drove the solutions that resulted.  
The information used fell into the broad categories of primary and secondary sources 
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Type / Nature Primary Secondary 
Quantitative Public Records 
Technical Specifications 






Qualitative Company board minutes 
Photographs 
Experience 
Historical books  
Editorials; 
Opinion Pieces 
Table 1: Categories of Sources. 
The data and information relating to these sources were collected from a range of 
repositories, as detailed in Table 2. 
Type/Archive Population Size Sample Size 
British Transport Historical 
Records 
674 indexed volumes 46 company record volumes 
and minute books 
Acton Works 
Correspondence Office 
Approximately 600 box files All reviewed for relevant 
information. 
Acton Works Drawing 
Office 
4000+ Drawings  
Shop Instructions 
300+ selected as relevant. 
3000 files noted. 
London Transport Museum 
(LTM) Archives 
Approximately 1400 files on 
LU subjects 
Reviewed for specific 
relevant records 
Books in LTM Library 6000 60 selected 
Photographs 700+ 700+ 
Journals Total unknown Approximately 50 series of 
volumes. 
Table 2: Selection of sources from archives and data stores. 
During the early period of the research, the author acquainted himself with the various 
sources available, beginning with discussions with interested colleagues, followed by 
visits to locations where information was said to be available. This led to further 
discoveries of document storage locations and libraries. With each area of research, 
more experience was gained in determining the veracity of the data available and the 
whereabouts of further sources. 
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2.3 Primary Quantitative Sources 
2.3.1 Public Records 
A major source of information for this research was the corporate records of the 
railway companies that were combined to create the London Underground. They are 
catalogued under the former British Transport Historical Records (BTHR), now part 
of the London Metropolitan Archives.  
2.3.2 Internal Records 
Two main sources of London Underground corporate internal information were 
available to the writer during the years when this research was being carried out. One 
was the main rolling stock engineering drawing collection at Acton Works, 
subsequently removed into the London Transport Museum (LTM) collection; and the 
other was the Acton Works Correspondence Office records microfilming project that 
the author had responsibility for during 1981-1982. During this time, the author had to 
select files from the Correspondence Office that were to be microfilmed for long term 
retention. This provided him with access to a data source that went back as far as the 
early 1900s. It included technical specifications, equipment purchase and delivery 
dates and information on reliability and instructions for modifications to be carried 
out. 
2.4 Secondary Quantitative Sources 
2.4.1 Technical Journals 
A range of technical journals were reviewed to assemble relevant papers covering the 
technical development of London Underground rolling stock. Some of these provided 
detailed accounts of the original construction and supply of routes and systems. Later 
papers provided accounts of how trains were designed and developed and the results 
of their performance in service. Some of the papers reviewed contained information 
that could be classified as a primary source and some as secondary. Information from 
these papers has been used throughout this research and is referenced accordingly. 
The writer also reviewed a number of papers on corporate memory, path dependency 
and the theory of technology during the project. These allowed him to form a clearer 
view of the problem. These are discussed in Chapter 3, ‘Literature Review’. 
2.4.2 Trade Magazines 
Throughout the period under research, articles in trade magazines described the 
introduction of new trains and systems, both with and without sponsorship by 
suppliers. These provided useful contextual information as well as drawings and 
photographs. Some contained detailed technical descriptions of, for example, traction 
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control or braking systems and car body designs.  
2.5 Primary Qualitative Sources 
2.5.1 Board Minutes 
Michael Robbins (1967) wrote, “the history of a railway cannot be written from 
minute books alone”. In the author’s experience, he was right but, nevertheless, the 
minutes of the board meetings of the companies that came together to form the 
London Underground system are a useful source of data relating to the major 
purchases of new equipment and rolling stock and, to a lesser degree, the alterations 
carried out on them, in the early days at least. However, there were wide variations in 
the quality and detail of minutes. Also, the dates of the recorded minutes may not 
always correspond with the dates the work or order was actually carried out and it is 
essential to check deliveries and actual dates of action wherever possible. In some 
cases, an order is noted as agreed at board level but not necessarily carried out 
immediately or even at all.  
2.5.2 Photographs 
A careful selection and review of photographs has provided the author with a number 
of useful checks and confirmations of other sources, such as company records and 
published magazine or journal articles. In particular, the LT Museum photographic 
collection is well known to the author and, as a result of his research, he has been able 
to correct some of the erroneous captions seen on the collection’s website. 
The use of photographs has been coupled with inspections of drawings, contemporary 
journals, maps and other published works in order to obtain an accurate description of 
the subjects and to confirm what work was done or not done. 
2.5.3 Experience 
In this work, the author has included some of his own experiences and his 
participation where appropriate and relevant to the case study. The author considers 
that the addition of his personal experience can provide a usefully different or 
confirming perspective for a process recorded or for the results of an event. It can also 
provide background to aid understanding or to offer a rationale for the recorded event 
or decision. In dealing with history, it may also provide a useful validation of how 
work was actually done rather than how it was supposed to have been done. The 
author recognises that such comments are of a subjective nature, inevitably, and he 
always advertises such additions as his own views. 
The author had completed an MSc programme in Railway Systems Engineering and 
this experience has also shaped his thinking and approach to problems. It has allowed 
 
Managing Technical & Operational Development PhD Thesis 
 
Piers Connor 39 
 
him to be more critical in his analysis of situations and issues. 
2.6 Secondary Qualitative Sources 
2.6.1 Books 
There is a large body of historical literature that refers to the London Underground 
system. It is of variable quality. Some is excellent and well researched, such as ‘Rails 
Through the Clay’ (Jackson & Croome, 1962), a history of the tube railways that 
originally stimulated the author’s interest in the history and development of the 
London Underground system, ‘London’s Metropolitan Railway’ (Jackson, 1986), 
‘The Waterloo & City Railway’ (Gillam, 2001) and various shorter books by M.A.C 
Horne on each line, published in a series by Capital Transport Publishing. These 
authors based their contributions on sound research and provide sources that are 
useful for triangulation.  
An excellent resource is a book by Philip Dawson, ‘Electric Traction on Railways’, 
published by the journal, ‘The Electrician’, in 1909. This extensive volume contains 
detailed descriptions of the contemporary electric traction systems available around 
the world, including those of the London Underground railways. It includes power 
supplies, traction control, rolling stock and bogies. It has proved a useful source of 
data. 
Other literature has been consulted and referenced as appropriate, but some of it is 
less well researched and has been used as a sense check against some of the more 
obscure suppositions about how systems developed.  
2.6.2 Opinion Pieces 
The research has discovered a range of opinion pieces and editorials that offer views 
about the development and success of LU rolling stock performance and engineering 
over the years. These have been considered and noted as appropriate. 
2.7 Participant Observation through Personal Experience 
The author considers that researchers will, in the course of their work, be influenced 
by their own experience, particularly if the research is related to their professional 
past and current activity. Whilst they must try to maintain rigour in their research, 
some influences will remain and this will, to a greater or lesser extent, affect the 
direction of the research and how the researcher views his sources and conclusions. 
This may be considered a hindrance or an aid but, it is believed, used carefully and 
referenced appropriately, personal experience can be an aid to research.  
In respect of this thesis, the author has used his personal experience alongside the 
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conclusions from the research for his case studies and he feels that this is acceptable, 
provided the reporting of the experience is clearly positioned as experience without a 
literary or statistical reference to substantiate it. Some useful remarks on this subject 
are in a paper “Research Methods – a Case Example of Participant Observation” 
(Iacono et al, 2009). 
The author has over 55 years’ experience of working in the railway industry around 
the world, with over half that time working for London Underground in various roles, 
ranging from platform attendant to senior management positions, responsible for both 
financial and technical implementation of large projects. The early years of this career 
comprised front line experience in railway operations, including three years as a train 
guard and another 10 years as a driver, dealing with the public (sometimes in hostile 
situations), coping with accidents and failures and sometimes acting in an ad hoc 
supervisory role in emergency situations.  
In later years, after periods of working in train maintenance workshops and training, 
(including graduates), the author was sent on international residential assignments as a 
consultant and, subsequently, worked on various major railway projects around the 
world. The author is currently working as an international railway systems consultant. 
Unavoidably, as a result of his experience, the author has retained memories and 
developed certain views that he has used in this thesis but, as noted above, such 
experiences have been indicated as such without necessarily having a documented 
reference. 
2.8 Analysis 
The analysis of the data and information collected was carried out in stages, beginning 
with the creation of a timeline to trace the progress of rolling stock development and 
its deployment on the various lines of the London Underground. The timeline offered 
a view of the initial procurement and development of the rolling stock and systems 
and this provided a background against which the service performance and success or 
otherwise of the original designs could be measured. Once an understanding of the 
distribution of the fleets was established, a view was obtained as to the success or 
otherwise of the original purchasing policy and how stock performed on different 
lines.  
The timeline demonstrated that the delivery and withdrawal of rolling stock and 
equipment and its replacement showed different trends on different routes and for 
different suppliers. These trends were noted and traced throughout the period under 
study. Information on the vehicle record cards was recorded and the resulting totals 
sorted to provide a comprehensive record of rolling stock owned. The company 
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annual returns of rolling stock provided useful checks for acquisitions and official 
withdrawals. The analysis provided an overview of the procurement strategy and life 
cycles of various ranges of rolling stock. 
Where records showed an unexpected trend, this was noted and a further examination 
of the records covering the prevailing circumstances was carried out and additional 
research using other sources was undertaken. This was particularly the case for any 
significant modifications involving early replacement of parts or systems or for 
intrusive structural modifications on vehicles. A check on a record of purchase in a 
company’s board minutes was confirmed (or not) by reviewing engineering drawings, 
looking for further minute book entries and examining photographs of the relevant 
vehicles. Further confirmation was provided by vehicle record cards that showed 
major items of equipment fitted. 
The next task was to integrate the relevant parts of the information found and to create 
a usable historical narrative. As the narrative evolved, certain trends and links became 
apparent. These were evaluated, commented on and recorded in the narrative.  
The narrative involved a range of different events, systems and technologies and 
resulted in a body of text amounting to over 150,000 words. The subjects covered a 
total of seven broad themes relating to rolling stock use and development, of which 
three were selected for further analysis. The choice was driven by a requirement to 
cover a diverse range of examples for the analysis so as to provide a broad base for 
the research outcomes.  
The analysis shows that a useable historical narrative can be produced for the London 
Underground case study. It provides examples that demonstrate how the use of 
domain knowledge and the history of development can provide useful guidance for 
new projects. However, it was not possible to verify or validate the results of the 
analysis by following from start to finish a project that had benefited from a formal 
process to capture and apply learning from history. 
The analysis provided information for the preparation of findings and 
recommendations for further work and for applications to current railway business 
management. 
2.9 Summary 
In this chapter, the methodology adopted for the research and analysis has been 
described and the type of sources has been listed and categorised. The introduction 
has provided an outline of the chapters and notes how the research revolved around 
the identification of patterns and themes from within both the quantitative and 
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qualitative information and how it provided an element of triangulation between the 
different sources. 
The next section dealt with the approach adopted for the research and it showed the 
range, locations and quantities of the sources accessed during the research. Tables 
were provided to display the data in an accessible format. 
The writer then examined the sources in detail, showing each category of primary and 
secondary sources and then the quantitative and qualitative sources. The sources 
covered official records, reports, books, journal papers, opinion papers, engineering 
drawings and photographs.  
The next section of the chapter described the author’s consideration of his participant 
observation through personal experience. It is noted that personal experience has been 
used to aid interpretation of the information generated from the document based 
research and to provide possible reasons why events unfolded the way that they did. 
In addition, the author mentions that, used carefully and referenced appropriately, 
personal experience can be an aid to research. 
The final section of the chapter describes the approach adopted for the analysis of the 
data gathered from the research. It describes how the construction of a timeline was 
used initially as a framework for the analysis and how it helped to set out the fleet 
distribution and usage. This was followed by an analysis of the longevity of the 
different types of fleets used and of the reliability of their equipment. Triangulation 
was used to validate, as far as possible, the events recorded in the various sources. 
The analysis was developed around a historical narrative covering three case studies 
and was then used to develop findings and recommendations. 
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3 Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the writer reviews literature on the historical development and 
retention of knowledge within the railway system, how this knowledge was and is 
used and what part it played and plays in the development of the railway as a system. 
He then examines the changes that have occurred as a result of the privatisation of the 
British railway industry and the accompanying changes in the knowledge base, the 
continuity of service, the development of projects and the day to day operation of the 
railway.  
In addition, a search has been conducted for literature relating to the relationship 
between large-scale corporate changes and knowledge retention and has sought to 
understand the relationship between railway development and path dependency.  
3.2 The Orderly Railway 
From the earliest days of railway operation, it became evident that, if a railway was to 
work effectively as a business, it had to manage itself in an orderly manner, with 
trains operating in a regulated fashion, equipment kept in a reliable condition and 
operated by staff who knew what they were supposed to do. The principal reasons for 
these requirements were the guided form of the railway’s motion, the stiffness of its 
interfaces and the relatively limited coefficient of adhesion between wheel and rail. 
A conventional railway operates with inside-flanged wheels on a fixed guideway or 
track formed of two steel rails laid to a fixed gauge on a supporting base constructed 
from sleepers2, ballast, sub-ballast and track bed or a continuous concrete slab. The 
wheels of railway vehicles must remain on the fixed rails and thus provide a 
predictable path for the train (PWI, 1993). Deviation from the path is not permitted, 
nor should it be possible. There is no driver-controlled steering mechanism as found 
on a road vehicle, the combination of wheel and rail profiles of the railway providing 
the guidance. Railways thus require special infrastructure components to allow the 
overtaking of trains or the divergence of routes, that is, S&C (switches and crossings) 
(PWI, 1993). 
Whilst providing a seemingly simple and predictable method of operation, trains have 
a disadvantage over road vehicles in that the guideway is not flexible. If there is an 
obstacle on the track in front of a train, the train has nowhere else to go, since it 
cannot deviate from its line of route. It will either stop before reaching the obstruction 
                                                
2 British terminology is used throughout, e.g., sleepers would be referred to as ties in US parlance. 
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or it will run into it. Trains cannot swerve out of the way. This restriction also 
introduces another reason behind the need for the orderly railway, the nature of the 
wheel-rail interface.  
3.3 The Wheel-Rail Interface 
The introduction of the steel wheel on the steel rail in the early 19th century provided 
a degree of efficiency of movement unheard of on a conventional road. The high 
stiffness of the wheel-rail interface and the reduced friction allowed a locomotive 
weighing 4 tons to move a load of 30 tons at 6 mph for 10 miles, something 
impossible using horses and carts on a road (Pearce 1996), even though the level of 
adhesion was considerably lower on the railway. With the continuing development of 
locomotive design and power, speeds and loads increased and trains very soon 
became increasingly efficient but, also, increasingly dangerous, since the low level of 
adhesion made stopping difficult.  
For the new railways, the difficulty in stopping trains developed into a serious 
problem. Originally, locomotives did not have brakes, relying on limiting the 
operational speeds and compressing steam and air in the cylinders when necessary to 
slow down. The trains that they hauled had crude, hand-operated brakes on some but 
not all vehicles, requiring the use of ‘brakemen’ located along the train. Continuous 
vacuum and air brakes, controlled by the driver, did not appear until the 1870s. In the 
meantime, strict rules for railway safety, enforced by various Regulation of Railways 
Acts brought into law between 1840 and 1893, had to be developed to reduce the 
number of what became known as movement accidents. In devising these rules, the 
railway companies used a military approach. 
3.4 The Military Railway 
The inadequacies of braking and the lack of an obstacle avoiding capability in the 
fixed guidance system required a disciplined approach to the management of trains if 
they were to operate effectively and safely. Locomotives and equipment were 
expensive and had to be designed effectively, maintained properly and operated safely 
if the railway was to remain in business. Not all railways achieved the necessary 
performance, and breakdowns and accidents were common in the early years of 
operation. The better railways soon adopted a more disciplined approach and they 
realised also that the modern military organisations of the time offered an example 
that they could adopt (Ellis, 1954; Schmid, 2001). 
A successful military approach was simple: Provide trained men, reliable equipment, 
a schedule and rules. Keep the men and equipment in good order and enforce the 
schedule and the rules (Fiennes, 1967). Deviation was not permitted without severe 
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penalties. In wars, it had been proven over centuries that this strict approach was 
essential if success was to be achieved under combat conditions (Parker, 2005). 
Experience had also shown that the officers responsible for the troops and equipment 
had to understand their business and they had to be adaptable in times of crisis. 
So it became for the railway. With expensive equipment, a large workforce, long, thin 
lines of communication, tight schedules and the need for strict rules, the parallels with 
the military were all in place, and military men had the ideal background for railway 
management. McKenna, in the book ‘Victorian Railway Workers’, wrote, “The 
railway discipline stemmed partly from the needs of the work itself - obedience, 
literacy, and punctuality - and partly from the expectations of railway officials, many 
of whom were from the army and used to controlling large numbers of uniformed and 
obedient men” (McKenna, 1976, p. 27). 
In time, techniques in operations and engineering developed into sophisticated 
systems, led by technocrats and military-style officers and staffed by expert artisans 
and operators. The author was part of this system for 25 years and his career 
developed within it. The learning generated by staff experience was considered 
valuable by the railway companies, particularly as they did not pay for it directly. 
Initially, there was little formal training but this gradually improved into wide-ranging 
instruction both on and off the job. The author was involved with providing lessons 
and the administration of training for five years of his career and he grew to realise 
that companies needed to retain staff if the training was to pay for itself. Companies 
realised that the skills and experience developed by staff with their length of service 
were valuable assets that were expensive to replace. Staff were encouraged to remain, 
not only by pay increments but by offering good prospects for promotion.  
A reliable and able member of staff could get promotion ’through the ranks’ and, 
eventually reach “officer” level (McKenna, 1980). This applied on the Underground, 
which took on many ex main line staff at all levels, including senior management, in 
the early 1900s and these men brought the main line railway traditions and values 
with them. The ethos of staff retention within railway service led to the concept of a 
job for life (McKenna, 1976, p. 31). The combination of the corporate policy towards 
staff experience and retention and the desire of staff for job security benefitted both 
parties and thus could positively influence the system’s performance. 
3.5 Officers and Men 
Railways quickly adopted military style rules for operation and military style 
discipline for the conduct of staff. From the 1840s, uniforms were provided for almost 
all operating employees, with the exception of the most senior officials, who were 
expected to dress appropriately: stationmasters at larger stations, for example, often 
 
Managing Technical & Operational Development PhD Thesis 
 
Piers Connor 46 
 
sported morning dress when on duty. 
Military terminology was widespread. McKenna (1980, p.27) records that Victorian 
workers who joined the railway, ‘joined the service’. When they arrived for work, 
they ‘reported for duty’ and when they left, they were only allowed to go if they had 
been ‘relieved’, like a sentry on guard duty. These terms were still the norm in the 
early 1960s, when the author joined the service, and many are still in use at the time 
of writing. 
Railway artisans and operators were classified as ‘men’ and senior managers as 
‘officers’. This lasted into the 1980s, when the author recalls being informed that he 
was, having being promoted to the grade of Executive Assistant, now permitted to use 
the ‘Officers’ Dining Room’ at the workshops where he was employed. Using the 
facility for the first time was a revealing experience, with its table service and 
(subsidised) restaurant quality food. He quickly got used to it. 
3.6 The Corporate Knowledgebase 
As they grew, the new Victorian railway companies quickly developed a wide and 
diverse knowledgebase. They loved paperwork and documented every process and 
business transaction; tickets, for example, on collection at the ticket barriers, would be 
sent to the Railway Clearing House for accounting purposes (McDermott, 1904, p. 
108 et seq,). Rule Books were developed and staff were required to learn them. 
Everything to do with the operation was written down (McKenna, 1976). Notices 
were issued to staff about changes to the timetable, line, stations, signalling and rules. 
Time was allocated for train crews to read the noticeboard at each depot and a ‘traffic 
notice’, or similar document, was a common weekly publication. In effect, this 
became a part of what might be called the corporate knowledgebase. Much of this 
paperwork has survived and has proved a valuable source for this research. 
The collective knowledgebase included both local and centralised tacit knowledge. 
The railway corporate knowledgebase extended upwards through the management 
structure. Gourvish (1973, p. 77) wrote that, “As the industry developed, so too did its 
capacity to produce its own management material, and the companies were soon able 
to show a distinct preference for men with practical experience of railways.”  
Until the early 1990s, a large proportion of middle and senior managers were 
promoted from the ranks (as was the author). As had been the case for earlier 
generations, their years of practical experience and their understanding of what to 
look for during problem solving or investigations became a valuable corporate tool. 
When problems arose, the right questions would be asked and, when new ideas were 
proposed, these home-grown managers had a better feel for what would work and, 
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more importantly, what would not. This was within the author’s own experience as a 
senior manager with LU who was required to attend executive committee meetings as 
a deputy director. 
The same experience was used in planning and design across the organisation. Chief 
Officers would consult with their staff and with each other when preparing 
submissions to their board of directors for authority for improvements, changes to 
rules or new equipment requiring expenditure. If the advice from their staff was 
controversial or unusual, most officers had the experience and knowledge to refer 
back decisions or recommendations with suitable questions. Those who did not would 
be pushed into such questions by their colleagues. There was a demonstrable culture 
of corporate responsibility involving all departments and evidence of this can be 
found in records kept (e.g. LU, 1988; Morris, 2012)). 
Although most of this chapter has referenced main line railways in Britain, the same 
story was seen on London Underground, which was, in the early days at least, partly 
staffed by people from main line railways around London (Yorke, 1912). The 
traditional railway hierarchy was very familiar to the author in his career on the 
Underground up to 1992. 
3.7 Organisational Change 
Beginning in the late 1970s, there was a gradual but important change in the way the 
railways in Britain were managed. Commercial behaviour, having been removed 
almost completely by the late 1940s as a result of the two great wars, when the 
management of the railways had been taken over by the government, and then 
nationalisation, began to be re-established as part of a Government-backed policy. 
With the privatisation of public utilities like telephones, gas and electricity, already in 
process, railways were being considered as possible candidates too. Tyrrall and Parker 
(2005) describe the transition to privatisation as occurring in two stages:  
The first stage of commercialisation was the development of the ‘Business railway’, 
where the ‘Public interest’ was retained within policy but with increased pressure on 
the management to get ‘business revenues’. There was “more commercial orientation 
with emphasis on revenue surpluses and reduced government subsidies” (Tyrrall & 
Parker, 2005, p. 514). To promote this, in 1982 British Rail’s operations were 
reorganised from regions (basically the old post-grouping railway companies) into 
‘Sectors’, like Intercity, Network SouthEast, Railfreight and Regional Railways, 
where business-type directors were appointed and then judged on their financial 
performance (Gourvish, 2002, p. 103-107). 
‘Sectorisation’, as it became known internally, gradually led to a management shift 
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from monitoring operating performance and keeping the assets in working order to a 
more financially orientated approach, where assets were sweated; track maintenance 
was deferred to reduce expenditure and rolling stock was allocated on the basis of 
where it would produce the highest income, regardless of its suitability. At the same 
time, money was, according to Tyrrall & Parker (2005), diverted to providing new 
and distinctive liveries and logos, in the pursuit of business orientation3.  
The second stage of the conversion to commercialisation recognised by Tyrall and 
Parker (2005) was privatisation, when the railways were supposed to become a 
‘profitable business’. Privatisation was written into law by the Railways Act of 1993 
(Bartle, 2005) and, in 1994, work started on the final break-up of the British railway 
system into Railtrack, 13 separate infrastructure maintenance companies, 3 rolling 
stock leasing companies, 25 train operating companies and numerous other smaller 
companies spun off from BR Research and similar internal non-core organisations 
(Harris & Godward, 1997, pp. 82-85).  
With this conversion to a ‘profitable business’, Tyrrall & Parker (2005) noted that the 
railways moved from integration under their intermediate state as a ‘social railway’, 
through a state of ‘differentiation’ under sectorisation to ‘fragmentation’ under 
privatisation. The fragmentation was to have a profound effect on both the financial 
management of the railways and their knowledgebase. 
3.8 Fragmentation 
The fragmentation of the railway system following privatisation was quoted by Bartle 
(2005) as one of the reasons for the loss of the railway knowledgebase. He writes that, 
amongst other things, “Extensive fragmentation has also led to a severe loss of 
institutional and organisational memory unsatisfactorily replaced by a complex maze 
of contracts many of which are incompletely specified and very difficult to enforce” 
(Bartle, 2005, p. 40).  
This issue was also raised by Mercer Management Consulting in a review conducted 
on behalf of the Government (Mercer, 2002) when they deduced that one of the 
principal problems with the rail industry at that time was that they failed to carry out 
correctly the maintenance and renewal of the network, largely as result of a loss of 
knowledge and expertise. 
                                                
3 The author’s own observations at the time were that signal gantries, cable runs, lineside fencing, and railway 
buildings were no longer repainted at regular intervals and eventually showed signs of rust and deterioration while 
weeds were to be seen growing on running lines, even within station limits, something previously unheard of. 
Regrettably, little has changed in many areas. 
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3.9 New Management 
It could be argued that fragmentation in itself would not necessarily cause a loss of or 
even reduction in the corporate knowledgebase. After all, dividing an organisation 
into smaller parts might only move staff around or change their reporting lines. The 
knowledgebase could still be retained, even if the communication lines were more 
difficult. 
However, with privatisation came new senior management. One of the features of 
company takeovers, for that is really what privatisation was, is that the old 
management is removed and new management brought in. Boyne (2004), using a 
selection of private sector companies as a model, describes the takeover process for a 
failing company as involving a combination of ‘the three Rs’, retrenchment, 
repositioning and reorganisation. Since the whole idea of railway privatisation had 
been based on the premise that railways were inefficient and needed ‘turning round’, 
it was inevitable that Boyne’s model, or something like it, would be applied. 
In broad terms, Boyne says that retrenchment involves a reduction in staffing levels. 
This was quickly applied in the railway industry. In the five years from 1996 to 2001, 
the staffing levels in train operating companies dropped by 21% (Glaister, 2004) 
during an era when traffic levels were rising on all routes. Some operating companies 
cut back staffing to the point where they had to cancel trains (The Independent, 1997). 
South West Trains, offering drivers redundancy packages to encourage them to retire 
early, lost so many that they were unable to run a full service and had to re-recruit 
some.  
Another feature of the corporate takeover described by Boyne (2004) is 
‘repositioning’. This was not so applicable in the railway industry, since most of the 
companies had a local monopoly and did not need to reposition themselves other than 
establishing branding to show that the routes were under new management. However, 
repositioning might also be said to include a new and improved marketing approach, 
and this was widely seen after privatisation. 
The third of Boyne’s takeover tools is reorganisation. He says, “the form of 
reorganization that is cited most frequently in the literature on private sector 
turnaround is the replacement of the chief executive or the entire senior management 
team.” (Boyne, 2004, p.99). In the privatisation of the railways, the latter option was 
the most commonly adopted. The rationale for this is explained by Glaister (2004, p. 
2) when describing the ethos of privately managed companies, “Conventional 
disciplines are supposed to apply whereby failure to do well for the shareholders 
would normally be punished through the competitive market for corporate control, the 
threat of takeover and replacement of the management.” In the author’s view, since 
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the railway’s failure to do well was already assumed in the political decision to 
privatise, management re-replacement was inevitable.  
In the railway’s post-privatisation reorganisations, managers, many with long service, 
high salaries, and good pension conditions, the author included, were offered 
substantial incentives to take what was euphemistically called ‘voluntary severance’. 
In effect, managers were told they did not have a job under the new order and were 
advised to leave without making a fuss. The (normally cash) incentives were carefully 
positioned to ensure compliance without recourse to law. Indeed, they were so 
attractive that, like the hourly paid staff, too many left and companies struggled to 
manage their operations. Many ‘severed’ managers were re-employed as consultants 
to assist. The author has made a living from it for 18 years. 
3.10 Corporate Memory Loss 
Railway managers taking ‘voluntary severance’ not only took large payments with 
them, they also took their expertise. The unrestrained culling of senior railway 
management that followed privatisation resulted in a corporate memory loss of 
considerable proportions (Brendan, 2002). Only the three rolling stock leasing 
companies (known as RoSCos) survived unscathed, largely because two of the three 
were set up as a result of management buyouts and all three retained most of their 
railway technology experts. The expertise stayed where it was needed and money was 
made. All the RoSCos were sold on to banks and investment companies within three 
years (McCartney and Stittle, 2012). The media-generated public outcry over how 
much money was made by some of the buy-out managers was such that a government 
enquiry was initiated (Competition Commission, 2009). 
The general lack of technical expertise in the rest of the railway industry after 
privatisation was to leave many of the operating and maintenance organisations 
floundering (Cole & Cooper, 2002). The best known example is Railtrack, the 
original infrastructure management company set up by the Government for 
privatisation. Railtrack saw itself as simply a management company (Glaister 2004), 
subcontracting maintenance and renewals to external companies like Amey, Jarvis 
and Balfour Beatty, most of whom had purchased the maintenance organisations that 
had been created out of parts of the former BR organisation. Few of these companies 
had any railway management expertise left and some of them suffered as a result – the 
collapse of Jarvis refers (The Guardian, 2010).  
The process of corporate memory loss is characterised by Annie Brooking in her book, 
‘Intellectual Capital’, where she suggests that every time an employee leaves, a 
substantial amount of corporate memory is lost (Brooking ,1996, p.9). For the British 
railway industry, the ultimate example of the consequences of the loss of corporate 
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memory was the Hatfield accident. As Glaister (2004, p.35) noted, following the 
accident, “Railtrack all but closed the system: they imposed very wide and restrictive 
train speed limits and caused many train cancellations. Experienced railwaymen have 
said that they would not have reacted in this way and [Railtrack’s] senior 
management received advice against the need to do it.” There followed several years 
of poor timekeeping, falling passenger numbers and hugely increased expenditure on 
‘catch-up’ track maintenance. 
The Hatfield accident and the consequent destruction of effective railway services 
across the country was to lead to the collapse of Railtrack itself and the setting up of 
Network Rail in its place. Network Rail was formed partly on the understanding that 
there was a need for railway experience at a high level in its organisation and it was 
therefore set up with 8 of the 12 members on its board having railway experience (NR, 
2004).  
3.11 Understanding the Technology 
The acknowledged loss of operational and technical understanding in the railway 
industry may not, in the author’s view, be entirely due to the fragmentation of the 
industry and the loss of experienced staff. There have been other changes too. In 
parallel with the changes in organisation have come changes in technology – solid 
state power systems, plug-in hardware, optical cable transmission, GSM technology, 
software based control, satellite based mapping, social media and tablet technology 
are some of these. All have been developed in the last 25 or so years. These 
developments need new expertise and, in many cases, more, in depth technological 
understanding.  
New technology is complex. Power electronics have replaced electro-mechanical 
systems, software has replaced levers and bell codes and microprocessors have 
replaced locking frames and relays. The complexity of the new technology means that 
it is no longer possible for the artisan to understand and troubleshoot a whole system. 
He (or she) has to be a specialist in say, communications systems, train control 
software or computer operation. He can no longer be the ‘signal lineman’, who could 
deal with most mechanical and electric signalling problems equally competently. Now, 
specialists are needed for each system. In itself, this will fragment the knowledgebase 
and this fragmentation, combined with the parallel fragmentation of the organisation 
into separate companies, reduces the integration, the co-operation and cohesion 
needed to make the railway system work effectively. 
What is missing, in the author’s view, is systems expertise. This requires an overall 
understanding that includes both the operational and engineering systems used on the 
railway and the interfaces between the systems. It also requires an understanding of 
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the background and development of the systems and the reasons why they developed 
in the form seen on today’s railway. The long-term nature of the assets – 30-40 years 
being the generally recognised norm for electrical and mechanical systems – means 
that a historical perspective has to be included to gain a proper understanding of the 
railway system.  
3.12 Developing the Historical Perspective 
Divall (2009) offered an argument for the development of a historical perspective. He 
wrote, “Other things being equal, it is better to have the best comprehension we can 
of what was going on in the past rather than none, as long as we are clear about the 
limitations of that knowledge and its sources” (p. 2). Developing Divall’s theme in 
this thesis, the author believes that, in order for an understanding of the railway and 
its systems to be complete, a comprehensive historical record of the railway system 
needs to be developed. This would go a long way to recovering from the corporate 
memory loss experienced in recent years. To make this corporate memory useful, it 
also needs to have a convenient data access system, available to all who need it. There 
is no reason, given the capabilities of modern technology, why this cannot be 
developed, given time and money, perhaps using modern data retrieval systems like 
cloud computing. The difficulty might be in persuading people to use it. 
The author also believes, that there has to be a succession plan for railway companies 
that allows some senior people to be long service staff who have been brought 
through the organisation and who have, as a result, developed a broad understanding 
of the railway and its systems and who have a network of relationships with people in 
the industry. Railway companies need again to provide the right sort of incentives to 
encourage staff retention and development. 
3.13 Path Dependency 
Another area of the research was in the field of the theory of the history of 
technological development. This was an attempt to determine what had been done in 
this area that might aid the research analysis or which might suggest patterns in 
technical evolution that would drive future development.  
In this connection, path dependence and how it might be seen in relation to the pattern 
of development of the London Underground train was considered. The author first 
noted a definition from the Financial Times lexicon (ft.com, 2014) as follows: 
“Path dependence is the idea that decisions we are faced with depend on past 
knowledge trajectory and decisions made, and are thus limited by the current 
competence base. 
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“In other words, history matters for current decision-making situations and has a 
strong influence on strategic planning. Competences that have been built in the past 
define the option range for today’s moves.” 
There is, in this definition, some relevance to the loss of corporate memory in the 
railway industry described above, largely because the cost of equipment and 
infrastructure for railways is so high that it tends to survive for a long time (usually a 
minimum of 40 years for electrical and mechanical equipment, 60 years for buildings 
and over 120 years for the civil engineering works) and therefore the systems have to 
be embedded in the management and culture of the organisation. The whole system is 
therefore path dependent. If the management has lost its understanding of the 
infrastructure and systems it has under its control, decisions about changes to them or 
on their replacement cannot be made rationally or effectively; examples in Section 2.2 
above refer. 
Path dependence is described largely in literature in relation to economic progress, its 
causes and the factors driving or restraining it. The well-known book by Joseph 
Schumpeter (1934), ‘The Theory of Economics Development’, first written in 1911 
and published in English in 1934, suggests that innovation is essential to business 
development but that invention is not. This is further developed by various authors, 
notably Paul David (2001), who believes that path dependence restricts the ability of 
organisations to change when necessary (2001, p. 19) and Rycroft and Nash (1998) 
who suggest, conversely, that path dependence is a powerful influence on the 
innovation of complex technologies.  
In their paper ‘Correlations between Past and Present Transport and Urban Planning 
Policies’, Pflieger et al (2009), examine path dependency in the context of urban 
transport planning to try to see why some cities were more successful in changing 
travel habits than others. From their work, it would appear that changes were 
restricted by path dependency. The author questions whether this is valid for the 
railway system. In the author’s view, there is evidence in London Underground’s 
rolling stock development of both arguments, as will be seen in the case studies 
described in this thesis. 
3.14 Project Management and Systems Engineering 
As a direct consequence of the catastrophic Clapham Junction accident of 12th 
December 1988 (Hidden, 1989), Britain’s railway industry adopted the discipline of 
project management (PM) to improve the way in which resources were managed on 
railway renewal projects. A few years later, the poor performance in managing major 
projects and programmes at the start of the Railtrack era on Britain’s mainline 
railways led to the introduction of systems engineering (SE) to the industry. The 
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former discipline deals largely with the appropriate and economic use of resources, 
while the latter is aimed at creating outputs that satisfy the aspirations of the 
stakeholders at an acceptable cost and in a reasonable time frame. Essentially, it is 
about ‘building better systems better’. At each stage in the process, the use of 
historical data should be incorporated. In the following paragraphs, the author 
provides a brief overview of formal SE approaches, since he will propose to adopt 
some of the associated tools to support the generation and retention of corporate 
knowledge in Chapter 9. 
SE includes a range of activities and tools that are designed to ensure that 
stakeholders’ objectives are captured correctly and that a system delivers the correct 
outputs throughout its life-cycle, from cradle to grave. Often, systems engineers 
employ a Vee process (Figure 1) to develop new systems or to define projects 
(Estefan, 2007). 
Figure 1: System Engineering V model. Source: Systems Engineering and Project 
Management Integration: V-model (Explanatory Note), APM/Incose, 6/11/2014. 
3.14.1 User Requirements 
In order to ensure that the strategic requirements of any project meet the expectations 
of the stakeholders it is essential at the start of the system engineering process that a 
set of user requirements is developed. A stakeholder may be defined as someone who 
has an effect on or will be affected by the project or its outputs (Ryan, 2014). There is 
often a wide array of stakeholders, ranging from the client, who may be the sponsor 
and financier for the project, to the operators and maintainers who will make the 
 
Managing Technical & Operational Development PhD Thesis 
 
Piers Connor 55 
 
system work and keep it working. There will also be external stakeholders like 
landowners, local authorities, environmental and safety agencies and utility suppliers. 
Once the stakeholders are identified and registered, the process of gathering the user 
requirements can begin. This often requires the use of an object orientated or 
relational database, where the user requirements are stored for use as part of the 
project design and validation process.  
3.14.2 Requirements Capture 
A requirement can be defined as the ability needed to provide the output of a project. 
The requirements are usually listed as project specifications. As noted by Githens 
(2000), “The process of requirements specification is very important because when 
requirements are poorly captured or managed, scope creep can occur and imperil 
project success”. A rich requirement approach will provide the necessary detail. The 
author would propose that, at this stage, the historical perspective should be 
introduced into the process so that former requirements are noted and assessed and 
their results incorporated as necessary. 
Once the requirements capture process is substantially complete, it will be possible to 
start on preparing the engineering specification. The process will include going 
through each process taken from the user requirements database and incorporating 
that into the design from which the specification will be derived. This process will 
have many variations depending upon the type of project and its scope. When the 
specification is complete, it will be necessary to validate the clauses in the 
specification with the requirements database. 
3.14.3 Configuration Management 
Once the project is underway, and the specification is being prepared it is essential to 
provide a system of configuration management. This is described as “the 
administrative activities concerned with the creation, maintenance, controlled change 
and quality control of the scope of work” APM (2018). This should include a rigorous 
system of change control. In the author’s experience, the success of a project almost 
invariably depends upon the effectiveness of the change control process. It is 
important that this is begun at the start of the project and is meticulously enforced 
throughout. 
3.15 Summary 
In this review of literature on corporate memory in the railway industry, the author 
has examined the development of the engineering, staffing, structure and operation of 
railway systems and the adoption of a military-style management system. The 
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consequent building up of the corporate memory was described, based on the need for 
system continuity and the desire of staff for secure employment. Moves into 
privatisation and the resulting exodus of experienced staff were noted and, with it, the 
loss of corporate memory and a reduction in technical competence. References were 
made to the loss of railway expertise since privatisation and, in particular, the over-
reaction of Railtrack after the Hatfield accident in 2000, largely due its lack of 
experienced engineers.  
In the context of the influence of history on development, in the literature on path 
dependency, there appears to be a two-fold influence on technological progress. One 
is what could be described as a ‘drag effect’, where innovation is restricted by a 
reluctance to change what is seen as the historical reliability of the current systems 
while the other is the need to ensure that path dependency is understood and utilised 
by the system’s management to ensure a viable approach to the development and 
introduction of new technology. The author’s case study on London Underground 
rolling stock development attempts to demonstrate these ideas. 
The author also reviewed sources relating to system engineering processes to 
determine its possible use to incorporate reference to historical data in the 
development of specifications and projects.  
3.16 Conclusions 
The author’s conclusions, from the literature he has reviewed, is that it is widely 
recognised that the former railway business structure, based on a military style, 
vertically integrated organisation and an ethos of staff development and retention, has 
been replaced by a new structure that has resulted in a loss of corporate memory and a 
reduction in the capability and effectiveness of railway system management. The 
records of the failed projects described above show that there are serious deficiencies 
in the integration and knowledgebase of the railway industry both on the main line 
railways and the London Underground. This recent history shows that the lack of 
understanding of the basic engineering, economic and operational background of the 
railway system has resulted in some serious project failures and has affected the 
future prospects for political and financial backing for railway development. The 
author believes that an understanding of the historical background and past technical 
development of the railway system are essential for a project to stand a reasonable 
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4 The Heritage of the ‘The Tube’ 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter opens with a broad description of the London Underground railway 
system (known as “The Tube”) to provide a background for the technical cases in the 
thesis. Since an understanding of the development of electric traction on the system is 
fundamental to understanding the subsequent technical progress and path dependency, 
the author examines the early, developmental phase of electric traction in London. 
The author’s objective in this chapter is to provide a background for the case studies 
in his thesis and to determine if or where the chosen solutions of the pioneer 
electrification schemes could have been handled differently and what the results were. 
This examination of the early electrification schemes shows that options were limited 
by the technology available, by the conflict between affordability and the system 
offered and by an already developing path of dependency on what had been done 
before. 
Figure 2: Official diagrammatic map of the London Underground system known as ‘The 
Tube’. It includes other lines operated by TfL. Source: Download from www.tfl.gov.uk, 16th 
September 2012. 
4.2 The London Underground 
In order to understand the development of technical change on the London 
Underground, it is useful to review the system and the historical context in which it 
was developed. The London Underground, is the oldest of the world’s many urban 








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This diagram is an evolution of the original design conceived in 1931 by Harry Beck
Correct at time of going to print, June 2012
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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celebrated in style for its 150-year anniversary in 2013, including a visit by Her 
Majesty The Queen and members of the Royal Family and a re-enactment of steam 
operation between Edgware Road and Moorgate over part of the original route.  
The Underground now has 11 lines and serves 270 stations, which provide services 
for up to twenty-four hours a day on some lines. The system is governed by TfL 
(Transport for London), a public body that is also responsible for the provision of 
some main line rail services (the ‘Overground’), London area bus service franchising 
and surface transport facilities in the greater London area, amongst other things. 
The region known as Greater London has an area of 618 square miles and a 
population of over 8 million. Over a million people travel into central London each 
day for work and over 60% of these use the London Underground system. Between 
2000 and 2015 there was a 70% increase in the demand for travel on the Underground 
so that, more than ever before, London relies upon the Underground system as part of 
the social and economic structure of the city. The number of passenger journeys is 
around 1.35 billion a year (TfL, 2017). 
 Figure 3: Tube and Surface 
stock on test at the Bombardier 
factory in Derby. The smaller 
train on the right is 2009 Tube 
Stock for the Victoria line, 
while the larger train is the S 
(sub-surface) Stock. The tube 
car floor is about 300 mm 
lower than that of the sub-
surface stock car and the roof 
is 800 mm lower. A surviving 
tradition on the Underground is 
to identify Sub-surface Stock 
train types by letters and tube stock by the date of order, or close to it. Photo supplied by Ted 
Robinson. 
This area within the Circle Line forms the commercial heart of the capital. The area 
known as ‘The City’, east of Holborn, is the financial district, while the ‘West End’ 
contains the principal shopping and entertainment areas. Until the beginning of the 
twentieth century there was virtually no penetration of these areas by railways but 
then the various deep level Underground ‘tube’ lines were opened and there is now a 
network of lines covering both the City and West End zones and connecting them 
with many of the suburbs. The routes going out to the suburbs rise to the surface 
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outside the central area and, in fact, now some 55% of the London Underground route 
mileage is in the open. 
The greater London area is geographically divided into two halves by the River 
Thames, which flows west to east across the city. In the north-south division that this 
causes, by far the greater proportion of the Underground system is located in the 
northern area (Figure 1). Of the 270 stations serving the system only 29 are located 
south of the Thames, due partly to old railway company economics and partly to the 
nature of the subsoil in the area, which rendered tube construction difficult and 
expensive. As a result, in contrast with the freight-rich railway companies north of the 
river, the southern companies depended very much on local passenger traffic for 
revenue and provided a dense network with frequent services, which had been 
electrified almost entirely by 1935. The Underground was not needed in this area and, 
indeed not wanted. The newly formed Southern Railway objected, in 1923, to the Bill 
for the proposed extension of the City & South London Railway from Clapham to 
Morden, which it regarded as an incursion into their territory and the LER’s Bill for 
the extension was dismissed by the House of Lords. Eventually, the SR’s General 
Manager, Sir Herbert Walker, reached a compromise with the Underground, which 
allowed the LER to build the line to Morden as long as there was no further attempt to 
extend the Underground into the Southern’s territory without prior agreement 
(Croome & Jackson, 1993, pp 150-151).  
4.3 Two Sizes of Trains 
One of the features of the London Underground is that it operates rolling stock of two 
different sizes (Figure 1). This is because, over the long period of its development, 
two tunnel cross sections were adopted, a result of the different methods of tunnel 
construction used. The original tunnelling method, used for the Circle Line and its 
extensions (now the Metropolitan and District Lines), is known as the ‘cut and cover’ 
method. With this method, a cutting is dug along the line of route just deep enough to 
take a main line-sized train and its track (Baker 1885a). When completed, the tunnel 
is roofed over and the surface restored, often with a road-way (Figure 4). Cut-and-
cover construction is still adopted for shallow tunnels but the modern methods are less 
intrusive in that diaphragm walls are established first, the alignment is then excavated 
to a shallow depth to allow the installation of a concrete deck on which roadways can 
be reinstated, following which, excavation work takes place underneath. 
Most of the resulting tunnels are just wide enough to take two tracks, except at 
stations where they are widened to take platforms and stairways. Because of their 
proximity to the surface they are often referred to in London as ‘the sub-surface lines’ 
(SSL).  
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Cut-and-cover construction is still adopted for shallow tunnels but the modern 
methods are less intrusive in that diaphragm walls are established first, the alignment 
is then excavated to a shallow depth to allow the installation of a concrete deck on 
which roadways can be reinstated, following which, excavation work takes place 
underneath.  
Figure 4: Cross 
section of the 1863-
built Circle Line tunnel 
at Baker Street station 
(now Platforms 5 & 6) 
showing the original 
cut and cover 
construction that is 
still in place today. The 
arch and side walls are 
brick. The station 
tunnel was provided with angled shafts at intervals to admit natural light, seen on the left 
section. Note that the track shown is mixed 7 ft. and 4 ft. 8½ in gauge, to accommodate trains 
from the Great Western Railway as well as other operators. This section is wider at 45 ft. 1 in 
than the inter-station sections, where the internal width is 28 ft. 6 ins. Later tunnels were only 
25 ft. wide as they did not need to accommodate the broad gauge track. (Baker, 1885b). 
The second type of tunnel is the deep level ‘tube’ tunnel. This method of construction 
was adopted to overcome the huge surface disruption caused by the cut and cover 
method and it took advantage of the blue clay soil upon which London is built. Single 
track, circular tunnels of about 3.4 m diameter (11 ft. 8 ins) were bored at a level deep 
enough to minimise conflicts with water mains, sewers and other underground 
services. Tunnels bored since the late 1930s were built to a standard 12 ft. diameter on 
straight track and widened slightly for curves (Croome & Jackson, 1993, p. 249). 
Figure 5: Cross section of C&SLR tube tunnel 
showing the profile of the locomotive and passenger 
car. The internal diameter of the original tunnels 
varied between 10 ft. 2 ins and 10 ft. 6 ins but it was 
increased to 11 ft. 6 ins on the Moorgate extension. 
A tube line required two separate tunnels, one for 
each direction of running. The older, sub-surface 
tunnels, were usually double track. Drawing: 
Adapted from McMahon (1899) by author. 
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Stations usually feature a large single-track tunnel for each platform. Station tunnels 
are generally 21-25 ft. in diameter. The greater depth of these lines (an average of 20 
metres) meant that lifts or escalators had to be provided for street access. The 
technology of deep level tube construction was available quite early on in the 
development of railways but it had to await a practical means of propulsion that did 
not require the use of smoke and steam. At first, cable haulage was considered for 
London’s first tube line, the City & South London Railway (C&SLR), but this was 
soon discarded in favour of electric traction (Lascelles, 1955, p. 7). 
4.4 City & South London Railway  
The C&SLR was London’s first tube railway. It was opened in 1890 between King 
William Street in the City of London (near the Monument) and Stockwell. It used 
small, 4-wheeled, electric locomotives to haul a set of three passenger coaches. The 
original, single track, running tunnels were only 10 ft. 2 ins in diameter (Figure 5). 
Intermediate station tunnels were 20ft. in diameter and included both tracks and an 
island platform (Greathead, 1895).  
Figure 6: Scale drawing of early 
C&SLR locomotive showing the 
principal parts. One feature 
introduced at this time was the 
location of the brake pipe 
connection hose at roof level. The 
small bore tunnel restricted the 
height of the vehicle and there was 
no room for anything other than the 
link & pin coupler below floor level. 
The lowest floor level was only 
30ins (762mm) above rail level. It had to be raised in two steps to clear the motors. Another 
unusual feature was the setting of the conductor rail height below that of the running rails. It 
meant that wooden ramps had to be inserted at points and crossings so that the collector 
shoes could ride up over the running rails. Drawing McMahon (1899) modified by Author. 
The electrical equipment of the C&SLR, including the motors and controls for the 
locomotives, was contracted to Mather & Platt of Manchester. The locomotive bodies 
were built by Beyer Peacock, who were actually better known for their steam 
locomotives. The C&SLR locomotives’ equipment consisted of two electric motors, 
controlled through a hand-operated, rotary power controller carrying traction current 
through exposed, live contacts connected to the controlling resistors and motors. 
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There was no driver’s safety device (deadman’s handle) - it was to be another ten 
years before it was invented. In any case, a second man was available as he was 
needed to ride in the cab to assist with coupling and uncoupling.  
These locomotives were tiny (Figure 6). With a 10 ft. long body (just over 3 m), they 
were shorter than the distance between two sets of doors on a modern tube car but 
they had enough power, just, at 100 h.p. (75 kW) to haul a set of three trailer cars. 
For train lighting on the C&SLR, a simple two-core cable was provided down the 
train at roof level and was connected to three lamps in each car. Connections between 
cars were along the roof, with sockets and a jumper cable between vehicles. The brake 
control pipe (later known as the Train Line) was also connected at roof level. The 
lights were fed directly off the DC traction supply and would reduce to a dull red 
glow when the line voltage dropped on uphill gradients or at busy times (Lascelles, 
1955, p. 17). 
4.5 The Waterloo & City Railway 
The next electric railway to be opened in London was the Waterloo & City Railway 
(W&C). This railway is important in this story because it had three major technical 
distinctions. It was the first tube railway to be allowed cables carrying motor current 
between cars, it was the first to adopt the duplex floor configuration for its cars that 
became a standard for London Underground for the next 40 years and it was the first 
to be built to the American standards adopted for most of the new electric fleets built 
for the Underground’s subsequent electrification. 
The W&C was opened in 1898 by the London and South Western Railway as a means 
of getting their incoming business passengers from their terminus at Waterloo to 
‘Bank’ in the City of London. There were no intermediate stations, just the two 
termini. It was built with single-track tube tunnels like the C&SLR but with a 12 ft. 
1½ in (3.7 m) internal diameter. The line was electrified at 500 V DC, using a 
centrally positioned third rail. The larger tunnel allowed the 3rd rail to fit centrally 
under the vehicle couplers instead of being located off-centre as it was on the 
C&SLR. The voltage was increased to 600 V in 1917. 
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Figure 7: A sketch of a W&C motor car, showing the general layout and split floor 
arrangement. The floor level was raised over the motor bogie to provide room for the traction 
motors. The trailer wheels were designed to protrude through openings in the floor that were 
covered by seats. This was the first example of what became the standard tube motor car 
design, which lasted for almost 40 years. Drawing by Author from Jenkin (1900). 
The electrical equipment was supplied by Siemens Bros., the British arm of the 
German company. They already had some experience of electric traction. In 1881, 
they had opened a short tramway in Berlin using 180 V DC electrified running rails. 
Over the next 15 years they developed electric motors for industry and railway 
traction and, in 1896, the company equipped a 3.5 mile long underground railway in 
Budapest (Siemens, 2008).  
Figure 8: The motor bogie of a W&C motor car 
with the cab end of a motor car immediately 
behind. The current collector shoe can be seen at 
the front of the bogie. It was similar in design to 
that of the C&SLR, being a hinged flap. It was 
mounted on a wooden block attached to the front 
of the motor case. The huge motors can be seen 
occupying most of the space between the wheels. 
The motor armatures were mounted directly on 





In the W&C contract, Siemens provided the generators for the power station at 
Waterloo and the electrical equipment for 5 x 4-car trains. The car bodies were built 
by Jackson & Sharp of Wilmington, Delaware, USA. Separate locomotives were not 
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used. Instead, each train had a motor car at each end with space for 46 seated 
passengers and a cab with the power controller at the leading end. There were two 56-
seat trailer cars between them (Gillam, 2001).  
Figure 9: An electric motor with the 
armature fitted around the axle. The 
C&SLR, the W&C and the CLR all 
adopted this design on their original 
electric trains. It removed the need for 
expensive and noisy gears but it limited 
the torque of the motor. This example 
was used on a C&SLR locomotive. It 
begs the question as to how difficult it 
was to fit the case around the armature 
without damaging the windings. Photo: 
Cassier’s Magazine, August 1899, p353. 
Each motor car had a bogie at the leading end with a large, 60 h.p. motor on each 
axle. Like the C&SLR locomotives, the motors were gearless, the armatures being 
mounted directly on the axles (Figure 9). The wheels of these bogies were 33 ins (828 
mm) in diameter and the car floor was raised from the 1 ft. 10 in (560 mm) level of 
the main part of the car to 3 ft. 2½ ins (978 mm) to clear these wheels. A small section 
of this floor was provided with a longitudinal row of three seats either side of the car 
which passengers could access (doubtless carefully minding their heads in the 
process) up a pair of steps (Figure 7). 
The power controller was large – a roughly 4 ft. cube which sat in the middle of the 
cab and protruded through the cab front making it look like an old motor lorry (Figure 
8). The driver sat on the left hand side and controlled the power through a large wheel 
linked to a rotating drum inside the controller box. There were eight power positions 
on the controller. 
The rear car was connected electrically to the front car through eleven power cables 
that ran along the car roofs, so that the driver controlled both cars from the front. The 
eleven cables were necessary to allow the driver to control the motors at both ends of 
the train in a series-parallel configuration. This was the first example of a deep level 
tube railway being allowed to run motor cables between cars. Drawings (Jenkin, 
1900) show that the cables were hung in a row over the entrance platforms between 
cars. They were semi-permanently coupled and suspended from chains attached to the 
overhanging roof canopies. As the height of the canopy from the floor was 7 ft. 8 ins, 
it seems it was quite possible for a passenger to touch the cables.  
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The 500 V DC current was collected by a single shoe attached to the leading edge of 
the front motor frame and another attached to the leading edge of the trailer bogie. 
The current rail ran along the centre line of the track and the top of the rail was at the 
same level as the top of the running rails. To avoid the shoes touching the running 
rails and causing a direct short circuit, when negotiating points and crossings, wooden 
ramps were fitted at each location (see Figure 9). These lifted the shoe 1½ ins above 
the running rail so they could cross without touching it. The shoes were almost 1 ft. 
wide to allow them to bridge the gap in the ramp where the rail passed through. This 
seemingly fragile concept seems to have worked and a somewhat similar version was 
adopted by another new line, the Central London Railway. 
 
Figure 10: Detail from a photo showing a set of points in the CLR’s Wood Lane Depot c. 
1925. The current rails have wooden sections added to the ends where rail cross their 
alignment. The wooden sections allowed the wide shoe to ride over the running rail without 
touching it. The outline of the shoe is added to demonstrate how it worked. Note also how the 
ends of the current rails are anchored to the sleepers to prevent them moving out of alignment. 
The photo also shows how the short, curved section of current rail slopes down where it joins 
a straight section of rail. This is to prevent the shoe striking a blunt end of rail. The wooden 
safety ramp between the two joining sections of current rail performs a similar function. LT 
Museum photo modified by Author. 
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4.6 The Central London Railway 
Figure 11: A completed CLR locomotive coupled to a train at Wood Lane depot. There are no 
current rails. An overhead wire system had been installed over the yard and at least two 
locomotives are said to have been fitted with trolley poles to allow them to shunt vehicles 
around the yard. Date believed to be mid-1900. Photo: Collection B.R. Hardy 
By the time the Waterloo & City Railway had opened in August 1898, another new 
tube railway in London was close to completion. This was the Central London 
Railway (CLR). It opened in July 1900 and ran from the City of London (Bank, as the 
station was called) to Shepherds Bush – the prime route in London then and still a 
prime route today.  
The CLR learned from C&SLR experience that the tunnels should be a little larger, so 
they adopted a standard of 11 ft. 8¼ ins on straight track and 12 ft. 5 ins on curves. 
The diameter narrowed to 11 ft. 6 ins at the entrances to stations where the tunnels 
were lined with concrete. Like the C&SLR, the CLR adopted locomotive haulage for 
their trains, so it was necessary to change locomotives at each end of the line. Both 
lines used the well-tried arrangement at termini where an arriving locomotive was 
uncoupled from its train and then waited until another locomotive had been coupled at 
the other end and had taken the train away on its next trip back down the line. The 
arriving loco was then run clear of the platform where it was held in a short spur to 
wait to become the departure locomotive for the next train. This was a reasonably 
efficient solution for the day but it did involve the provision of an additional 
locomotive for each terminus. 
As we have seen, the CLR was electrified with a central positive conductor rail but at 
550 V DC (instead of the 500 V of the C&SLR) and set with its top surface 1½ ins 
higher than that of the running rails like the W&C. The similarity with the W&C 
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system allowed the Central London to send one of its locomotives there for testing 
(CLR Board minutes). 
With the intention to operate 7-car trains, the CLR locomotives were larger and 
heavier than the C&SLR machines (Figure 11), weighing 44 tons each, more than 
four times the weight of the C&SLR locos. They had four gearless motors, so that the 
unsprung weight was 33 tons. This soon began to cause trouble. Suffice to say here 
that the locomotives caused such high levels of vibration along the line that they 
forced the Central London to replace them, as we shall see.  
The other Underground lines operating at this time, the District and Metropolitan 
railways, plus the Circle line, which they shared, were all worked with steam 
locomotives. The tunnels were dirty, stuffy and full of smoke and steam. Towards the 
end of the 19th century, there were moves to convert the routes to electric operation 
but electric traction was then new technology and expensive. The new tube railways 
had been costly to build and operate and the return for the private investors who 
invested in them was small. This made financing new electric railways very difficult.  
Figure 12: CLR locomotive drawing with known dimensions added. The basic layout is 
almost as built but the air reservoirs are omitted and the layout of the resistor grids was not 
as shown here. It is interesting to note that there are no axlebox springs. The lighting socket 
has been added. One of these was provided at each end of the locomotive. The only indication 
of how the locomotive was orientated is in the location of the handbrake wheel. This is on the 
south side of the locomotive. The driver was on the north side. Another item not shown is the 
steel cover over the twin buffers. With this in place the overall length increased to 29 ft. 11 
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4.7 Discussion 
The three pioneer tube railways that had been opened during the 10-year period 
between 1890 and 1900 provided what appears, at first sight, to have achieved a series 
of steps forward in terms of technical development. However, closer examination 
suggests that the Central London Railway took a step backwards in adopting 
locomotive haulage in 1900 rather than the motor car arrangement introduced on the 
Waterloo & City in 1898. Why, one could ask, would the obvious advantage of 
having a train that maximised passenger capacity by using all the vehicles to 
accommodate passengers and that had a driving cab at each end allowing a quick 
turnround at the terminals, be abandoned in favour of locomotive haulage with all its 
disadvantages? 
The answer could be to avoid the need to through-wire seven cars but also it could be 
in the timing. The Act of Parliament authorising the Central London was given Royal 
Assent in August 1891 (Croome & Jackson 1962) while the W&C was authorised in 
1893 (Gillam 2001). The decision to use electric locomotives on the CLR was 
probably taken quite early on, even though construction of the line did not start until 
1896. There does not appear to have been any consideration of any other type of train. 
They adopted a design based on the electric locomotives of the Baltimore & Ohio 
Railroad that had been introduced in 1895 (Wilson, & Haram, 1950). 
The specification for the W&C trains was issued in March 1897. By this time, electric 
traction was being introduced on American urban elevated lines, where a ‘locomotive 
car’ was placed at the end of a set of trailer cars. The first such installation is recorded 
by Frank J. Sprague (1899) as having been commissioned in May 1895 in Chicago. 
The locomotive car was a passenger car with electric traction equipment mounted on 
it. Initially, the leading car was the only one powered but some systems tried a 
locomotive car at both ends. The one at the rear was dragged as through cables to 
supply current were not provided. The W&C specification was simply a copy of the 
locomotive car concept but with power cables connecting front and rear ‘locomotive 
cars’, although they were never called that in Britain. In terms of innovation, the real 
progress was to come after 1900 with the introduction of multiple unit control. 
4.8 Conclusions 
This chapter shows that the status of urban electric traction development in the early 
20th Century was still largely experimental. In London, the Central London Railway 
seems to have taken a step backwards in adopting locomotive haulage in 1900 rather 
than the motor car arrangement introduced on the Waterloo & City in 1898. The 
answer is likely to be that the decision to use electric locomotives on the CLR was 
probably taken before construction of the line began in 1896. There does not appear to 
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have been any consideration of any other type of train. At the time, they did not know 
of any alternative. 
This was new technology, there was little experience to go on and administrators and 
engineers were still feeling their way, whilst hoping that their investors would get 
some sort of return on their investment. However, the high cost of the investment 
came with the expectation of a long asset life. In this expectation, the author 
concludes that a route to path dependency was already being laid down and that the 
corporate knowledgebase was gradually being developed within each of the operating 
companies. At such a critical time in the early development of urban electric traction, 
combined with the expected long asset life, retention of knowledge to aid future 
decision making was going to be essential for the future progression of the system.   
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5 Dreams and Wheelbarrows 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the development of multiple unit electric traction on urban 
railways in the US and London and provides a more detailed background for the case 
studies in this thesis. The period covered includes the introduction of the multiple unit 
control system, the design of the nose suspended traction motor and the manoeuvring 
by some of the companies and people involved in the development phase.  
The chapter also shows how, in the early days, the lack of experience in the 
technology and systems led to some quite serious technical failures and it 
demonstrates how the rapidly growing expertise of engineers like Sprague, Thomson, 
Houston and Westinghouse eventually led to success and how this experience was to 
provide the basis for a reliable and effective railway system. 
5.2 More History 
Victorian Britain was very conservative in its approach to railway technology, largely 
because railways were privately financed and owned. The owning companies had 
shareholders to satisfy and making money from railways was always a precarious 
business. New technology cost money and, unless it could be seen to make financial 
sense, no board of directors would allow it on their railway. Some railways readily 
adopted new technology, like superheating of steam on locomotives to increase 
efficiency and save coal (Ross, 2004), the use of the electric telegraph for message 
distribution and the adoption of the Westinghouse air brake to improve stopping 
performance (Edmonds, 1908). In the late 19th century, new technology known as 
electricity appeared. Although it was seen to have potential by some, it was generally 
considered expensive and high risk. Most British railways ignored it.  
In the US, many railways also eschewed conversion to electric traction. It was 
technically difficult at that time to electrify over long distances and the capital costs 
would have been too high to see a reasonable financial rate of return. However, for 
short distance, heavily used street tramways however, it was a different story. Most of 
these used horse-drawn tramcars, and a few were cable operated. Horses were 
expensive to keep and maintain, requiring at the very least, stabling, water, hay, 
shoeing and disposal of dung, with vast amounts of labour to provide these facilities. 
Conversion to electricity showed that operating expenses could be slashed, quoted in 
one early case as being halved (Clarke, 1899). So it was the street railway operators 
who first adopted electric traction and it was they who caused it to spread widely in 
urban transport. Some densely used main lines later adopted electric traction but it 
was in the field of US urban transport that the early development flourished, so it is 
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there that our story starts.  
5.3 A Dream 
In America, on 26 July 1897, for one 10 year-old boy a dream came true. He got a 
brand new train set to play with. This was unusual in those days, since toy trains were 
rare and expensive but this was no toy. This was a full size train. He was given the 
controls of the first 6-car electric train to be assembled at the General Electric 
Company’s works in Schenectady, New York and he was allowed to drive the train 
along the test track in front of the assembled officers and engineers of the Chicago 
South Side Elevated Railway. The boy’s name was Desmond Sprague and he was the 
son of one Frank Julian Sprague. He was showing off his electrical engineer father’s 
system of multiple unit control, which Dad was trying to sell to the Chicago South 
Side Elevated (Middleton and Middleton, 2009, p.124).  
Figure 13: Chicago South Side 
Elevated car on a demo run in 1898. 
The driver’s cab is the cubicle on the 
right. Sprague himself can be seen 
second from the left, standing in the 
back of the cab. The rest of the riders 
are company officials and their 
hangers-on. The general design of the 
car was to be adopted for the first 
electric fleets of most of the 
Underground lines in London. Photo: 
CERA. 
 
The demonstration was a resounding success and, within twelve months of this 
demonstration, the whole of the Chicago South Side Elevated system had been 
converted from steam to electric traction with 120 multiple unit cars. Electric trains, 
operating under the same principles that their engineers would recognise on electric 
train fleets today, provided a frequent, high capacity urban transit service and set a 
new system of railway operation on a path of development that continues to this day. 
Perhaps it is just as well they did not know then that, over 100 years later in Britain, it 
would take twelve months just to write the safety management system as part of the 
process of getting permission to operate the railway, let alone re-equip a whole 
railway. Sprague (1932, p. 21), who was not troubled by such bureaucracy, proudly 
noted later that his invention caused the shares of the Elevated company to treble in 
value.  
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Sprague’s conversion of the Chicago South Side Elevated Railroad to electric traction 
was not without its troubles. During the early months of 1898, while the newly 
converted trains were being delivered and tested, one of the cars caught fire. It was 
quickly found that the cause was electrical and that a large batch of the resistor grids 
were defective (Sprague, 1932, p. 21). Seventeen of the 20 cars by then delivered had 
to be taken out of service that day. Suffice to say, teething troubles with new rolling 
stock are not unique to modern times. 
5.4 More Dreams 
In the Sprague family, Desmond had not 
been the only member with a dream. Back in 
1881, Sprague senior visited London to 
attend an electrical exhibition at the Crystal 
Palace. During his visit, he travelled 
regularly on the steam-operated lines of the 
London Underground and he became 
convinced that here was a system that 
needed conversion to electric power. He 
wanted to rid the tunnels of steam and 
smoke and he had a dream that, one day, 
electric trains would do the job. He told the 
story later (Sprague, 1932) that he seriously 
considered staying on in London just so he 
could achieve that dream. He did not stay 
then – electric traction technology had not 
developed sufficiently to allow its use on 
railways - but his dream did come true when 
his multiple unit electric traction system replaced steam in London some 24 years 
later. 
Sprague’s invention of the multiple unit system was gradually developed from his 
involvement first with electric motors and then with lifts. Sprague, who was born in 
1857, began his career in 1878 as an engineer in the US navy. His interests were in 
the field of electricity and, after spending some time at sea and in Europe (including 
his visit to London), he left the navy in 1883 and, for a few months, worked for 
Thomas A. Edison on setting up electric light systems 4 . Realising that his real 
                                                
4 A useful work on the early history of Edison and his involvement in power distribution systems in 
cities is “Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society: 1880-1930, by Thomas P. Hughes, 
John Hopkins University Press, 1983, Baltimore & London. 
Big Bang Theory 
Rather strangely, although Sprague tested 
his electric motor on the Manhattan 
Elevated RR, they did not adopt his ideas 
until early in the 20th century. He told the 
story (1932) that, during his demonstration 
on the Manhattan Elevated in 1886, he 
frightened Jay Gould, the autocratic head 
of the railroad, when a fuse blew with a 
loud bang as Sprague was driving the 
demonstration car. Gould jumped off the 
car and refused to get back on, believing 
that he was in danger of his life. Perhaps 
this was why the Manhattan was the last 
elevated to convert to electric operation. 
Sprague later admitted that he had been 
over enthusiastic in his operation of the 
master controller and attempted to 
accelerate too fast, which is why the fuse 
blew. The idea of an overload relay instead 
of a fuse came later. 
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interests lay in electric motors and in equipping railways with them, later that year he 
set up the Sprague Electric Railway & Motor Company. With financial help from 
Edison’s company, he developed a successful constant speed, static electric motor 
and, by May 1885, Edison was selling the motor under his name. (Middleton and 
Middleton, 2009) 
Sprague was already looking at the electrification of railways, particularly urban 
railways and, in early 1886, he demonstrated an electrically driven flat car on a 
section of the steam operated Manhattan Elevated Railroad in New York City. In this 
instance, Sprague was demonstrating the use of electric motors to drive a train, not 
multiple unit control, which he was to develop later. At that time, he just wanted to 
sell motors to urban railway operators. 
Although the Manhattan company did not take up the idea of electric traction then, 
enough people saw it as the future for urban rail transport to enable Sprague to gather 
a group of investors to put together offers to equip street tramways with electric 
traction. Their first contract was in Richmond, Virginia, where they had to finance, 
build and equip a 12-mile long street tramway, complete with power station, overhead 
wires, track and 40, 2-motor equipped, 4-wheeled tramcars within an heroic 90 days 
allowed for the whole job.  
The contract was signed in May 1887. Sprague (1932, p. 1) said later that his contract 
had a “superabundance of reckless confidence”, especially since his contract to supply 
40 motors was roughly equal to the number of electric traction motors that had been 
built anywhere in the world over the previous 10 years. And, of course, he did not 
manage to open the line in 90 days. There were lots of technical problems, many, 
according to Sprague, because of the poor quality of the civil engineering work and 
Sprague himself caught typhoid fever in the middle of it and spent several weeks in 
his sick bed followed by several more convalescing.  
Sprague lost financially on the Richmond job (amounting to about $1.2 million in 
today’s money) but it was the first complete, long distance, commercially working 
electric tramway in the world and it led to his company eventually getting over 100 
contracts to supply electric traction systems (Middleton and Middleton, 2009, p.83). 
Because he was already successfully selling electric motors for static industrial use, 
he had enough money to save him from bankruptcy after the Richmond losses and he 
had enough for further research and development in electric traction. He did not have 
the market to himself however, as a new organisation appeared in the eastern US 
called the Thomson-Houston Company, based in Lynn, Massachusetts. This 
company, in its British form, was to develop a long and fruitful relationship with 
London Underground as the British Thomson-Houston Co. Ltd. (BTH). 
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Figure 14: A typical product of BTH – a master 
controller, as supplied around 1906, for an electric train 
driving position, with the cover removed to show the 
control circuit contacts. The key operated reverser switch 
is on the left (with the key in place) and the controller 
handle on the right. A spring-loaded button in the handle 
acted as a ‘deadman’ facility. The button had to be held 
down while the controller was in a motoring position. If 
it was released, the power was switched off and the train 
brakes applied. Generations of drivers up to the present 
day would attest that the button, which is still in use on 
the Underground’s battery locomotives, is uncomfortable 
to hold down for a long time. Author’s collection. 
 
 
5.5 Company Twists and Turns 
An interesting change to the corporate relationship between Sprague and Edison took 
place in 1889. It was to affect the way electric traction was marketed for much of the 
20th Century. Thomas Edison formed the Edison General Electric Company to sell 
electric lamps and DC generating equipment for town lighting and his company also 
manufactured much of Sprague’s motor equipment under contract. Edison had 
originally financed part of Sprague’s company and eventually he got together a 
consortium with enough stock to allow him to take it over. Up to this time, he had 
seen Sprague as a partner but now he saw him as a future competitor. The expanded 
conglomerate began to sell Sprague’s designs under the Edison General Electric 
name. When Sprague discovered that his name had disappeared from his inventions 
(Sprague, 1932), he decided, apparently in a fit of pique, to drop the traction business 
and go into electric lift design.  
At round this time, another electrical equipment company acquired an interest in 
railway traction. This was the Westinghouse Electric Company, part of the George 
Westinghouse empire (he of air brake fame) which was in direct competition with 
Edison’s General Electric, offering AC electricity generation for towns instead of DC. 
It appears that some of Sprague’s engineers, doubtless made redundant by the 
takeover, went to Westinghouse, taking with them some of the Sprague company’s 
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ideas. At Westinghouse, they produced some interesting ideas of their own on electric 
traction, of which more later (Section 5.7). 
Thomson-Houston also developed traction motors and, in Britain, they introduced 
their electric equipment for tramcars to Leeds in 1891. They already had a foothold in 
the market here, distributing electrical products from 1886 through a local company 
called Laing, Wharton and Down (Price-Hughes, 1946, p.8). Edison wanted to take 
Thomson-Houston out of the market by buying them but he was out-manoeuvred by 
their CEO, Charles Coffin. In 1892, Edison’s GE company was absorbed by 
Thomson-Houston and Edison’s name was dropped from the title. The new 
organisation was simply called General Electric (GE) and Coffin became CEO.  
In Britain, so that they could expand their market, the enlarged GE put additional 
capital into Laing, Wharton and Down in 1896 and renamed it British Thomson-
Houston (BTH). During almost the whole of the 20th century, BTH and its 
successors, would be the London Underground’s principal traction equipment 
supplier. 
Figure 15: Simplified diagram of 
Sprague’s system of motor mounting in a 
bogie frame. Only one motor is shown 
for clarity; usually both axles were 
motored. He called it a ‘wheelbarrow’ 
suspension. Later it became known as a 
‘nose suspended motor’ arrangement, 
the ‘nose’ being the motor suspension bracket that rested on the bogie transom. The clever 
thing about this arrangement was that it allowed the weight of the motor to be distributed 
between the bogie frame and the axle while keeping the pinion and gearwheel in mesh, 
regardless of the movement of the axle relative to the bogie frame. Drawing: Author. 
5.6 Wheelbarrows  
Sprague’s demonstration in Manhattan of electric motors driving a rail car saw the 
first example of what eventually became the standard arrangement for a motor bogie 
for electric railway traction around the world. It was to become known as the ‘nose 
suspended motor’ and, since it used a 3-point suspension principle, Sprague likened it 
to a wheelbarrow (Figure 15).  
The traditional bogie frame consists of two side frame pieces and two headstocks 
forming a box structure. To add strength, a pair of cross members, called transoms, 
are added. Sprague installed his motor between the transom and the wheelset with a 3-
point suspension – two points on the axle and one on the transom. A schematic 
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arrangement is shown in Figure 15 above (Hutchinson, 1899, p.338).  
Figure 16: A detailed drawing of the 
original Sprague motor bogie 
adapted by the author from a 
graphic in Cassier’s Magazine, 
August 1899. The bogie was used for 
the original Manhattan experimental 
car in 1886. It shows the 3-point 
motor suspension known as ‘nose 
suspension’. It also has gear drives 
at both ends of the motor. This was 
soon found to be unnecessary and 
later models had the drive at one end only. Drawing modified by Author. 
Sprague’s idea was to hang the motor between the transom and the axle, with two 
bearings on the axle carrying part of the motor weight and a third fixed to the transom 
so that the bogie frame carried some of the weight. This was Sprague’s ‘wheelbarrow’ 
with its three mounting points; one in front and two at the back. The one at the 
transom end was called the ‘nose’ and in the early days it was usually fitted with 
springs to further reduce vibration.  
Figure 17: A motor bogie 
from a 1972 Tube Stock car, 
showing the nose suspended 
motor fitted into the bogie 
frame. The motor case is 
bolted, on one side, to a 
suspension tube mounted 
round the axle and, on the 
other side, to the bogie 
transom. Additional safety 
brackets are provided on the 
transom side. The motor 
drives the axle through the 
gearbox at the end of the suspension tube. Photo: Author. 
The drive system was a simple pinion, driven by the motor, meshing with a gear 
added to the axle. In Sprague’s original design (Figure 16), there was a gear/pinion set 
on both sides of the motor but it was soon reduced to one set and this remains the 
norm.  
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Sprague’s drawings of his 1886 Manhattan bogie (Figure 16) also show current 
collectors mounted roughly where London Underground negative shoes are today, 
hung off the bogie headstock. A strange feature of the current collectors was that they 
were in the form of wheels, like the trolley wheels used on tramcars but rather larger. 
They were also spring-loaded to provide good contact with the centrally positioned 
current rail.  
Many years later, in 1932 just two years before his death, Sprague (1932) wrote a 
brief account of his Manhattan electric traction trial and in it he mentions, almost in 
passing, that his system incorporated regenerative braking and that later in the trials 
he installed new motors with interpoles in an attempt to reduce arcing on the 
commutator, a feature which did not appear on the London Underground until 1914 
(Bruce 1988, p.46).  
The design of interpoles proved troublesome at first but it was eventually developed 
sufficiently to see their introduction on motors provided for the 1000V DC Cologne to 
Bonn railway in 1905 and in 1907 the US was marketing 600V motors with interpoles 
(Pannell, 1916, p. 453). They soon became standard in new motors. Regeneration was 
more difficult to activate with the lightweight electro-mechanical controller used in 
the Chicago installation and it was abandoned. 
5.7 Lift Control to MU Control 
Sprague’s diversion into the lift business in 1889, under the name Sprague Electric 
Elevator Company, was to offer electric motors for lifts to replace the steam or 
hydraulic power that was used for lifts in those days. Part of his design involved a 
way of controlling the electric motor mounted at the top of the lift shaft from inside 
the lift car. He adopted a form of remote control, using a relay. When a switch inside 
the car was closed, a current passed up a cable to an electro-magnetically operated 
switch (effectively a solenoid) in the machine room. This closed a set of contacts in 
the power circuit and activated the power for the motor to drive the lift. In this way, 
the high power required to drive the lift did not have to pass down a heavy cable to 
the controller inside the car. The controller also used much less power in a separate 
circuit. Sprague developed his system further into two remote controllers, one in the 
lift car and one on the basement landing. It was first tried in the Postal Telegraph 
building in New York City in 1894 (Sprague, 1899). 
The lift design was a success and led Sprague, in 1895, to see if the idea could be 
applied to electric trains. He called it ‘multiple unit’ control. He knew that there was 
scope for the system on American urban elevated railways, which then operated up to 
four cars per train. 
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Some of the steam operated elevated railways already operating in New York and 
Chicago were looking at converting to electric traction and Sprague was invited to act 
as consulting engineer to one of them, the Chicago South Side Elevated. For the 
conversion, the South Side expected to have locomotive cars hauling trailers, like the 
other lines, but Sprague took the opportunity to propose his new multiple unit system. 
It offered benefits in allowing more than one power car in the train, with the 
opportunity for longer and faster trains, and it reduced the turnround time by 
eliminating the uncoupling/coupling procedure.  
By this time, Sprague seems to have made up with GE and he got friends there to help 
him with trials and to let him use their test track at Schenectady. As we have seen, his 
success with the tests led to the complete conversion of the South Side line. What is 
curious about this story is that GE were actually bidding for the job of electrifying the 
line but they were not aware that Sprague, who was supposed to be the consulting 
engineer for the South Side, was also bidding against them to supply his MU system. 
They were not happy when he won.  
5.8 The First Multiple Unit System 
Sprague initially equipped 120 former steam-hauled South Side Elevated cars with his 
system (Dalzell, 2010, p.161). The cars were typical US-style passenger cars with 
gated open entrance platforms at the ends and ‘clear storey’ (later clerestory) roofs. 
All became motor cars, each with a single motor bogie at one end and a trailer bogie 
at the other end. Driving positions were provided at both ends of every car. This was a 
legacy of the original tram and locomotive car design, where the car had to have 
driving controls at both ends to avoid the use of a turntable or loop. To change 
direction, the driver just had to change ends. 
Figure 18: Schematic of the layout of Sprague-equipped cars used on the Chicago South Side 
Elevated RR in 1898. All cars were motor cars with one motor bogie and two master 
controllers. Cabs were one third of the width of the car and could be folded away when not in 
use. Drawing: Author. 
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The layout of Sprague’s system was rather different from what we see today. Today, 
for safety’s sake, all the 600 V equipment is below the floor. On Sprague’s system, 
the power controller was fitted in the cab roof. It had a rotating drum carrying the 600 
V switches that controlled the resistances in the motor circuit. The drum was turned 
by a small electric ‘pilot’ motor whose speed depended on the current passing through 
the main motor circuits. ‘Notching up’ to full power was therefore automatic5. There 
were three positions on the master controller, basically the same as the ‘Inch’ (very 
slow), ‘Series’ and ‘Parallel’ still seen today on the Underground’s pre-1992 trains. 
The driver’s controls were mounted behind a one-third width wooden screen on the 
right hand side of the gated entrance platform (Figure 18). The controls were at waist 
height under a windscreen. A side screen, with a window, unfolded to provide an 
outside wall. This elaborate setup was a direct result of having controls on each end of 
every car but with the additional need to use the platform for passenger 
loading/unloading.  
Because controls were provided on every entrance platform, they had to be tamper-
proof, so both master controller and brake handles were removable. Later, master 
controllers were isolated by removable keys and had their handles fixed but the driver 
always took the brake handle with him. Some were personalised by their owners with 
elaborately decorated handles. The District imported the idea from the US for its 
1903-5 electric stocks but it did not survive for long and fixed controller and brake 
handles became the norm on the Underground. Only the master controller keys were 
removable.  
5.9 Multiple Unit Control 
As in Sprague’s lift control, the multiple unit system used a set of low voltage wires 
to connect the driving positions in the cabs to the control gear of the higher current 
traction equipment on the train. In the early examples, the current for the control 
circuits was taken off the 600 V DC third rail supply and the voltage reduced by 
resistors. The leading ‘master’ controller was connected by a switch (the ‘control 
switch’) to the wires running along the full length of the train. Other controllers were 
isolated by opening the control switch, which was later to become key operated – the 
‘control key’. The wires were grouped together in a multi-core cable and, to allow for 
vehicle movement through suspension and curves and to permit simple uncoupling, 
they had removable flexible connections between cars called ‘jumpers’ (Error! 
                                                
5 The term ‘notching up’ comes from steam locomotive control, where the valve gear is set by a lever mounted in a 
notched frame to latch it in the required position. To increase power, the locomotive is said to be “notched up”. 
The phrase was carried over to electric traction. 
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Reference source not found.). Sprague’s original M.U. system had a five wire 
control cable; later versions had nine or ten wires when automatic acceleration was 
dropped. The basic principles of the system remain to this day. Jumpers were fitted 
into sockets at the car ends and are usually duplicated either side of the central 
coupler in case a car got turned. This became a problem for the tube lines in London 
because of their low floor height and led to some complex schemes over the years. 
Figure 19: Schematic showing the basics of the multiple unit layout on a 3-car train with two 
motor cars and a trailer. In reality, up to six trailers could be coupled between the motor cars. 
Both motor cars collect 600 V DC from the track to supply their traction equipment but only 
the leading master controller has a low voltage supply through the closed control switch. This 
controller sends signals down the multi-core control cable to the traction equipment switches 
on each motor car. The cable is connected between cars by a jumper. Drawing: Author. 
5.10 Series-Parallel Control 
A feature of Sprague’s traction system was series-parallel control of motors. On one 
of the few occasions when he admitted that something in the railway traction business 
was not one of his ideas, Sprague (1932) said that series-parallel control (which he 
used at Richmond, Virginia) was John Hopkinson’s idea. Looking back now, this 
seems strange because, although Hopkinson was the consulting engineer for the 
C&SLR, he did not use series-parallel control. His original locomotive design had two 
traction motors permanently wired in series. 
Series-parallel control was to become a fundamental feature of the traction system 
used on the Underground (and many other DC electric railways) until the introduction 
of electronic power control in the 1990s. It was introduced on the C&SLR in 1898 (on 
Locomotive No. 18) and became standard thereafter. It was only superseded in the 
1990s when modern electronics allowed the introduction of the brushless AC motor, 
with its simpler design and easier maintenance, driven from a DC supply through an 
on-board inverter. 
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5.11 Summary 
In this chapter, we have seen the development of the multiple unit system and the 
nose suspended motor. With the basic multiple unit traction control setup that Sprague 
designed for Chicago in 1898, we have all the elements in place for multiple unit 
traction that have remained, in principle, to this day. Not confined to traction 
equipment, the same idea was adopted on trains for door control, lighting, heating, 
ventilation, compressed air, brakes and communications, although not all were done at 
that time. Put in modern language, we can say that a low voltage, remote control 
system using a hard-wired distribution network is connected to high voltage or remote 
equipment packages. Connections to the man-machine interface can be tapped into the 
network at selected locations.  
In the 10-year period between 1888, when a viable tramcar system was introduced, 
and 1898, when multiple unit traction arrived in Chicago, significant progress was 
seen in electric traction. In particular, motor power increased from the 7 h.p. of the 
Richmond tram motor to the 50 h.p. used in Chicago, motor efficiency was improved 
when gearing became a viable option and multiple unit control replaced single car 
control, allowing power requirements to be matched with variable train lengths.  
5.12 Conclusions 
It this chapter, it is shown that a number of lessons were learned during the early 
development of electric traction for urban public transport in the US and London. The 
first lesson was, be prepared for things to go wrong with new systems and be prepared 
to cope with them, as in the case of the defective resistors in Chicago. In addition, 
‘Don’t run before you can walk’ might have been applied to Sprague’s ideas for both 
regenerative braking and automatic acceleration. He knew they were possible but the 
lightweight electro-mechanical control systems he designed were not refined enough 
to allow reliable, in-service operation. In the example of motor/axle gearing, a single 
gear/pinion proved to be sufficient rather than the two he originally designed. And the 
wheel-based current collection system, whilst working fine on overhead wire trolley 
systems, didn’t last for 3rd rail railway operation. It is likely that this was due to the 
higher currents needed for trains causing deterioration of the wheel bearings. In 
addition, the problems with the traction resistors on the initial Chicago electric cars 
showed that a good system can be let down by poor materials. 
Perhaps the single most important lesson learned was that new ideas might seem to 
solve a problem but that the engineer must be prepared to adapt his design to suit 
service conditions or even, in extreme cases like regeneration, put it to one side until 
practical technology has caught up with the theory. In parallel, clients must expect 
new systems to require a shakedown period and appropriate time and cost should be 
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allocated for it. The pioneer engineers and operators of the London Underground were 
gaining from their experience as their system developed. This is still occurring today 
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6 Electric Traction in London 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the development of the electric traction systems applied to the 
London Underground from the major line electrification projects of the 1905-7 period 
to the present day. It demonstrates the pattern of technical and operational 
development and shows the path dependency that the system adopted over the years. 
It includes the traction current supply system as well as the application of technology 
to trains. 
In this chapter, the author shows the path that developed in London as electric traction 
was applied to the new and existing urban railways on a large scale. In most cases, the 
introduction was a success because the technology has already been tried out in 
America and it was being installed in London by experienced, mostly American, 
engineers. Failure occurred with the systems that were new and not fully understood, 
even by the suppliers, as in the case of the Central London Railway.  
During this period, valuable lessons were learned that are just as valid today as they 
were then. It was learned that railway equipment is expensive, has a long life and 
must be reliable. It also showed, more than once, that even prototyping does not 
always prove a system. 
6.2 Problems of Electrification 
In London, the opening of the new tube lines with electric traction in the late 19th 
century showed what could be done with modern technology. It also showed up the 
steam operated Metropolitan and District railways as old-fashioned and behind the 
times. When the third of the new tube lines, the Central London, opened in 1900 
between Shepherds Bush and the Bank, it was in direct competition with the 
Metropolitan’s route to Moorgate and District’s route to Mansion House, which is a 
short walk from the Bank. The District, almost always being in a bad way financially, 
rarely ever paid a dividend on its ordinary shares. Off-peak traffic was very light. 
Apart from some commuter traffic from the western suburbs, the fortunes of the 
railway seem to have rested on the popularity or otherwise of the various exhibitions 
which were staged on District land at Earls Court. Alexander Edmonds, in his history 
of the District (Edmunds, 1908), describes how the income fluctuated during the final 
years of the 19th century in accordance with the levels of exhibition traffic. It was a 
precarious railway company indeed that relied on showmanship by others for its 
survival.  
In spite of, or perhaps because of its financial position, the District’s management was 
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forced to get into negotiations with the Metropolitan Railway over how things might 
be improved. Electrification was obviously the way forward and, with their joint 
operation of the Circle, they had to choose the same system. With the long-standing 
rivalry that existed between the two companies, they must have struggled to get 
through the animosity to decide how to tackle the problem. Still, eventually they did 
and they agreed, in May 1898, to try out an experimental installation of electric 
traction between High Street Kensington and Earls Court. 
6.3 Siemens Equipment 
The contract for the Earls Court trial was eventually given to Siemens. The traction 
current for the joint experiment was supplied at 500 V DC, from a specially built 
power station at Warwick Road (near Earls Court), to pairs of current rails (one 
positive and one negative) located on the track. Both rails were positioned outside the 
running rails in the style later adopted by the Great Northern & City Railway but the 
arrangement was never used on the rest of the Underground network (see box, below). 
Figure 20: The Metropolitan and 
District Railways’ jointly owned 
experimental electric train stabled in 
a siding next to the eastbound track 
between Earls Court and High Street 
in 1900. This whole area is now built 
over. The outside conductor rails 
can be seen on either side of the 
adjacent eastbound track. One was 
positive, the other negative. This 
arrangement was abandoned 
because it would have been unworkable on the Circle. Photo: The Electrician, (1900). 
A special 6-coach train was ordered in May 1899 from Brown Marshall & Co. of 
Saltley, Birmingham (later absorbed into the group that eventually became Metro-
Cammell), which was delivered late in 1899 to the District’s depot at Lillie Bridge. 
Trial running started early in December 1899 and continued spasmodically up to 21st 
May 1900, when public operation began. The District charged a fare of one shilling - 
5p in decimal money but actually the equivalent of £4 today. Naturally, the train ran 
practically empty, since the ordinary fare was about 20% of that, so it only took the 
District a week to drop the special fare. Even so, the train never did ‘pay its working 
expenses’, as reported at the time (Edmonds, 1908, p. 178) – hardly surprising, since 
it was a high-tech experiment over a very short piece of line. We might wonder today 
why anyone thought it would give a meaningful assessment of running costs in the 
first place.  
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The train was formed with a motor coach at each end of a set of four trailer coaches, 
all vehicles being based on traditional British compartment style coaches with ‘slam 
doors’. The motor coaches were like the US elevated style ‘locomotive car’, the 
leading coach hauling the whole train without assistance from the other motor coach 
at the rear, which was towed like a trailer. There was no though control and no power 
connections to the rear motors from the front but there was a pair of ‘bus lines’ 
connecting the 14 sets of collector shoes along the train. This reduced the risk of the 
train getting ‘gapped’, i.e. stalled at the breaks in the current rails (necessary at points 
and crossings) due to loss of contact between the shoes and the current rails (The 
Electrician, 1900). The motor coaches had a control compartment at the leading end 
with a power controller operated by a large hand-wheel. The driver sat beside it, as on 
the W&C.  
The Siemens motors were very large so 
the driving wheels had to be 4 ft. (1219 
mm) in diameter compared with the 
usual 3 ft. (1067 mm) diameter for 
coach wheels. In fact, the motors were 
so large that the motor coach floors had 
to be raised about 6 in (152 mm) higher 
than normal over the bogies at each end 
of the vehicle. For passengers using 
these coaches, access doors were 
restricted to the central part of the body 
and, inside, the floors sloped upwards 
to the seats provided over the bogies. 
The seats were longitudinal in these 
areas (The Electrician, 1900, p.163).  
The trains were provided with the 
Westinghouse air brake and an electrically driven compressor was fitted in each motor 
car to supply it, the sanding equipment and the whistle. The Westinghouse was 
already the brake used by the District and it was to become the standard brake of the 
Underground railways in London and, in spite of the fact that the Metropolitan used 
the vacuum brake on its steam trains, it too adopted the air brake on most of its 
electric trains (Metropolitan Railway, 1933, pp. 3-33).  
6.4 Next Steps 
The experimental service went on through the summer of 1900, finally being wrapped 
up on 6th November, when the train was withdrawn. Even while the experiment was 
Outside Conductor Rails 
Having two separate conductor rails, one on 
either side of the running rails, would have 
presented a difficulty if it had been used for trains 
going round the Circle. Let us say the positive rail 
was on the north/west side of the track between 
Earls Court and High Street. If this was continued 
on round the Circle via Baker Street and back on 
to the District at Tower Hill, the positive rail would 
now be on the south side. Travelling on to Earls 
Court, the positive rail would now be on the other 
side of the track compared with when the journey 
started. One might wonder how long it took to 
realise this. For the main electrification, the 
District & Metropolitan used a 4-rail system with 
the positive rail on the outside of the track 
(swapped from one side to the other as 
necessary) and the negative rail in the middle. 
This was also adopted later on the tube lines.  
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still going on, the joint committee asked for a report into “the whole question”, as 
Alexander Edmunds (1908, p. 179) put it, of electrification. They were soon told they 
should electrify “the whole system” and that they would need “two or more” new 
trains on the “multiple unit” system for the Inner Circle and some electric locomotives 
to haul the existing coaches on the branches (Edmunds, 1908, p. 179). It is interesting 
to note that they knew about Sprague’s multiple unit system as early as the summer of 
1900 and that they thought it was the way to go. 
The experimental train was still running when, on 3rd August 1900, nine different 
firms were invited to tender for the electrification of the Circle. It is an instructive 
thought that the tenders were due to be returned by 1st December in the same year, 
while our modern procurement processes seem to demand six months just to pre-
qualify, let alone submit a bid. No wonder our railways are now so expensive. 
Two suppliers for the electrification project became qualified as what we would call 
today ‘preferred bidders’ –BTH and Ganz & Co. of Hungary. BTH proposed the DC 
3rd rail system to become familiar across the world in many urban railway systems 
and with earlier versions already in place on the W&C, Central London and C&SL 
railways, while Ganz offered a 3000-volt, 3 phase AC system requiring three 
conductors - twin overhead wires for two phases and the running rails for the third 
phase. The electrification committee came down in favour of Ganz, without a doubt 
because it was the cheapest offer but almost certainly against the advice of any sane 
electrical engineer of the time (Edmunds, 1908, p.180). Regardless of it being untried 
and untested, just the electrical clearances required for the twin overhead lines in the 
tunnels of the Circle should have disqualified it.  
In the event, the whole question of the choice of electrical system was turned on its 
head by the inability of the District Railway to raise enough capital in London to pay 
for it and having to turn to the US for it, where an urban railway financier, Charles 
Tyson Yerkes was persuaded to finance both the District’s electrification and the 
building of three new tube lines. He set up a company, the Underground Electric 
Railways of London Ltd. (UERL) to electrify the District (Edmonds, 1908, p189).  
Yerkes brought a technical advisor to Britain, one James Russell Chapman, who had 
considerable experience of setting up electric railways in the US, notably in Chicago. 
Chapman quickly realised the weaknesses of the Ganz system and set his mind in 
favour of something akin to the BTH proposal, already tried and tested in the US and, 
as we have seen, adopted by the pioneer tube railways in London. This was in direct 
opposition to the joint electrification committee’s choice of Ganz and it precipitated 
months of argument between the District and Metropolitan, which ended up with 
them going to arbitration. The arbitrator’s decision, which was in favour of the 
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District’s DC system, was made in December 1901. An interesting hint in Edmunds’ 
history (1908, p. 199) suggests that, as is often the way in such things, the 
Metropolitan only fought the District over the DC proposal because Ganz were paying 
their legal costs. 
6.5 Central London Conversion 
Initially, the Central London Railway (CLR) was a great success. Traffic levels were 
robust from the line’s opening in July 1900, with up to 140,000 passenger trips a day 
but there were the inevitable teething troubles. Various reports at the time suggested 
that the locomotives were prone to derailment and there were problems with the 
traction supply system that required modifications to be carried out. However, the 
most serious issue for the railway was vibration. (Wilson & Haram, 1950, pp. 24-25) 
Figure 21: The Central London 
Railway’s first 6-car, 
experimental multiple unit train 
at Wood Lane Depot in the 
spring of 1901, when trials with 
the new system were started. 
The driving cab was added to 
an existing car in the form of a 
new front screen with a full 
width roof over the original end 
platform. It had no side doors, 
just a gate on each side. The car is facing west and the driving position is on the North side of 
the train (the left hand side as we look at it), the same as the locomotives. The driving 
position at the other end of the train was on the same side. (Collection B.R. Hardy) 
Soon after the line opened, a number of property occupiers along the Central 
London’s route began to complain of vibration when trains passed underneath. The 
problem seems to have become public knowledge about three months after opening. 
A number of letters to ‘The Times’ in early December 1900 suggest that reports had 
been around for several weeks by then and subsequent investigation was to reveal that 
the evolution of the problem was gradual. It was found to be due to the high unsprung 
weight on the loco axles and the damage it did to the joints of the shallow rails laid to 
compensate for the oversize of the locomotives as originally designed. The rail joint 
damage built up until it became very noticeable (Mallock, 1902, p.4). 
There is no doubt that the Central London knew that there was going to be a problem 
before the opening of the line. The residents in various locations had already become 
aware of the passing of trains by the vibration they had heard during the several 
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months of testing. Wilson & Haram (1950, p. 24) suggest that complaints started 
“towards the end of 1900”. The CLR must have known that the unsprung weight of 
the gearless motors was far too high and they also knew by the time of the line’s 
opening that geared designs were now available and workable. That they were 
worried by the signs and that they were pretty sure that they knew what the solution 
should be, was clearly signalled by the decision to order some new bogies with geared 
motors and improved suspension. They ordered enough to equip three locomotives. 
Quite when this happened is not clear but it must have been before the end of 1900. A 
reverse process of the sequence, suggests that testing with the new bogies must have 
started in the spring of 1901 to give time for assessing the results and preparing 
conclusions before publication. To get the bogies manufactured and ready, the order 
must have been placed around six months earlier, say October 1900. 
At around the same time the new bogies were ordered, the Central London decided to 
convert two of their trains to multiple unit traction. The conversion involved 
equipping the train with motor bogies and geared motors and providing new control 
equipment. For the two trains, they needed four motor cars, each one to be equipped 
with a motor bogie carrying two motors plus a set of multiple unit (MU) control 
equipment.  
A trial of the multiple unit system was carried out early in 1901 using four existing 
passenger cars which were converted to driving motor cars (Figure 21). They were 
modified by adding a driving position and motor bogie at one end, with the power and 
control equipment in a small compartment above the bogie (Dawson, 1909, 347). The 
multiple-unit equipment to Sprague’s patents was supplied by GE’s subsidiary 
company in Britain, British Thompson-Houston. They used a new version known as 
‘Type M’ control. This replaced the electric pilot motor and drum controller of the 
Chicago South Side installation with groups of individual switches called contactors. 
Each contactor was operated by an electro-magnet.  
The contactor system was necessary because the small switches in Sprague’s original 
drum controller could not carry the higher currents being demanded by the larger 
motors arriving on the traction scene. The CLR experimental motors at 100hp were 
almost twice the size of the South Side design. Each motor car had two of these 
motors driving 3ft diameter wheels (Parshall, Parry & Casson, 1903, p. 29).  
The individual contactors were each fitted with a ‘blow-out’ coil, wrapped round an 
iron core, which provided a magnetic field to extinguish the arc caused by the opening 
of the contactor under load. This action was accompanied by a loud ‘plop’ as the 
contactor opened. The use of individual contactors also allowed better insulation than 
was possible between the small drum controller contacts.  
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The new equipment also lost the automatically controlled acceleration of the original 
Sprague system. The pilot motor was slow to respond and the system was prone to 
failure. With the Type M equipment, each resistance cut-out step was now controlled 
manually by the movement of the driver’s master controller in the cab. Instead of 
three operating positions, the Type M controller had ten. The driver had to be careful 
to judge the step from one position to the next in case he tried while the current flow 
was still too high and he ended up rupturing the main fuse. In later versions of this 
equipment, a circuit breaker was provided to detect overloads before the fuse blew.  
The CLR’s experimental motor cars were similar in layout to the W&C motor cars, 
having a raised floor over the bogie at the driving end, but all the electrical equipment 
was mounted on this floor behind the cab instead of the W&C arrangement where 
much of it was beside the driver. The equipment area behind the driver later became 
known as the ‘switch compartment’. In the first two cars, it was limited to converting 
some seat space into space for equipment. Only 4ft 9ins in length was available and in 
this they had to provide a central gangway, with the resistors, contactors, control 
rheostats, an air compressor and two small air reservoirs for the brakes crammed into 
the space either side. Things were so difficult to get at that photographs of the second 
two experimental cars show that they were built with enlarged switch compartments 
but at the expense of eight seats. 
Figure 22: A drawing of 
the first CLR trailer car 
converted in 1901 as a 
motor car for multiple unit 
experiments. The floor over 
the motor bogie was raised, 
an idea taken from the 
1890-built C&SLR 
locomotives. The length of 
the cab and equipment 
section was only 8ft 3ins. 
This was increased to 12ft 
3ins for the last two of the 
four cars converted. Source: 
Dawson (1909, p.347). 
 
After some experiments with shorter trains, the converted motor cars were formed 
with one at each end of a set of four existing trailer cars to make up a 6-car train. The 
trailers were fitted with multi-core control cables to provide the multiple-unit 
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connection between the two motor cars. Two such trains were tried in a series of tests 
in the summer of 1901 (Mallock, 1902, p.5) and it was found they reduced the 
vibration problems to such a degree that the company was quickly convinced that the 
locos would have to go. They therefore ordered 64 new motor cars (Parshall, Parry & 
Casson, 1903, p. 32) with BTH m-u equipment and GE66 125hp geared traction 
motors with nose suspension and put them into service gradually from early in 1903. 
The Central London thus became the first British railway to adopt the Sprague 
multiple unit system.  
In terms of a cost benefit analysis, the re-equipment of the Central London probably 
broke even. Notwithstanding the reduction in vibration and its associated 
compensation risks, the adoption of multiple unit control allowed capacity to be 
increased by 16% because of the reduction in terminal operation time and there was a 
reduction in journey time achieved by the introduction of motors with a 25% increase 
in power (Parshall et al, 1903). It was also obvious that re-equipping the existing 
locomotives with new bogies and motors was not going to be much cheaper than 
adding a new bogie to each end of the existing trains. Doing this and including them 
with new motor car bodies increased the size of the passenger fleet so that, following 
the conversion, 32 multiple unit trains were available for service instead of the 28 
locomotive hauled trains. 
6.6 Westinghouse Arrives 
In 1899, the British Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company was set up in 
Britain with premises in Trafford Park, Manchester (Dummelow, 1949, p3.). The 
company was a subsidiary of the US-based Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing 
Company, with George Westinghouse as president. Westinghouse himself was no 
slouch commercially and he had seen the potential for electric traction on railways. 
With some of Sprague’s former engineers in his employ, he went to work looking at 
multiple unit systems. He knew that Sprague’s ideas on m-u traction were sound and 
that this was likely to provide a substantial market. He started a few years behind 
Sprague but he soon caught up (getting sued by Sprague (1932) for patent 
infringements in the process) and it was 1902 when he first sold his multiple unit 
system in the UK - to the Mersey Railway in Liverpool (The Electrician, April 24th 
1903, p. 8.). He also offered the system to both the District and Metropolitan 
Railways in London. The District took a trial set, while the Metropolitan ordered 
enough equipment, initially sight unseen, for its first two batches of electric stock.  
6.7 The British Westinghouse (BW) System  
The original Westinghouse m-u equipment was electro-pneumatic. It is described in 
detail by Dawson (1909, p. 332-333). It used a drum controller operated by 
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compressed air pistons. The pistons turned the drum. They were controlled by electric 
valves operated remotely by contacts in the driver’s master controller. Forward and 
reverse selection was also electro-pneumatically operated. Acceleration was 
automatic, the progress of the resistance switching being regulated by a ‘limit switch’. 
All the driver had to do was select one of three master controller positions as follows: 
1. Switching – all resistances in circuit with motors in series. This later became widely 
known as ‘Inch’ (as in ‘inch forward’) and it allowed a speed of about 5mph. 
2. Full Series – motors connected in series but all resistances switched out, giving a 
speed of about 20mph 
3. Full On – motors connected in parallel with all resistances switched out, allowing the 
train to accelerate up to full speed. This was later referred to as ‘Parallel’. 
The controller had these three positions for the forward direction and two for reverse, 
preventing any more than series speed in that direction. It had a small handle 
operating in the vertical plane, rather like an old-fashioned lift controller, which 
would swing back to the ‘off’ position when released by the driver so that the motors 
would switch off. There is no description of a deadman feature being provided in the 
original installation to apply the train brakes.  
Instead of the line fed system used by BTH, the BW control circuits were powered by 
a 14 V battery (The Electrician, 1903, p7.). The battery was charged from the 600 V 
supply and a manually variable resistor was connected in series with it to allow the 
charge rate to be varied. There was also a relay to prevent the battery discharging 
through the resistor. 
The BW system first appeared on the London Underground in 1903 on one of two 
prototype District electric multiple unit trains which became known as the A Stock 
(Bruce, 1983, p.30). The other train had BTH equipment. These two 7-car trains were 
ordered for the Ealing & South Harrow line where, following the arbitrator’s decision 
in favour of the DC electrification scheme, the UERL had installed their trial 4-rail 
600 V DC system.  
The Metropolitan got a second version (Dawson, 1909 p. 333, Benest, 1964, p. 55). In 
this design, the drum controller was rejected, for reasons similar to Sprague’s original 
setup, being insufficiently robust for the power of the motors, and it was replaced by a 
device known as a ‘turret controller’. Like the BTH equipment, this had contactors, 
introduced because they were more robust than the simple finger contacts of the drum 
controller. However, unlike the electro-magnetic BTH system, each BW contactor 
was operated by a compressed air piston controlled by a small electrically operated 
valve. In the BW turret version, they were arranged in a circle around an air supply 
pipe and housed in a circular steel bin. Apparently, a single, 18,000-amp blow-out 
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coil was provided for all contactors (Benest, 1964, p. 55). 
Figure 23: The interior of a District Railway A 
Stock end motor car cab showing the controls 
supplied by Westinghouse. On the left is the 
driver’s brake valve and on the right the 
master controller. The layout of these controls 
is the opposite way round to the BTH equipped 
train and it was eventually adopted as 
standard on the Underground. The 
Westinghouse master controller seen here 
operated in the vertical plane as opposed to 
the horizontal movement normally used. It was 
inherited from the lift controller design that 
Sprague devised. Westinghouse later adopted 
the horizontal setup. The driver’s seat might be 
described as primitive today but similar 
designs were still in use when the author 
started his time on the trains in 1964. Photo: 
Author’s collection. 
 
There was an overload switch or ‘line breaker’, as it would be called today, in the 
power circuit. If the current in this circuit became too high, it would open and switch 
off the connections to the motors. It had to be reset manually. It could also be opened 
manually from a switch in the cab so that the control equipment could be tested 
without traction power. The control circuit was also equipped with a contact that 
prevented train power being switched on when the brakes were applied. This was a 
new idea that was adopted later by the Underground group and which became known 
as the control governor. 
The Metropolitan’s BW master controllers were similar to the Mersey railway version 
but moved in the horizontal plane like BTH controllers. The controller handle was 
removable and carried with it a plug attached to it by a chain, the plug acting as the 
control switch. When the driver arrived in the cab, he placed the handle on the master 
controller spindle and inserted the plug into a socket to connect the controller to the 
battery supply.  
For its electrification programme, the Metropolitan ordered three batches of multiple 
unit electric stock, dated 1904, 1905 and 1906, corresponding broadly to the year of 
their delivery. BW turret controllers were fitted to the first two batches and they were 
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also provided on 10 electric locomotives purchased by the Metropolitan in 1904 
(Bruce, 1983 pp. 37-39). The multiple unit trains were originally designed to be in 6-
car sets, each with two driving motor cars and four trailers. Each motor car had four 
traction motors controlled through two complete sets of turret equipment mounted 
under the car. Since it was full-sized surface stock, there was enough room. The two 
motors on each bogie were controlled by their own turret controller. With this 
arrangement, the cars were effectively double-equipped.  
6.8 BW Difficulties 
With the retention of automatic acceleration and quite sophisticated (for the day) 
attachments like limit switches, the British Westinghouse (BW) equipment was quite 
bold technically compared with the BTH system but it paid the price in reliability. It 
very quickly ran into all sorts of technical problems, particularly with the turret 
controllers. What exactly was wrong with them has not emerged from the author’s 
research but it is likely that the single blow-out coil would have been under extreme 
stress, having to operate frequently and it must have been subject to a rapidly rising 
coil temperature. Whatever the trouble was, it was so bad that, in 1906, BW replaced 
the turret controllers with racks of contactors, similar to the BTH arrangement, 
providing each contactor with its own blow-out coil. Each contactor had electro-
pneumatic operation. 
The battery charging arrangement was also unsatisfactory. Although there were two 
batteries, (The Electrician, 1903) which were separated by a changeover switch. The 
switch was intended to be operated once a day in the depot to alternate the battery 
usage. It is not known if this was done on the Metropolitan but, if it was it did not 
work and, by 1906, a small, 15-volt motor generator (MG), powered off the 600 V 
DC supply, was added to improve the charging system. Even this was not enough and 
a second MG was soon added as a back-up (Benest, 1964, p.123).  
With these problems, plus rectification work on the traction motors and expensive 
equipment alterations that were required to the power generating station at Neasden, 
Westinghouse lost a lot of money on the Metropolitan contract and, largely as a result 
of this, the company went into receivership in 1907. It survived only with cash 
injections from British investors and, in 1917, entered into a collaboration with the 
armaments manufacturer, Vickers. The group chose to call itself Metropolitan-
Vickers, a famous name in 20th century electric manufacturing. This part of the 
company’s history is covered in more detail by C. A. Niblett (1980). 
Back in 1906, the Metropolitan had, for the moment anyway, learned its lesson on 
BW technology and decided to equip its third batch of cars, and a second set of 
electric locomotives, with BTH Type M equipment. The Hammersmith & City Line 
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also got BTH equipment (Benest, 1964, p.147). As with the BW equipment, the 
Metropolitan used a double-equipment configuration on each motor car, with four 
motored axles instead of the two used on the tube lines and District. The Metropolitan 
went back to BW for additional equipment in 1913 and, in the 1920s, they bought 
more equipment from its successor, Metropolitan-Vickers (Metropolitan Railway 
1933, pp. 71-73, 76-77).  
6.9 The District 
Having tried BW and BTH equipment on its 
two experimental A Stock trains, the District 
decided on BTH as its supplier for its main 
line electrification (UERL, 1903, p.133). 
They must have realised that the BW system 
was not up to the job and they were very 
quickly proved right by the debacle on the 
Metropolitan. Initially they adopted the same 
7-car train formation for the bulk order of 
1905 for 60 trains as they had for the 
experimental A Stock, using three motor 
cars and four trailers in the formation DM – 
T – T – MM – T – T – DM. The new order 
eventually became known as the B Stock. 
The motor cars had one set of BTH 
equipment with the two motors on the 
leading bogie. The MM (Middle Motor car) 
had driving controls at both ends to allow 
the train to be uncoupled in service to 
dispose of the T – T – DM cars during off-peak periods. Because of the lack of 
driving controls at the trailer end, this arrangement did not last long and 4, 6 or 8-car 
formations using an equal number of motors and trailers became the standard. Some 
middle motor cars were also used as single car trains on the South Acton to South 
Harrow and Hounslow local trips. Control trailers (see box above) were later provided 
for a time up to the Second World War to allow these short trains to be extended to a 
2-car formation (District Railway, 1909).  
From this time on, the District used BTH Type M equipment on all its trains until it 
obtained the version with automatic acceleration in 1927. Its only excursion into 
double-equipped cars was the F Stock of 1920 (Figure 24). This stock originally had a 
3 motor car – 5 trailer formation (including control trailers) with double equipment on 
each motor car. This gave the stock a 35% increase in power/weight ratio over the 
Control Trailers 
In the original arrangements for multiple 
unit trains, driving cabs were provided only 
on motor cars. However, it was quickly 
discovered that running full length trains all 
day was wasteful so the new tube lines 
opened in 1906-7 adopted a short train 
policy for off-peak periods. A 6-car train 
comprised two half trains in the formation 
Motor car – Trailer – Control Trailer (M-T-
CT) which was coupled to another set 
facing the other way round (CT-T-M). The 
control trailer was a trailer car with a 
driving cab at one end, with its driving 
controls connected to the motor car at the 
other end of the 3-car set. When driving 
from that end, the train was pushed from 
the motor car at the rear. For peak hour 
operation, two 3-car sets were coupled to 
give a 6-car M-T-CT+CT-T-M formation. 
Some variations had control trailers with 
cabs at both ends and the Metropolitan 
(always different) described control trailers 
as “Driving Trailers”. 
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older stock, with a consequent increase in current consumption. It was intended that 
all older trains would be upgraded to match so that an 8-car set would have 3 trailers 
and 5 motor cars. However, the current supply system would have required a 
substantial upgrade and the expense of this and of buying more traction equipment for 
the additional motor cars led to the idea being abandoned. It left the new stock as an 
over-performer, constantly catching up the older trains in service and causing serious 
drops in line voltage at peak times. Within a couple of years work began on a scheme 
to overcome this by removing a set of equipment and motors from one motor car in 
each train, the affected vehicles then becoming ‘single-equipped’ (London Transport, 
1963). 
The District introduced automatic acceleration on its 1927 order for 101 new cars of 
K Stock. The order was part of a watered down upgrade of its ageing fleet and it 
involved converting a large number of old 1905-built motor cars to trailers that would 
match the new motor cars. This fleet was known as ‘Main Line Stock’. The remaining 
oldest cars were left to operate shuttle services on branches and were known as ‘Local 
Stock’. This policy resulted in three batches of cars operating on the line that were 
largely incompatible: the 1920 Stock, Main Line Stock and Local Stock (Bruce, 1983, 
p.85). 
6.10 The BTH Monopoly 
Figure 24: This is an early photo of 
the District’s 1920 Stock, which 
later became known as the F Stock, 
under London Transport’s 
management. A hundred cars of 
this stock were bought as part of an 
intended upgrade for the District. 
Motor cars were originally 
‘double-equipped’, i.e. they had 
two sets of traction equipment. The 
trains turned out to be too powerful for the traction supply and had to be modified to reduce 
their current consumption. This train is made up of a motor car (leading), trailer and control 
trailer. The stock’s design allowed for a full train of eight cars, made up of a 3-car unit 
coupled to a 5-car unit. Collection B.R. Hardy. 
By 1907, the main electrification of the District and Metropolitan lines was complete 
and five electric tube lines had been completed in London, including the Bakerloo, 
Hampstead and Piccadilly lines in 1906-7. These three later became unified under the 
name London Electric Railway (LER). The C&SLR and the W&C did not have m-u 
control but, looking at the totals of equipment purchases of the various lines, BTH 
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were clear winners. They had supplied 617 sets of equipment as opposed to the 135 
sets supplied to the Metropolitan by BW. This virtual monopoly went on during the 
following 15 years when new stock for the Bakerloo, Central and District was all 
equipped by BTH. They also supplied the District with the equipment for the F Stock 
and it seemed as if they had an unbreakable position. It was at this point that an abrupt 
change occurred.  
The F Stock was delivered in 1921-22, at the same time that the Underground was 
about to order the electrical equipment for new tube stock - the Standard Stock, as it 
became known. BTH assumed they would get the new order. Why would they not? 
They had been supplying the Underground for the last 20 years and their equipment 
had proved reliable but, they were in for a surprise. William A. Agnew, appointed as 
the Chief Mechanical Engineer of the District back in 1907 (I. Loco. E., 1958), was a 
Scot with a firm reputation and he had an ambitious new assistant, one W.S. Graff-
Baker. Graff-Baker was disenchanted with what was perceived as BTH arrogance 
and, in particular, with their prices for the F Stock, which he thought were outrageous 
(Birkbeck, 1980). He and Agnew persuaded other electrical equipment suppliers to 
offer the same control equipment and traction motors as BTH but at a better price. 
The suppliers quickly rose to the challenge and the first batch of Standard Stock (The 
1923 Stock) had equipment supplied by BTH’s main rival, Metropolitan-Vickers 
(MV). Of course, MV were British Westinghouse in new clothes and, such was their 
keenness to replace BTH as the Underground’s main supplier that they even offered 
to abandon their usual electro-pneumatic system and to provide electro-magnetic 
equipment to comply with the Underground’s specification.  
Figure 25: A 4-car 
train of Standard 
Tube Stock at 
Epping about 1957. 
The four cars are 
each from different 
orders ranging from 
1923 to 1926. It was 




for traction equipment in place of BTH, who were thought to have become too expensive. The 
poor reliability of both GEC and Met. Vickers equipment drove the Underground back to 
BTH for their 1927 order. Collection B.R. Hardy. 
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Another new supplier, GEC, equipped two of the 1923 batch of motor cars. GEC (the 
General Electric Company) was a British company, (nothing to do with GE in 
America), which was founded in 1886 and which supplied lamps and switches. By the 
end of the First World War, they were well established in Britain but they were new 
to railway traction. They had an association with Oerlikon of Switzerland, which had 
been developed back in the closing years of the 19th century in connection with 3-
phase motors, but it took another 20 years before they produced multiple unit DC 
traction equipment to Oerlikon designs in Britain. It seems likely that the installation 
on the two Standard Stock cars in 1923 was the first in Britain under the GEC name, 
although similar equipment was supplied for the London & North Western Railway 
(LNWR) Watford electric m-u stock under the Oerlikon name. 
LU drawings (LPTB, 1935) show that both MV and GEC supplied equipment for the 
1924 Standard Stock but this was MV’s last order for the Underground group. GEC 
supplied the 1925, 1926 and part of the 1927 batches but BTH were called back into 
the field for the rest of the 1927 Stock and supplied all future stocks (Figure 25). BTH 
were brought back because the GEC and MV equipment was not as reliable as 
expected and the ‘Schedules of Special Works’6 from the overhaul works at Acton 
that the author inspected, show many modifications were carried out through the 
1930s to both types to try to get them to match the reliability of BTH. In future years, 
both MV and GEC supplied the Metropolitan Railway but neither gained the level of 
acceptance to make them the preferred supplier.  
6.11 Smaller Equipment 
In the mid-1930s, improvements to rolling stock design and efficiency came to the 
forefront. W.S. Graff-Baker, who was in charge of rolling stock design for the 
Underground in 1933, had joined the District Railway in 1909, shortly after its 
electrification. He had seen all the problems of wooden body design, he had seen the 
need for more doors and problems of adding doorways to steel cars and he was well 
aware of developments in electric traction in the US. He had a number of design 
initiatives under way when the LPTB took over the organisation in 1933 and he 
continued with these for the new regime (Graff-Baker, 1938).  
One of Graff-Baker’s most significant achievements came in 1936 with a prototype 
tube car design where all the equipment was small enough to fit under the car floor. 
                                                
6“Schedules of Special Works”, a series of instructions issued to workshops on the Underground by the 
engineering offices at Acton Works from November 1927 to 1946, detailing modifications to or 
technical trials on rolling stock. Lists of these documents are currently stored by the LT Museum at 
Acton. 
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With this development, the switch compartment over the motor bogie was no longer 
required and the much needed space was released for passengers. Motor cars now had 
(almost) level floors throughout and could accommodate almost the same number of 
passengers as trailer cars. The breakthrough gave a 15% increase in capacity on a 7-
car train. The two principal improvements which allowed this to happen were the 




Figure 26: Side views of old and new tube car designs. On the left, the switch compartment 
end of a 1931 Stock motor car with the raised floor over the motor bogie. On the right, a 1938 
motor car showing how the switch compartment area has been removed in favour of 
passenger accommodation by introducing small motors and traction control system. Photos: 
LT Museum. 
However, squeezing all the kit under the floor was not easy and it required a number 
of changes to the underframe and floor design. To begin with, the floor was not flat, 
hence the author’s ‘almost’ remark above. It was lifted slightly over the bogies to give 
enough clearance for the motors and sloped slightly down at the sides to the doorway 
areas to maximise door height clearance. All cars were built to the same pattern, even 
those without motors. The feature survived until smaller traction motors allowed a 
completely flat floor on the 1967 Tube Stock. The author noted in an inspection of the 
vehicles that the sloping floor has been revived on the 2009 Tube Stock for the 
Victoria Line, which needs more room for bogie clearance.  
The prototype 1936 car underframe structure was a completely new design. Previous 
designs had cantilevered transverse stiffeners across the underframe in the area 
between the bogies. These were provided to strengthen the structure but they 
restricted the space available below the floor for equipment. For the new cars, the 
transverse cantilevers were eliminated and deeper solebars and longitudes were 
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provided. The traction equipment and other bits and pieces which had been in the 
switch compartment were tucked into the spaces between the solebars and longitudes. 
The seat risers protecting the wheel areas were strengthened to reinforce the 
longitudes so that they became part of the underframe structure (Figure 27). New, 
heavy body bolsters were added to absorb the traction forces arising from having the 
motors tucked under the passenger areas.  
Figure 27: Schematic of post-
1935 tube car design showing 
the seat riser as part of the 
structure of the car and the 
deep underframe longitude 
provided. This arrangement 
survived on new trains until 
the 1990s. Drawing: Author. 
The new cars formed the prototypes for the next generation of tube stock and were put 
into production as the 1938 Tube Stock. The same basic door/seat layout (with minor 
variations) has remained for all subsequent tube car builds and will survive well into 
the 21st Century. The author was familiar with all these types of vehicles as both 
operator and engineer. 
6.12 Traction Equipment Shrinkage 
The major development in equipment design for the new tube stock was in getting the 
traction motors and control equipment to fit under the car floor. This was done in two 
ways. First, the motors were made smaller but the number was increased to give the 
same level of power and they had to be distributed over more cars in the train. For a 
7-car Standard Stock train, three motor cars housed six 240 h.p motors but, on the 
1938 Tube Stock, there were ten 168 h.p motors spread under 5 cars, actually giving a 
higher powered train (see Table 3 below).  
The second size reduction was achieved by getting the traction control equipment to 
fit under the floor. The smaller powered motors allowed a slight reduction in resistor 
grid size for each pair of motors but the real reduction was in the contactors used to 
switch the resistors out during acceleration. They were redesigned and repackaged 
and they became part of the system known as the PCM – Pneumatic Camshaft 
Mechanism. 
The novel feature of the PCM system was the reduction in the number of contactors 
required to carry the full traction current if they opened. Up to this time, each 
contactor in the traction motor power circuit could open under load at any time during 
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the acceleration sequence, causing an arc. If this was not suppressed, it would quickly 
burn off the ends of the contact tips, so each contactor had a large ‘blow out’ coil and 
an ‘arc chute’. The coil was designed to extinguish the arc, or blow it out through the 
arc chute as the contact tips separated (Agnew, 1937, pp.119-120). It made a loud 
‘plop’ if it blew out. Naturally, each contactor required a lot of space and, with 
fourteen of these in a motor circuit, a large section of the switch compartment was 
filled with them. Passengers travelling in motor cars could hear the rhythmic clack, 
clack, clack of the contactors as the train accelerated away from stations.  
On the PCM equipment, the control sequence was completely redesigned so that there 
were only two ‘load bearing’ contactors. These became known as Line Breakers 
(LBs). They were used as the only switches which separated the equipment from the 
‘line’ - the traction current supply - under load. Any time there was a break in the 
current supply or the contactor operating sequence, it was detected by the control 
circuit and this opened a contact which caused the Line Breakers to open (Agnew, 
1938, p.16).  
The contactors were made smaller and were grouped together on a camshaft. The 
camshaft was driven by compressed air against an oil reservoir. As the camshaft 
rotated, the contactors opened and closed in sequence to cut out the resistors during 
the acceleration process. Again, this process can be heard as the older type of train 
(pre-1992) accelerates.  
It is worth noting the move to pneumatic operation of traction equipment. Up to this 
time, the tube lines and District had relied on the tried and tested electro-magnetic 
BTH control equipment. BTH’s move to pneumatic operation and the Underground’s 
acceptance of it was something of a leap of faith, even though they had tested the 
system on some of the 1936 experimental cars. Their faith was justified, as the system 
proved capable, once it had settled down. 
Table 3 (at the end of this Chapter) shows the train weights, traction motors types, h.p 
and power/weight ratios for a selection of the main types of Underground train. It is 
actually very difficult to get accurate figures for power/weight ratios, since published 
figures do not always agree, they do not always make clear the difference between 1 
hour and continuous ratings for motors and measurement criteria vary. Gear ratios and 
motor designs affect performance, with some motors being designed for high 
acceleration and low top speed while others are designed for a more gentle 
acceleration and a high top speed for longer distance running. Car weights vary with 
modifications applied during their life and even London Underground’s own power 
figures are sometimes calculated on 630 V or 575 V, depending on whether the 
engineer used the nominal or the standard average voltage. However, using published 
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sources, checking figures and converting metric back to imperial measurements for 
consistency, the author offers a representative list of Underground train power, past 
and present in Table 1 below.  
6.13 KLL4s 
Another big consumer of train equipment space is the compressor and its main air 
reservoir. These were originally mounted in the switch compartment of pre-1936 
trains but, for the new design, they were simply reduced in size and increased in 
number and spread along the trains so that there was actually an improvement in 
capacity. It also became normal from this time to provide separate reservoirs for doors 
and traction equipment on individual cars.  
The author’s experience of pre-1938 train compressors was that they were large, 
heavy and noisy. They consisted of a 630 V DC motor and a two-cylinder pump. To 
get an air pump with the capacity required for intensive railway service under the 
floor of a tube car was another difficult design task. It was achieved by using a 
completely new design, originally developed for trolleybuses. The new compressor 
was a high speed, rotary vane type built by Bernard Holland to a Swiss design, known 
as the KLL4 (Bruce, 1983, p.76). It was much quieter and smaller than the older ones 
but it was specified to have the same capacity and performance as the reciprocating 
compressors. Because most of the space under the motor cars was occupied by 
traction equipment, the compressors were mounted under the trailers. Their 630 V DC 
power supply was fed from the adjacent driving motor car. Placing compressors under 
trailer cars became a standard feature of Underground train design for many years. 
In service, the actual performance of the KLL4s left much to be desired. In spite of 
the specification, they were too small, which as the author knew well as a motorman, 
made recharging the air system on the train very slow. Also, they were not robust 
enough for the hammering they got on the Underground and they were difficult to 
maintain. Many were later replaced by more robust, small, reciprocating designs 
developed after the war (Bingham & Bruce, 1965, p. 504). Unfortunately, in the 
experience of the author, they were noisier than the rotary type, but they were more 
reliable. 
6.14 Four-Rail Traction 
As we have seen, London Underground has an almost unique traction power supply 
system. Traction current is supplied to trains at a nominal voltage of 630V DC via a 
positive conductor rail mounted on the outside of the running rails and a negative rail 
mounted in the ‘4-foot’ between the running rails. The dimensions of the current rails 
are shown in Figure 28. This arrangement is described as a ‘4-rail’ system, so as to 
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distinguish it from a more common ‘3-rail’ system, where the 3rd rail carries the full 
line voltage and the return is carried by one or both running rails at or near earth 
potential. 
Figure 28: Cross section of District Railway track used for its main line electrification in 
1905-6, showing the dimensions of the positive and negative conductor rails in relation to the 
running rails. The voltage was originally set at 600 V DC, arranged with the positive rail at 
+400 V and the negative rail at -200 V. The voltage was raised to 630 in the 1930s and is 
currently gradually being raised to 750. This 4-rail arrangement was adopted by the 
Metropolitan and the tube railways built by the UERL. It remains to this day. Drawing: 
Dawson (1909, p. 492). 
It should be noted form the diagram that the height of the top of the positive rail is 3 
inches above the running rail, while that of the negative rail is 1½ inches or 50% of 
that of the positive rail (Figure 28). This proportional difference is reflected in the 
voltages of the two rails in relation to earth. The current rails are bonded to earth 
through resistances (Bletcher, 1987, p. 321) so that the positive rail is nominally at 
+420 V while the negative rail is at -210 V. 
The only other railway known to the author that is currently using a 4-rail supply 
system is Line 1 of the Milan Metro, where the voltage is 750 DC. Some other 
railways in Britain did use the 4-rail system but these were converted to 3-rail 
operation in the mid-20th century. The former London & North Western Railway 
suburban routes based on Euston the so-called ‘New Lines’, used the 4-rail system 
because they shared track with the Underground’s District and Bakerloo Lines. The 
‘New Lines’ were converted to 3-rail operation in the 1970s (although 4-rails are 
retained as far as Harrow & Wealdstone for Bakerloo operation) and now form part of 
the London Overground system. On the other hand, the London & South Western 
Railway scheme for electrification out of Waterloo, started in 1915 (Cock, 1947, p. 
117), used 3-rail traction, even though the company’s lines to Wimbledon and 
Richmond had already been electrified on the 4-rail system ten years earlier in order 
to provide the District Railway with running powers for their new electric trains.  
6.15 Reasons for the Adoption of the 4-Rail System 
The development of electric traction in the late years of the 19th century was driven 
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by the expansion of urban tramways using DC voltage overhead lines as the means of 
supply. As development moved towards heavier rail systems, both urban and main 
line, the transmission of DC current at low voltages (in the range of 500 to 800 V) via 
an overhead line, required too large a dimension of conductor to provide the energy 
required, so a third rail, laid at ground level, was adopted as the conductor (Dawson, 
1909 p. 479).  
Figure 29: Photo of part of London 
Underground track (Jubilee Line) 
showing conductor rails with a gap as 







Return current was, in both cases via the running rails. In the case of the Central 
London Railway (now the Central Line of the London Underground), which opened 
in July 1900, both running rails were cross-bonded at 60 ft. intervals and the rails 
were bonded to the cast iron tunnel lining at the substations (Parshall et al. 1903). 
This was an attempt to reduce the risk of stray currents electro-magnetically affecting 
other services such as telegraph and telephone systems or causing corrosion of water 
and gas pipes. It was already a well-known phenomenon, having been experienced on 
the first electric tramway built in the United States in 1888, as related in Chapter 2.  
The choice of the 4-rail system was determined with the particular circumstances of 
the District Railway in mind. Arthur R. Cooper, Chief Engineer of the Underground 
Electric Railways of London Ltd (UERL) in a paper delivered to the Institution of 
Electrical Engineers in 1927 wrote, “Undoubtedly the chief feature determining the 
decision to adopt an insulated return was the possible injurious effect on apparatus of 
other concerns such as gas pipes, water pipes, telegraph or telephone cables and, in 
particular, the Government Observatories” (Cooper, 1927, p. 390). It was considered 
that the tube lines already opened were better suited to 3-rail operation because of 
their containment inside a cast iron tube, which acted to contain the return currents 
along the line of route. This was not the case on the District, where the lines were 
built to the ‘cut and cover’ system and were much closer to the surface, with its 
network of pipes and cable runs and therefore much more likely to cause trouble 
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(Cooper, 1927). The 4-rail system was expected to resolve the issues. 
Another important factor Cooper (1927, p. 390) mentioned was the intention to adopt 
a system of automatic signalling, using DC track circuits as a means of train detection. 
This proposal would have rendered the use of the running rails for the traction return 
circuit impossible. In the author’s view, this was more important than the risk of 
electrical interference or corrosion, which could have been controlled by suitable 
protection measures. 
Another point made by Cooper was that the 4-rail system “allowed the railways to 
continue working if one pole became earthed due to a failure of insulation” (p. 390). 
He noted that cases had occurred where “for many hours the system…operated with 
the positive conductor earthed”. This had its risks, as described below, but it was 
allowed to go on and still is today, under controlled conditions. 
The other tube lines that were taken into the Underground fold (the Central London 
the Great Northern & City and the City & South London) all had their 3-rail systems 
converted to 4-rail. The last line to be converted was the Central London, the work 
being carried out in 1940 in preparation for extensions into the London suburbs and 
the adoption of ‘Standard’ (4-rail) tube rolling stock. 
6.16 Retention of the 4-Rail System 
The 4-rail system used by London Underground has, over many years, been widely 
discussed in terms of its efficacy in relation to more traditional 3-rail systems. The 
most obvious questions relate to: 
• The cost of maintaining an additional rail; 
• The cost of providing and maintaining the negative collector shoegear; 
• The obstruction caused by the negative rail during emergency evacuation; 
• The problems associated with the earthing of one pole or the other at different 
locations on the system. 
Questions are asked on a regular basis as to why the system should not be converted 
to a more conventional 3-rail system. In the author’s own experience, since 1980 there 
have been two major assessments of the proposal by London Underground and, in 
both cases, it was recommended that the existing system should be retained. No 
literature for either of these cases has been found but Cooper (1927, p. 390) provided 
a useful description of the issues that exercised minds on the same subject in those 
days. In the end, the real issue relates to the cost of conversion and the lack of 
evidence for any real benefits. The most significant costs relate to the provision of 
impedance bonds at the ends of each track circuit. Cooper (1927, p. 390) quoted that 
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the Underground had an average of nine track circuits per mile of track and that the 
cost of providing impedance bonds for these was almost the same as the cost of 
providing the additional rail. There is also the relationship of the cost of either a 
negative earth brush for the 3-rail system or negative shoegear for a 4-rail system. The 
cost of converting a fleet of over 4000 vehicles from one to the other is not 
insignificant and, on tube vehicles, there is little space on the bogie for a reliable 
return circuit brush system. In addition, management of stray current throughout 
London’s sub-surface lines would be extremely onerous. 
6.17 Earth Faults 
On a 3-rail system, most instances of an accidental earth contact on the positive rail 
will cause a rapid rise in the current that will be detected by the protection system and 
will cause the supply circuit breaker to open. This does not happen with a 4-rail 
system. As Cooper (1927, p.390) explained, an earth connection to earth on one pole 
of the system would allow the voltage on the other pole to rise to the full voltage of 
the system and the system would continue to function. However, it often exposes 
weaknesses in the supply circuit and can lead to a dangerous situation arising if 
another earth occurs on the opposite pole. Cooper (1927, p. 391) quotes a case where 
a positive earth took place at Lambeth North on the Bakerloo Line and, within 27 
minutes a total of five faults appeared on various parts of the tube system, including a 
negative fuse box fire on a train at Highgate, some 7 miles away on another line. The 
reason for these occurrences was the connectivity arrangement of the system. 
Originally, the whole of the UERL system was supplied from the company’s power 
station at Lots Road, Chelsea and all the lines on the 600-volt system7 were linked. 
With the increasing realisation that an earth fault in one location could often cause 
fusing and arcing in another, the District supply was separated from that of the three 
tube lines and later the tube lines separated from each other, sometime prior to 1927. 
Despite the problems noted by Cooper (1927), little more seems to have been done 
until after the Second World War. In July 1948, it was announced to staff that the 
traction system was to be divided into six areas known as Metropolitan, Northern, 
Southern, Eastern, Western and Central Line (LTE, 1948). The sections did not relate 
to line separation but rather to the establishment of areas. The ‘Eastern’ area included 
the then British Railways line between Campbell Road and Upminster. Some sections 
were not coupled to the Underground system – the Hammersmith & City Line (west 
of Edgware Road), the line north of Queen’s Park, Putney Bridge – Wimbledon and 
Gunnersbury – Richmond.  
                                                
7 The original voltage adopted by the UERL was 600 but this was uprated to 630 V in the 1930s. 
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The work on implementing the scheme proceeded slowly. The divisions between 
sections could be seen on the track by the location of 48ft gaps in the current rails. 
The purpose of these was to prevent the collector shoes of one car bridging the gap 
between sections. This did not address the issues with trains on the District and 
Metropolitan lines that were equipped with buslines but it was intended that these 
would eventually be replaced with new cars that would not have power buslines. The 
replacement programme began in 1949 with the introduction of the first of the District 
Line’s R Stock (Bruce, 1983, pp 98-103). 
Additional sub-divisions of the traction current system were added over a period of 
several years and Bletcher (1987, p. 321) described how the Underground’s 
conductor-rail system was then split into sections, typically about 15 km long, each 
fed by some five substations. The negative-rail potential was monitored to show 
earths and the readings transmitted to control rooms. If an earth appeared, the line 
controller would see if the fault moved from one section to the next so that he could 
determine if the fault was on a train or on the infrastructure. Bletcher (1987, p. 321) 
observed that the length of sections had to be a compromise, since shorter lengths 
would make it easier to pinpoint the location of a fault and thus reduce the risk of both 
a positive and a negative fault occurring on the same section. On the other hand, a 
longer section gives better utilisation of rectifying plant and will offer more chance of 
a receptive load for regenerative braking. At that time, regeneration was being 
reconsidered as a possibility on the Underground. Regeneration was to turn the whole 
sectionalisation philosophy on its head.  
6.18 Sectionalisation & Regeneration 
With the desire to allow more effective regeneration, longer sections have been re-
introduced on some lines. On the Victoria line, for example, the original setup from 
the line’s construction in the mid-1960s, was to sectionalise every substation feed so 
that there were ten separate sections on the 20km long line. With the introduction of 
the 2009 Tube Stock, in order to allow better distribution of regenerated current, the 
number of sections was reduced to three (Chymera, 2012).  
This strategy was also applied on the Jubilee line where the number of sections over 
the 36km line was reduced to three. However, an incident on that line on 19th April 
2011 (TfL, 2011), described in an internal report, seen by the author but not now 
available, demonstrates clearly how train design and power system design can jointly 
cause severe disruption if they have not been properly co-ordinated. On this day, a 
negative earth on the traction system was recorded east of Canary Wharf at 18:39. As 
a result, a large number of trains east of Finchley Road lost traction. This was due to 
the on-board traction equipment being shut down by the trains' earth fault detectors. A 
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consequence of a lack of traction power is the loss of power to the on-board 
compressors as all 600 V systems are supplied through the same High-Speed Circuit 
Breaker (HSCB). Older stocks have separate compressor contactors, so they are 
independently supplied. On the 1996 Tube Stock, to reset the HSCB requires 
compressed air. If the traction current is off for a long period, the air supply tends to 
leak off, preventing resetting of the HSCB and thus preventing starting of the train. In 
addition, the on-board batteries will also become discharged. 
Figure 30: Schematic of the 630-volt supply systems on Underground Rolling stock. The 
traditional arrangement was to provide 
individual contactors for each of these 
systems but modern designs have 
reduced the isolation to one ‘High Speed 
Circuit Breaker’ for all systems. The 
trend now is for compressors to be 
powered from the auxiliary converter 
rather than directly from the traction 
supply. There is now a programme to 
gradually upgrade all lines from the 
existing 630 DC voltage to a 750-volt 
traction supply. Drawing: Author. 
In this incident, some trains could not be restarted. Teams were sent out to ‘pump up’ 
stalled trains using a variety of pumps, including emergency compressors and foot 
pumps. At one location, one of these failed and another one had to be sent for. The 
service on the line was suspended east of Neasden for the rest of the evening. The last 
train was finally stabled at 03:45 the next morning. The cause was eventually found to 
be a traction equipment case cover that fell off a train and jammed under the negative 
rail near West Ham.  
The reduction of sectionalisation gaps on the line meant that earth faults could spread 
along the long sections. In this incident, it was the reason why the earth fault was 
registered by so many trains at once. One lesson learned from this incident is that 
2009 Tube and S Stocks both have electro-magnetic HSCBs so they do not need 
compressed air to restart the compressors. In a discussion with the author, one LU 
senior person took the view that the rarity of earth faults on the infrastructure meant 
that the risk was low, particularly when put against the energy savings achieved from 
regeneration and that this made the long traction current sections a viable solution. 
6.19 GTO for AC Motors 
Although 3-phase AC motors with power electronics had been tried by Brush Traction 
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at Loughborough on a locomotive as early as 1963 (Duffy, 2003, p. 340), it was not 
until the late 1980s that this sort of technology was considered by the railway industry 
as reliable enough for regular service conditions. LU, fully aware of the pitfalls of 
new and untried electronic technology, conducted a series of trials of power 
electronics in the 1970s (Dobell & Fried, 1991, p.56) but only proceeded to adopt 
them for the 1992 Tube Stock8. Even then, there were fears about interference with 
signalling systems, the complexity of the control systems, the space required for all 
the equipment and its long-term reliability, not to mention its cost. So, AC motors 
were not deemed suitable when the ’92 Stock was ordered, hence its DC motors with 
GTO Chopper control. The step-by-step approach was the result of an awareness by 
the Underground’s engineers of the specific details of the system they worked on. 
3-phase AC motors became the ultimate prize for traction engineers. The two big 
advantages of the 3-phase design are that one, unlike a DC motor, the AC motor has 
no brushes since there is no need to physically connect the armature and the fields and 
two, the armature can be made of steel laminations, instead of the large number of 
windings required in DC motors. Also, it is smaller and lighter than a DC motor of 
similar power, making bogie design potentially better. These features give it a better 
power/weight ratio, make it more robust and cheaper to build and maintain than a DC 
motor. Once a suitable 3-phase control system had been proven and the technical 
problems with interference for signalling and external electrical systems were 
overcome, AC motors became the propulsion of choice for new stock. On LU, the 
first stock to get them was the 1996 Tube Stock. 
The AC system applied to the ‘96 Stock uses GTO choppers and it incorporates 
Variable Voltage Variable Frequency (VVVF) control (Neil, 2016). The system 
involves complex control and switching techniques which require the GTOs to switch 
on and off at exactly the right moments and to do it at high frequency (around 300 to 
900 times a second) so the right amount of current is available at the motors when 
needed. The control of the voltage pulses and frequency has to be adjusted with 
differing motor speeds. The changes which occur during this process produce a set of 
characteristic buzzing noises which sound like the ‘gear changing’ of a road vehicle 
and which can clearly be heard on the ’96 Stock as it accelerates and brakes.  
                                                
8  There was, apparently, no attempt to introduce synchronous motors. The author can find no 
references to it in the LU related literature so it might be assumed that the Underground’s engineers 
were aware of its limitations in the railway traction environment and preferred to wait until 
asynchronous control systems were sufficiently developed for railway use. 
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6.20 IGBTs 
Having got AC drive with GTO choppers almost universally accepted in the mid 
1990s as the traction system to have, power electronics engineers then perfected the 
IGBT or Insulated Gate Bipolar Transistor. The transistor was the forerunner of 
modern electronics and it can be turned on or off like a thyristor but it does not need 
the high currents of the GTO thyristor turn-off system. In its early development, the 
IGBT was only capable of handling fairly small currents and it first appeared on LU 
stock in the 1996 Tube Stock auxiliary converter (Neil, 2016) but it was quickly 
developed so that the latest devices can handle thousands of amps. Now it is standard 
in traction applications and was it provided for the 1995 Tube Stock9. It is also now 
used on the 2009 and S Stocks. Its principal benefit is that it can switch a lot faster 
(three to four times faster) than GTOs. This reduces the current required and therefore 
the heat generated, giving smaller and lighter units. The faster switching also reduces 
the cruder ‘gearing’ of GTOs and makes for a much smoother and more even 
sounding acceleration buzz from under the train. With IGBTs, ‘gear changing’ has 
gone.  
In all the instances where 3-phase traction was introduced, it was necessary to ensure 
there was no risk to the integrity of signalling circuits caused by interference from the 
power systems. The solution was to ensure audio frequency track circuits of the 
correct design were installed and the author recalls that on some Underground lines, 
extensive track circuit replacement was necessary in order to allow 3-phase trains to 
run. 
6.21 Modern Control 
With the development of systems such as doors, E.P. brakes, communications and a 
multitude of other control and fault indications being transmitted along trains, jumpers 
connecting systems between cars multiplied over the years and the number of cores 
increased in some of them from ten to more than forty.  
Once electronics appeared, ways of reducing the number of train wires offered 
themselves. Most promising was ‘time division multiplexing’, where one wire can be 
used to transmit different sets of data or information. The data is sent in packets which 
share travel time on the wire. The author first saw it used on the 1973 Tube Stock for 
its infamous Fault Annunciator (of which more below). Being electronic, this sort of 
system was (and still is) regarded as basically unstable, so hard wiring is retained for 
most safety circuits.  
                                                
9 Although described as 1995 Tube Stock, the fleet was built and delivered after the 1996 Tube Stock. It thus had 
more modern equipment. 
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In the case of the 1990s Tube Stocks, the traction/braking control uses pulse width 
modulation (PWM) on a wire passing to each set of traction equipment on the train. 
PWM is a variable electronic signal, which has similar characteristics to the electronic 
traction inverter controller. The PWM signal is altered to vary the voltage and 
frequency of the traction inverter and the inverter allows the power supply for the 
motor to match the demand for power or braking. 
The arrangement is shown schematically in Figure 31. The PWM signal is sent by an 
encoder, which responds to the demand from the driver’s controller or the ATO 
system on a train if it has one. The encoder sends the PWM signal along the train to 
each car with traction equipment. Here, the demand signal is used to tell the inverter 
controls (the PWM Controller) what level of power to pass to the motors. The 
performance of the motors is then fed back to the inverter controls to verify that the 
traction effort achieved is equal to that of the effort demanded - the classic feedback 
loop. 
Figure 31: Simplified schematic of 
Pulse Width Modulation (PWM) 
control showing how the demand for 
traction or brake is requested 
electronically and how the air brake is 
added if insufficient dynamic brake is 




In the author’s experience, drivers took some time to get used to the new system. As 
described above (Section 6.7), traditional traction control has three power positions 
for the driver, ‘Inch/Shunt’, ‘Series’ and ‘Parallel’, the resulting speeds being loosely 
governed by the electrical properties of DC traction-motors. Modern traction control 
however involves a notchless ‘motoring arc’ between ‘Off’ and ‘Full motors’, with 
the selected position on the arc usually regulating the amount of power delivered to 
the AC motors (Bombardier, 2009). 
In case of an electronic defect, there is a default ‘power on’ hard wire, which used to 
be referred to as the ‘actuating’ wire on traditional controls. This provides a default 
acceleration rate of 77% to 100% (depending on the stock) as long as the controller is 
in an ‘On’ position. The trains also have a split traction control system so that two sets 
of control wires are used – one controlling the ‘A’ cars and one the ‘D’ cars. If one set 
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fails, the other will allow half the train’s power to be used. This was a significant 
feature introduced on the 1973 Tube Stock. 
The 1973 Stock was also equipped with a ‘Fault Annunciator’ (with the unfortunate 
initials FA) that quickly became excoriated as unreliable and unfit for the rigours of 
railway service. Within a few years, it was replaced with a new system known as a 
Train Equipment Panel (TEP). This was an early form of electronic train management 
system. The stock also had significant problems with a new form of camshaft 
controller, with microswitches, miniature relays, key operated switches and brake 
components. It underwent three major engineering modification programmes within 
the author’s working life with it. It was over 30 years before it achieved the reliability 
of its predecessors. 
6.22 Braking 
Until the 1970s, London Underground almost invariably specified the Westinghouse 
automatic air brake for its electric trains. Only the Metropolitan Railway retained 
some units with Vacuum brakes for a while (Metropolitan Railway, 1933, pp. 205), 
believing that it would switch them from steam to electric traction en route in a 
versatile service pattern.  
Soon after the development of the multiple unit system, systems for electrical control 
of air brakes appeared in the US (Parodi, 1913), largely in an effort to get a graduated 
release, something quite difficult to obtain on the air brake systems then available. 
Eventually, in the late 1920s, the electro-pneumatic (EP) brake arrived in London in a 
sufficiently developed form for service use and was integrated into the Westinghouse 
system for all tube stocks built after 1929. Some of the earlier stocks were converted 
too so that by 1940, all tube lines had all trains with EP brakes. Such was the 
improvement in stopping accuracy for EP equipped trains that lines previously limited 
to a 6-car train formation could increase lengths to seven cars. 
Earlier in this work, we saw that Frank Sprague knew that the electric motor was 
basically the same machine as a dynamo and that the motors used for traction on 
electric trains could be configured so as to provide a braking effort, producing 
electrical energy as a result. Nowadays, we call it dynamic braking or regeneration. 
Sprague tried it on his pioneer Chicago South Side Elevated traction equipment and it 
sometimes worked but it was crude and unreliable. It fell into disuse then but the idea 
that it was possible never went away.  
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Figure 32: A 4-car O Stock 
train of 1937 standing at the 
‘Boston End’ of Northfields 
depot. This was the first 
Underground stock to have 
mercury retarder control of 
braking. It was also fitted with a 
new system of traction control 
known as a ‘Metadyne’, which 
provided a facility for 
regenerating braking current 
into the power supply. Photo: 
LT Museum. 
It eventually appeared on London Underground in 1935, when a set of six old 
Metropolitan Railway saloon stock cars were experimentally equipped (LPTB, 1934) 
with a new traction control system which included a form of electric braking where 
the motors generated power which could be fed back into the supply for use by other 
trains. The control system adopted was known as the Metadyne. It was the invention 
of an Italian named Pestarini and it was marketed in Britain by Metropolitan Vickers 
(Agnew, 1937, p. 458). It was to be fitted to the new surface stock being ordered at 
the time, which became known as the O and P Stocks (Figure 32). 
Metadyne motor control was derived from the Ward Leonard system, where a motor 
generator was used to control the motor instead of using starting resistances (Agnew, 
1937, pp. 458-470). The idea was that the Metadyne could “change power at a 
constant voltage to power at a constant current” as it was widely described at the time. 
The Metadyne was a large rotating machine which was mounted under one of a pair 
of cars. It was connected to two traction motors on each of the two cars in the unit, so 
one machine controlled the four motors on a 2-car unit. Three such units made up a 6-
car train. The machine was so large that it was necessary to put all the rest of the 
equipment, such as the compressor and motor generator, under the other motor car of 
the pair. 
Like all new systems, the Metadynes suffered a fair share of problems (Bruce, 1983, 
p. 94). Number one was the ability of the line to accept regenerated current. If there 
was nowhere for the current to go, it would not work, so the standard EP system did 
the braking. Also, the Metadyne machines were heavy, mechanical devices which 
needed a lot of maintenance and the extra valves and relays for the blending system 
added to these problems. As they were introduced at the beginning of the Second 
World War, during the period of the war, they suffered from a shortage of spares and 
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the manpower to fix them. The equipment survived until the mid-1950s, when it was 
replaced by the then standard PCM resistance control system as fitted to the 1938 
Tube Stock and R Stock. The O and P Stock was ‘converted’ and became CO and CP 
Stock.  
All modern trains are fitted with dynamic braking. In London, it started with DC 
motors in a resistance controlled environment, where the regenerated current was fed 
back into the resistance grids and dissipated as heat – rheostatic braking. It was still 
crude and unreliable but it was another attempt to reduce the reliance on friction 
braking. 
The author can attest to the fact that the control is not as refined as EP brake control, 
so adjustment of the braking rate is not as sensitive and this makes it more difficult for 
the driver to get an accurate and gentle stop. There is also a tendency, particularly on 
older trains, to lose dynamic braking from time to time, so the air brake has to be 
brought in to compensate. Naturally, this is automatic but the response is sometimes 
not as rapid as the driver would like, particularly because he has to wait for the air 
pressure in the brake cylinders to build up to the same level of braking as he originally 
requested. The result can be a tendency for the train to overrun the usual stopping 
mark. Engineers will say that they have resolved this problem in modern systems but 
the author has yet to find a driver who would agree with them. 
Most Underground trains have trailer cars, so they use only air brakes. They retain the 
EP brake, which is activated by the driver’s brake demand at the same time as the 
motor cars’ dynamic braking. In a train with a mix of dynamic and air braking, the 
control system is designed to give preference to the dynamic brake over the air brake. 
This calls for a blending system, which automatically selects dynamic brake and then 
adds air brake as necessary to achieve the required deceleration rate. This can mean 
that the motor cars will provide almost all the brake necessary and the trailers need 
very little.  
The reduction in the use of the friction brake that has resulted has a significant effect 
on the consumption of brake shoes. A useful demonstration of this took place when 
the main line Pendolino type of train had a problem with its dynamic brake control 
system in 2013 and it had to be isolated while the rolling stock supply company sorted 
it out. During this time, the author was informed by the depot engineer at Oxley 
Depot, the replacement period for their brake pads dropped from 18 weeks to 18 days 
– a 7-fold difference. There is also known to be a significant reduction in energy 
consumption (up to 17%) and heat (up to 38%) with the introduction of regenerative 
braking (Tinham, 2007, p. 8). 
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Having solid state power electronics with IGBTs, allows dynamic braking to be more 
easily controlled and more reliable. Brake control for the driver of LU’s post 1980s 
stocks is provided in the second segment in his traction/brake controller (T/BC). 
Between ‘off and release’ and ‘full-service’, the driver can select any position to 
match the rate of braking that he requires. In this respect, the controller is configured 
in a similar way for both traction and braking. Selection of a position in the traction or 
braking segment, will select a rate of acceleration or deceleration. Braking control 
also has a hardwired ‘brake on’ signal. If the encoder generating the PWM signal fails 
and has to be isolated, the hardwired signal will automatically provide a 50% service 
brake when the driver selects brake. In any circumstances, the emergency brake is 
always available. 
6.23 ECEB 
The Westinghouse air brake lasted as the Underground’s ‘fail-safe’ braking system 
for all new stocks until the appearance of the 1973 Tube Stock on the Piccadilly Line. 
On this stock, for which the author prepared training courses, the train line, used as 
the control pipe for the Westinghouse brake, was replaced by a ‘round the train’ 
(RTT) circuit which became known as ‘Electrical Control of Emergency Braking’ 
(ECEB). 
The idea is simple. Keep the wire energised and the brakes remain released; de-
energise the wire and the brakes go on. An electrically controlled valve on each car 
responds to the de-energised wire by opening a connection between a brake supply 
reservoir and the brake cylinders on the vehicle, giving an emergency brake. The 
dynamic brake is not used for emergencies, it is not fail safe.  
In order to ensure that, if the RTT circuit fails, there is a ‘get you home’ circuit, a 
second RTT circuit is provided but it only allows movement at slow speed – up to 
10mph. This is simply because, if the full speed circuit has gone wrong, some form of 
safety protection has been lost. Each safety device on the train is connected to the 
RTT circuits in one way or another and each system has a cut-out switch so that it 
defaults to the 10 mph circuit. Some circuits, like the passenger alarm, have a circuit 
for each car with a relay connection in the RTT circuit so that the car can easily be 
identified and isolated if necessary. Such 10 mph excursions are invariably time 
consuming and create huge delays. 
6.24 Analysis 
In this case study, it is shown that for the initial large scale electrification orders of the 
1903 to 1907 period, there were two main suppliers and that one proved more reliable 
than the other. The less reliable system may have been due to the use of a new and 
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untried electro-pneumatic control that was more complex than its rival electro-
magnetic system. Perhaps, the Metropolitan Railway’s choice of BW related to a 
financial incentive or to a package that included the power supply system. They also 
then tried BTH equipment but then went back to BW. The question as to why remains 
unanswered but it is noteworthy that, after World War I, the price of BTH equipment 
drove the LER to try MV & GEC. However, the equipment from these suppliers was 
not reliable, so they went back to BTH – a lesson that should be noted today when 
price seems to be the main driver for many procurement strategies. 
The 1930s saw experiments in miniaturisation and regeneration. The miniaturisation 
experiment was successful but regeneration was not. The failure to get regeneration to 
work effectively was largely due to the mechanical complexity of the system and the 
failure of manufacturer’s support. Miniaturisation was successful because of a 
combination of prototyping and a system understanding of the relationship between 
body underframe design and traction equipment. It provided significant passenger 
capacity improvement. Regeneration was not successful until the introduction of solid 
state power systems for the 1992 Tube Stock and only after extensive upgrades to the 
power supply system.  
The 4-rail power supply unique in London because of an early example of a system 
design approach. There was a need to reduce corrosion risk, introduce automatic 
signalling with DC track circuits, to keep running when there was an insulation 
problem and to widen the space between substations. Later, the problems with earth 
faults and insulation breakdown led to sectionalisation but this in turn reduced the 
effectiveness of regeneration. The reversal of the sectionalisation policy to improve 
the effectiveness of regeneration is now, with modern on-board earth detection 
equipment, considered acceptable.  
6.25  Conclusions 
The historical data on the development of electric traction equipment over the period 
between 1901 and the present day, shows that electric traction system development in 
London was generally static for long periods and development was limited to minor 
enhancements, like the move from manual to automatic acceleration and the adoption 
of interpoles in traction motors but, on two occasions, major advances took place. The 
first major change was in the mid 1930s, where miniaturisation allowed all the 
traction and auxiliary equipment to be placed under the car floor and the second 
change was the adoption of a solid state traction power system for the 1992 Tube 
Stock and subsequent fleets. 
Looking at it in more detail, it can be seen that by the mid 1930s, the electric traction 
systems used on the Underground had remained, for almost 30 years, a standard type, 
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the BTH electro-magnetic system. Automatic acceleration had been added to new 
purchases from 1915 but otherwise the equipment was essentially the same as the 
Central London’s first multiple unit equipment in 1901. In analysing this, the author 
sees two main reasons. One was reliability. Once it had settled down into full service 
use on the tube lines and the District, the BTH system proved reliable enough for 
everyday service on a railway which was showing a rapidly increasing level of traffic. 
Reliability was proving to be an essential ingredient for a successful urban railway 
system and the Underground’s management was well aware of it. They had learned it 
the hard way during the large increases in traffic seen on the tube lines and the 
District during the First World War of 1914-18 at a time when manpower shortages 
were at their height (Jackson & Croome, 1993). After the war, traffic continued to rise 
and new lines and extensions were planned. Reliability was already the prime goal for 
the organisation.  
The other reason for the continued use of BTH equipment was compatibility. New 
vehicles had to couple with and operate in trains with existing cars. Trains were 
required to be flexible, both in length and composition and the District in particular, 
bought small batches of similar and compatible cars over a number of years before the 
purchase of the F Stock in 1920. The decision not to upgrade the power supply system 
to match the performance of the F Stock was to cost the District dear and, by 1930, 
after a refurbishment programme carried out on the 1905 fleet, they had three 
operationally incompatible batches of cars. This was to haunt them for the next 50 
years and it affected the rolling stock purchasing policy during the whole of that time. 
On the tube lines, the move from BTH to alternative suppliers in the mid-1920s was 
not a success. The management, on both sides, seems to have not fully understood 
what was required and reliability suffered. Within four years, new orders had been 
directed back to BTH. They were to be the preferred supplier for a further 40 years. 
By the mid 1930s, some lessons had been learned. Miniaturisation of the mid-1930s 
was the clear ambition of the chief rolling stock designer of the Underground, W.S. 
Graff-Baker. He had developed a small team to search for solutions that would get rid 
of the 12-foot long switch compartment on every tube stock motor car. He eventually 
found several varieties of smaller traction equipment derived from tramcar technology 
and smaller air compressors to match them. He tried out various systems before going 
for the big orders. This was a valuable lesson that was sometimes neglected in later 
years.  
In this sequence of development, the usefulness of prototyping was shown in a 
number of cases – regeneration, miniaturisation of equipment, new brake control 
systems and new body designs. That said, some of the systems required significant 
modification after the main production fleet was introduced. The Metadyne 
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regeneration system was not to provide the reliability and performance expected of it 
and it had to be abandoned half way through the life of the O and P stocks to which it 
was fitted. It was learned that even prototyping didn’t always show up the long term 
issues. Also, the small KLL4 compressors were found to be not ideal for use on the 
Underground, even though they had been successful on road vehicles. Another lesson 
learned here was that what may be successful in one environment may not work in 
another. 
Regeneration was a feature that only came reliably with solid state power equipment 
for rolling stock traction. The development of solid state power systems was 
considered sufficiently advanced for it to be taken up in London for the 1992 Tube 
Stock on the Central line and regeneration followed as each line got new stock 
thereafter. It did however cause problems with the 4-rail power supply by rendering 
the previously installed section gaps (to aid earth fault finding) a hindrance to 
regeneration. In the author’s view, this issue remains to be fully resolved, since a 
large number of trains can be stopped by earth fault detection occurring on a 15km 
section of line. Whilst this may not be an issue from the point of view of electrical 
safety or fire risk, it will lead to large numbers of trains being stalled in tunnels and 
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Table 3: Power/weight ratios of LU Rolling stock 1903-2012. The data is converted to imperial 
measurements to allow comparison. Table by Author from various published and unpublished 
sources listed below. 
Line Train Stock + Date Weight Motors Power HP/Ton 
CLR 6-cars Gate 1903 101 tons GE66 4 x 125hp = 500hp 4.95 
LER 6-cars Gate 1906 120 tons GE69 4 x 200hp = 800hp 6.66 
LER 6-cars WJS 1920 161 tons GE212 6 x 240hp = 1440hp 8.94 
LER 7-cars Std. 1931 170 tons WT54 6 x 240hp = 1440hp 8.47 
DR 7-cars B 1905 173 tons GE69 6 x 200hp = 1200hp 6.94 
DR 8-cars F 1920 257 tons GE260 12 x 234hp = 2808hp 10.93 
DR 8-cars F 1925 252 tons GE260 10 x 234hp = 2340hp 9.29 
DR 8-cars G/K/L 1935 232 tons WT54B 8 x 240hp = 1920hp 8.27 
Met 6-cars 1904 158 tons GE76/50M 8 x 150hp = 1200hp 7.59 
Met 6-cars 1905/6 158 tons GE69/86M 8 x 200hp = 1600hp 10.13 
Met 4-cars 1905/6 99 tons GE69/86M 4 x 200hp = 800hp 8.08 
Met 7-cars 1927/9 (T) 243 tons MV152 8 x 275hp = 2200hp 9.05 
LT 7-cars 1938TS 177 tons LT100 10 x 168hp = 1680hp 9.49 
LT 6-cars O Stock 1935 210 tons MV145AZ 12 x 155hp = 1860hp 8.86 
LT 7-cars CP Stock 1960 240 tons MV145AZ 12 x 155hp = 1860hp 7.75 
LT 7-cars R Stock 1947 200 tons LT111 14 x 102hp = 1428hp 7.14 
LT 7-cars 1959TS 144 tons LT112 10 x 102hp = 1020hp 7.08 
LT 8-cars 1967TS 203 tons LT115A 16 x 106hp = 1696hp 8.35 
LT 7-cars 1972TS 164 tons LT115B 12 x 106hp = 1272hp 7.76 
LT 6-cars 1973TS 155 tons LT118 16 x 88hp = 1408hp 9.08 
LT 8-cars A60 Stock 215 tons LT114 16 x 86hp = 1376hp 6.4 
LT 6-cars C69 Stock 155 tons LT117 12 x 116hp = 1392hp 8.98 
LT 6-cars D78 Stock 144 tons LT118B 16 x 88hp = 1408hp 9.78 
LU 8-cars 1992TS 167 tons LT130 32 x 63hp = 2016hp 12.07 
LU 7-cars 1996TS 177 tons LT200 16 x 113hp = 1808hp 10.21 
LU 6-cars 1995TS 158 tons G355AZ 16 x 120hp = 1920hp 12.15 
LU 8-cars 2009TS 194 tons BT 24 x 100hp = 2400hp 12.37 
LU 8-cars S Stock 211 tons BT 32 x 100hp = 3200hp 15.17 
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7 Car Doors and Passenger Flows 
7.1 Introduction 
One of the defining features of an urban railway operation is the volume of passengers 
that have to be handled by the system, both on trains and at stations. This was not 
properly understood in the early days of operation in London and, up to the start of 
World War I in 1914, there was a gradual increase in the traffic on the Underground 
railways that did not particularly stress the train carrying capacity but there were 
problems with station dwell times because of long boarding and alighting times. 
During the war, traffic rose steadily, creating more problems for capacity capability. 
This chapter examines these problems and their solutions and demonstrates the value 
of understanding the relationships between car body design, door placement and 
opening size and the arrangement of seating compared with doorways. It also 
demonstrates the lessons learned from the interaction between passengers boarding 
and alighting from trains and door operation. 
7.2 C&SLR Cars 
One of the defining features of the London Underground is the small size of the tube 
tunnels and the restrictions this places on car body design. The original C&SLR 
tunnels were even smaller (at 10 ft. 2 in) than the ones seen today and the original 
passenger cars were designed to squeeze into this very confined space and to 
negotiate tight radius curves. Each car body was 26 ft. (7.9 m) long and was carried 
on a pair of bogies with relatively small 2 ft. (600 mm) diameter wheels (Greathead, 
1896). A normal size of railway carriage wheel in those days was about 3 ft. 6 ins 
(1150 mm). The trouble was that the C&SLR wheels had to fit under the car floor and 
still leave enough clearance inside the car for people to be able to stand. It was a tight 
fit and it was solved as shown in Figure 33. 
Figure 33: Schematic outline of C&SLR car showing the spatial 
relationship between the wheels and car body and how sufficient 
room was provided for passengers to stand up by sinking the floor as 
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The centre part of the car floor was sunk between the wheels to provide a narrow 
gangway about 3 ft. wide (1150 mm) down the centre of the car. This gave about 6 ft. 
9 ins (2 m) headroom. The two higher sections of the floor, raised to give enough 
clearance for the wheels to negotiate the sharp curves, became longitudinal seats, in a 
style provided on early horse buses. The angle of rotation for the bogies could be up 
to 10° from the centre line. 
The need to allow the wheels to intrude into the floor space remains a feature of tube 
car body design to the present day, even though tunnels have widened to a maximum 
of 12 ft. (3.5 m) in some places and wheel diameters are now 700 to 800 mm (Neil, 
2016). 
The body cross section precluded side doors, so passengers had to access cars through 
the ends. For the original 3-car formation, there were only two entrances. The design 
of the entrances was such that the outer ends of the set could not be used by 
passengers, so only the middle car had entrances at either end. The entrances were 
cleverly designed as open platforms built as discrete units placed between the car ends 
and resting on specially constructed, semi-circular extensions to the bogie frames. The 
platform sides were protected by collapsible, sliding, diamond lattice gates similar to 
a type supplied by a company called ‘Bostwick’ (Figure 34). They were commonly 
used for lifts and station entrances. A man at each platform operated the gates.  
Figure 34: Official photo of a C&SLR car built by the Bristol Wagon & Carriage Works Co. Ltd. in 
1901. It shows the underframe construction where the main longitudes are fitted between the wheels. 
The support brackets for the seating base can be seen placed at intervals along the longitudes. Note 
how the end platforms are fitted over extensions to the bogie frames. The ‘Bostwick type’ sliding 
entrance gates can be seen at the right hand end in this view. Author’s collection. 
7.3 Early MU Cars 
As described in earlier chapters, both the W&C and Central London railways adopted 
motor cars with a duplex floor design to get the required clearance over the motor 
bogies. They also had to allow trailer wheels to intrude through the passenger floor 
with longitudinal seats placed over them to cover the openings. 
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Transverse seats were provided where there was room for them – away from 
entrances and bogies - with longitudinal seats fitted over the bogies. This allowed a 
seating plan for the car which rather quickly demonstrated the usefulness of more free 
floor space near the car exits. The wider clear floor area at the trailing end bogie 
allowed some standing room for passengers near the end exit – a feature which 
originally appeared in US elevated railway cars to encourage passengers to leave 
quickly and which came to London almost accidentally, as it were, but which proved 
equally useful on the busier lines in future years. 
An unusual feature of the W&C motor car, which really was the first tube driving 
motor car, was that it used the one-piece entrance platform system copied from the 
C&SLR. It also had side access doors (one each side) for passengers. W&C trailer 
cars did not have them and other tube car designs did not adopt them until 1914 (LER, 
1914). 
Suggestions for freeing up the floor space by using very small diameter wheels have 
appeared from time to time but there are numerous difficulties with this, notably the 
reduced ability of the smaller wheel (and its bogie) to manage the combination of 
weight and stress involved in carrying the vehicle and the safe guidance of the smaller 
flange profile through point and crossing work. There is also the problem of getting 
the motors down to a suitable size – more on which later. With the lack of a suitable 
solution, the wheel intrusion remains to this day with the result that longitudinal 
seating always has to be provided at the intrusion areas and that this area is not 
suitable for doors. On the Central London and most subsequent tube cars, transverse 
seats could only be accommodated in the section between the two bogies.  
Figure 35: Central London Motor car as built in 1903, taken from a drawing published at the time. The 
four main sections of cab, switch compartment, passenger saloon and entrance platform were derived 
from the Waterloo and City motor car design and were subsequently adopted by the other Tube 
railways. Dawson, 1909. 
The production version CLR motor car (Figure 35) had a 12-foot cab and switch 
compartment section at the front end, on the raised floor over the motor bogie, a 
passenger saloon 33ft 3ins long and the standard 3ft 3inch entrance platform at the 
rear end only. David Jenkinson (1996, p. 415), in his book ‘British Railway 
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Carriages’, rather ungraciously describes the switch compartment as “a tin 
tabernacle”. Whilst perhaps being a little unkind, he was right in that it did have the 
look of a rush job (which it was) and that the subsequent LER gate stock designs were 
“far more cheerful-looking” (Jenkinson, 1996, p. 416).  
At the cab end, there were steps down from the switch compartment to the cab floor. 
The cab floor level was the same as that of the passenger saloon. It had to be to allow 
the driver to stand. It was a curious feature of Underground operation that drivers 
often stood when driving, something rarely seen now on main lines in this country. 
On the Central London, this was because cab seats were not originally provided but 
they were on other lines and eventually on the Central London. The author found 
driving was more difficult when standing because the glazing of the cab windows of 
tube stock was not high enough to give a clear view forward unless the driver of 
average height stooped slightly, doubtless the reason for the addition of seats on the 
CLR cars.  
The CLR motor car was a mixture of wood and steel (Dawson, 1909 pp 346-350). At 
the insistence of the Board of Trade, steel was used in the areas where electrical 
equipment was located but wood was still tolerated for passenger areas. Steel 
construction was not yet generally accepted for car body design at the time, it being 
publicly announced that the drumming noise caused by a steel body would make 
travel very uncomfortable for passengers, even in vehicles travelling above ground, 
let alone in tube tunnels. This was actually a smokescreen, since most car body 
manufacturers were basically still operating as horse-drawn coach-builders and did 
not have the skills to turn out production runs of steel bodies and, if they had tried to 
develop them independently, they would have priced themselves out of the market. 
Many operators were also concerned that car weights would rise and would thus 
increase power consumption. However, some of the more progressive operators of 
underground lines in the US and Britain saw the opportunity to reduce fire risk with a 
steel body and to increase car interior dimensions within a tight structure gauge.  
Britain was ahead of the US in the move towards steel construction. In 1902 the 
Central London decided to buy six trailer cars with all steel bodies from the 
Birmingham Railway Carriage & Wagon Co. and these were delivered in mid-1903 at 
the same time as the new motor cars (Bruce & Croome, 1996, p 16). They were the 
first steel-bodied passenger cars built in Britain and, as far as it has been possible to 
determine, in the world. All tube cars were henceforth built with steel bodies until the 
arrival of aluminium in the 1950s.  
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7.4 LER Cars 
Following the success of the Central London trial steel trailer cars, the Bakerloo, 
Hampstead and Piccadilly lines (known as the London Electric Railway (LER) from 
1910) all went for steel-bodied cars. The Bakerloo was the first, copying the original 
Central London experimental motor car design with a short switch compartment 
(UERL, 1906 Drawing C227), which measured 10ft 6ins including the driver's cab. 
Indeed, Jackson & Croome in “Rails Through the Clay” (1993, p.92), record that 
Granville C. Cunningham, the Central London’s general manager, acted as advisor to 
the Bakerloo. What the UERL did not know at the time was that the CLR switch 
compartment was too small and that experience had shown that it was necessary to 
increase the space for the electrical equipment, as was done for the production CLR 
cars. Later LER cars were also built with a longer switch compartment. 
By 1907, all the Underground lines in London, including the District but with the 
notable exception of the Metropolitan Railway, had accepted the steel body as the 
way forward for car construction. The reason for the Metropolitan's resistance to this 
change is not recorded but it was no doubt based on their traditional approach to 
coach building, to fears about first cost and to the company's penchant for changing 
the bodywork layouts of cars to adapt to traffic needs. Had the bodies been built of 
steel, this sort of work would have been beyond the capabilities of the company's own 
workshop at Neasden and they would have had to outsource it or buy new vehicles to 
cope with changing traffic requirements. From the benefit of our historical 
perspective, we could not now criticise the Met. for this decision, since the LER was 
to run into trouble in the early 1920s when it wanted to add additional doorways to its 
steel cars. Not possessing the skills to do it themselves, they outsourced the work to 
Cammell Laird and Gloucester but they found the business so lengthy and expensive 
(Birkbeck, 1980) they eventually decided to purchase new cars (the Standard Stock) 
when traffic conditions forced an increase in car doorway requirements. 
7.5 More Doors 
The standard US style main line car layout, having a single, full length passenger 
saloon with entrances at the ends, was adopted by most of the London Underground 
companies for their initial electric fleets. This arrangement was based on the idea that 
lines ran from the suburbs into the city centre and that, at each station in the mornings, 
passengers would almost entirely be boarding and that this would be the pattern until 
the train reached the in-town terminus, where it would disgorge all the collected 
passengers in one go. The long dwell time that this generated was required for the 
crew change ends anyway so it had little effect on the service performance. End 
entrances were thus regarded as perfectly adequate for this sort of operation.  
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As urban lines were extended and became cross-town links in large cities like New 
York and Boston, this pattern of operation changed. There was now a substantial 
boarding and alighting traffic at many consecutive central area stations and it quickly 
became obvious that the end entrance arrangements could not cope. Dwell times 
became extended and journey times lengthened. The issue was resolved, at least for 
the time being, by cutting a centre doorway into the passenger saloon. The idea had 
been first tried in New York City on the Manhattan elevated line in 1875 (Sansone, 
2004) and later in Boston, from where it was imported into London for the District 
Railway's new electric cars, which had the feature as part of their original design. It 
was not provided on the Metropolitan's cars as built, nor on any of the tube lines. As 
most of these routes were built as cross-town links, this was soon recognised as a 
mistake and experiments with middle doorways started as early as 1911, only a few 
years after electrification (Jackson & Croome, 1993, p. 93). 
7.6 Early Doors 
The District, on the other hand, was a pioneer in the provision of centre doors. They 
also pioneered powered doors in London, which were provided on the District’s new 
B Stock in 1905 (Figure 36). The doors were controlled from the car ends by 
‘gatemen’ who manipulated valves attached to the outside of the car body ends at 
waist level. The gateman stood between the cars and operated half the doors on the 
cars either side of his position. There was no positive detection to see that all doors 
were closed before starting the train, the gatemen just looking to see if they were shut 
(if they could see) and then passing the OK signal from car to car along the train 
(Connor, 1981, pp. 12-13).  
Figure 36: 4-car unit of District 
Railway 1905 B Stock at Ealing 
Broadway about 1909 after its 
conversion to hand-worked doors. This 
stock was fitted with air powered 
doors when delivered but these were 
poorly designed and slammed shut, 
trapping people and clothing and 
causing injuries. They had brass edges 
instead of the rubber edges used today. 
The conversion to hand operated 
doors took place during 1908. Collection: B.R. Hardy. 
The use of powered doors was, in the author’s view, because it was necessary to find 
a way of closing the doors using one person per car, hence the power operation. Each 
door leaf was operated by a pair of horizontal cylinders mounted at the top. Control 
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was directly through the gateman’s valves. There was one valve for each door leaf. 
Air entered one cylinder to open the door and the other to close it as required. 
Unfortunately, the system was not a success. The door operation was quick but crude. 
There was no anti-slam system and the closure action was rough on anyone who got 
caught in it because the door edges were finished in bronze, not rubber as they are 
today. There were soon claims for injury and torn clothing and they got to be so 
common that they were giving the District a bad press (The Times, 1908).  
A further problem with the system was that an attempt was made to regulate the use 
of the doors. End doors were reserved for boarding passengers while the middle doors 
were used as an exit – well, that was theory. But, it did not work. Philip Dawson, in 
his book ‘Electric Traction on Railways’ (1909, p. 285), wrote, “Unfortunately, 
experience has shown that it is very rarely possible to train passengers in this fashion, 
particularly at rush hours when it is most necessary”. Although notices were placed 
over the doors to show which was for entrance and which for exit, people just did not 
bother with them, even if they read them. 
In the end, the District gave it all up. The air system maintenance was expensive and 
the bad public relations was unlikely to be helping the share price or ticket sales. The 
air operation was withdrawn in 1908 and the doors converted to hand operation so 
that passengers could use them as they wished (MDR, 1908). Apart from a few 
experiments on a car in 1916 (MDR, 1916), the District did not see air operated doors 
again until 1937. It was left to the tube lines to develop them. 
The tube lines also quickly realised that they had to improve the door service if they 
were to maintain service quality and keep up with the demand. Although a bodyside 
door had been designed into the W&C motor cars of 1898, it required an attendant to 
close it before the train could be dispatched. This was not too difficult on a line with 
only two stations that were both terminals but there must have been some 
apprehension at how this might be done on the much longer new tube lines. 
It is worth mentioning at this point that, at the time of their opening, all the 
Underground lines employed a man on each car to operate the entrance gates. The 
standard arrangement on a 6-car train was: Driver, Front Guard, three intermediate 
Gatemen and a Rear Guard. The guards and gatemen stood at the coupling position 
between cars and operated the gates on either side (Jackson & Croome, 1993, pp. 95-
96). Working a central doorway as well would have required some sort of remote 
operation. The District solved the problem by introducing air-operated doors, of 
which more later (see section 6.13), but the tube lines did not develop such a system 
that would fit their car body profile. It just seems to have been too difficult. 
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With only a few years of operational experience, it was realised that adequate door 
service was crucial to the successful operation of a rapid transit railway and the 
Underground looked for ways to improve it. The provision of more doorways was a 
solution but, although this meant that seats would be sacrificed, it did not really 
matter. The average journey time was (and still is) only about ten minutes over much 
of the system so standing time was not considered an issue. Dwell time – the amount 
of time spent at stations boarding and alighting – is much more important and lots of 
wide doorways are essential to keep it short. This was a lesson learned very early on 
in the game and one that is just as important today. 
Figure 37: One of two Leeds Forge-built motor cars delivered to the Bakerloo in 1915, seen here in the 
yard at London Road depot. The car has several new developments in its design. The clerestory roof 
has been replaced by an arched roof to reduce complaints of the cold in winter; a 3’-2” wide opening 
has been cut into the car body to allow a centre entrance doorway and the traction control has 
automatic acceleration. Photo: LT Museum. 
It appears that some experimental conversion work on the fitting of centre doors was 
carried out in 1912 on the Piccadilly Line (Jackson & Croome, 1993, p. 116) but there 
is no detail on what was done and it was only in 1914 that new cars appeared on the 
Bakerloo with centre doors (Figure 37). The design was a single person width, 
automatically closing, inward-swinging, hinged door with a remote locking system 
operated from the gateman’s position. It was far from satisfactory but it was at least 
some relief for passengers trying to get off a motor car where there was previously 
only one exit. 
7.7 Doors - Swing or Slide? 
The introduction of centre doors on tube cars was not without its problems. A section 
through a typical tube car body shows that the height of the bodyside between the car 
floor and the cant rail is only about 5ft 6ins, compared with 6ft 9ins on a surface stock 
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car. This meant that the top of a door positioned in the bodyside was too low to be 
comfortable for most passengers getting on and off the train. The answer was to set 
the door back into the car and to cut away a section of the roof to accommodate the 
height required. The door was hinged because, at the time, no one could see a way of 
making a sliding door fit in this arrangement without using up a lot of the car interior. 
It also had to be partly automated because the gateman was located on the end 
platform to work the gates and did not have the time to fight his way through a crowd 
of passengers to open it. For safety, it was locked between stations but the gateman 
released the lock automatically when he opened the gate at the car end (Jackson & 
Croome, 1993, p. 116). Passengers had to open the door themselves but it was fitted 
with a self-closing mechanism so that it would swing shut when released. It was re-
locked automatically when the gateman shut his gate. 
In 1915, 24 new motor cars were ordered by the CLR for their Ealing extension 
(Jackson & Croome, 1993, p. 128). They marked a further step in tube car 
development with the enclosure of the end platforms. The gates were gone, replaced 
by swing doors but these were still operated by a gateman. The middle door 
arrangements were virtually the same as the 1914 cars. 
In 1920, two further additions to the tube car fleet were delivered - the Watford Joint 
Stock (WJS) and the Cammell Laird Stock (Thomas, 1928). The Cammell Laird 
Stock, a batch of twenty trailers and twenty control trailers ordered for the Piccadilly 
Line, presented the next stage of development in the tube car body with the 
introduction of air operated sliding doors (Prigmore, & Shaw, 1970). Perhaps because 
they were a small batch of cars, they were not always appreciated for the significant 
step in progress they represented. The new door system offered both better station 
dwell times and a reduction in staffing requirements. The height problem had been 
solved by shaping the doors to match the bodyside and roof, thus part of the roof 
became part of the doorway. Because the doors were sliding instead of hinged, they 
did not intrude into the passenger areas in the way that the inward opening gates and 
hinged doors did. It was difficult to get a gate or door open against the weight of 
passengers attempting to get off so the sliding door was the perfect solution. Even 
better, the doors could be operated remotely, so it was no longer necessary to have a 
man on every car. The typical 6-car train went from a 6-man crew if it had gates to a 
3-man crew if it had air doors. 
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Figure 38: A total of 10 x 6-car trains with pneumatically operated siding doors were introduced on to 
the Piccadilly Line in the early 1920s. The motor cars were converted from 1906-built stock while new 
40 trailers and control trailers were supplied by Cammell Laird. This is one of the new trailers. The 
central doorway pillar is clearly shown. Photo: LT Museum. 
7.8 Motor Car Conversions 
Figure 39: Piccadilly line motor car No. 18 in Lillie Bridge depot. This car was originally built in 1906 
as Gate Stock. It was one of two cars converted to air door operation by Cammell Laird in 1921. They 
were provided with a double doorway cut into the centre of the car while the end platform was 
enclosed and provided with remote door controls for the guard. It doubled as a passenger entrance 
when the guard was not in residence. Another 18 cars were converted by Gloucester but they had 
single central doors. A batch of 40 new trailers and control trailers was built by Cammell Laird to run 
with these cars. Photo: LT Museum. 
The motor cars to work the new Cammell Laird stock were converted from existing 
Piccadilly Gate Stock motor cars. Two cars were sent to Cammell Laird's factory in 
Nottingham, where they were fitted with double centre sliding doors and a trailing end 
door in an arrangement similar to their new trailer cars (Figure 39). Another 18 cars 
were sent to the Gloucester Railway Carriage & Wagon Co. but these had single 
sliding doors in the centre (GNPB, 1923). It is not now evident why the double door 
idea was abandoned on the motor cars when it was provided on the new trailers. 
Perhaps it was because the wide opening in the car body required for the double doors 
caused a weakness in the structure but this was apparently solved with a pillar in the 
middle of the double doorway. More likely, it was thought that the wide doorways 
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took too many seat spaces, so the single door was accepted as the preferred option. 
The conversion work done by Cammell Laird and Gloucester was time consuming 
and difficult. The work was outsourced by the Underground because the group did not 
have space in their existing facilities. Lines did their own maintenance and overhaul 
work and this was increasing with the size and age of the fleet, so there was no room 
for conversion work. In 1980, the author met Cyril Birkbeck, who was an 
Underground apprentice at the time of the conversion work and he told of how he was 
sent to Gloucester in 1920 to gain experience. He was the assistant to the 
Underground engineer responsible for the design work, R.G. Sharpe. Cyril described 
the slowness of the job and the constant stoppages due to design problems and 
shortages of men and materials. He said that the bodies were most unsuitable for the 
conversion. Also, few of the people at Gloucester had worked on all-steel bodies 
before. Most of them were carpenters and they had little idea of what to expect. He 
came back with the message that, next time, it would be better to “do it ourselves” 
(Birkbeck, 1980).  
With the introduction of the 1920 Cammell Laird Stock, remotely controlled sliding 
doors became standard for the Underground. More doorways were added for trailers 
in future designs but the motor car set up was pretty well fixed for the next 15 years 
with doorways at the centre and rear of the car. With this new feature, the struggle to 
get station dwell times stabilised had now turned the corner. It only remained now to 
find a way of reducing the size of the traction equipment so that it could fit below the 
floor and free all the above-floor space on motor cars for passengers like surface cars. 
This came in the mid-1930s with the 1936 Tube Stock.  
Figure 40: A Bakerloo train at the 
northbound platform at Waterloo in 1936. 
The car in the foreground is one of the batch 
of 40 cars built by Cammell Laird in 1920. 
The view shows the extreme platform curve at 
this station. Exhortations to “Mind The Gap” 
are nothing new (expect perhaps the 
additional word “Please”) and an 
illuminated ‘Beware of Gap’ sign hanging 
from the platform ceiling is also designed to 
make passengers aware of this problem, together with under platform lights that lit 
automatically as the train arrived. Photo: LT Museum. 
7.9 New Standard Stock 
An ambitious programme for the updating and expansion of the C&SLR was planned 
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immediately after the end of the First World War in 1918 (Jackson & Croome, 1983, 
pp. 132-133). It involved the rebuilding of the existing line to standard tube tunnel 
dimensions, connecting it to the Hampstead line at Euston and extending south to 
Morden and buying new stock to run over the extensions. Six ‘sample’ tube cars were 
built in 1922 to a single basic body configuration (LPTB, 1935). All the cars were 
trailers, apart from one control trailer. The details of construction and interior fittings 
were left to the manufacturers but the body layout and door positions in particular, 
were specified by the Underground. The big change from the previous design – the 
Cammell Laird Stock – was the provision of two double doorways per car side instead 
of one double door and two singles. The two double doors provided a wider opening 
than two single doors. The single doors on the Cammell Laird cars were rather narrow 
at a less than 2ft opening but the Standard Stock double doorway was 4ft 6in wide, 
giving more than a foot of extra opening width per car (LPTB 1935). The Cammell 
Laird end doors were narrow because they were squeezed, with the door engine, in 
between the car ends and the wheel box protecting the bogie. The double doors were 
also somewhat restricted by a stiffening pillar positioned midway in the opening so 
that the two doors were separated. The double doors on the new cars had no pillar. 
Figure 41: General arrangement of 1923 Standard Stock control trailer car built by Cammell Laird. 
The car was still the standard 50ft long but it had two double doorways each offering a clear 4ft 6in 
opening. This general design was used on all batches of new tube trailer cars up to 1930. Collection: 
Author. 
The sample cars entered service on the Piccadilly Line in 1922, coupled between pairs 
of the recently converted Gate Stock motor cars. They were generally regarded as 
successful and were soon transferred to the Hampstead Line for tests on the newly 
opened Edgware extension. Most of the more outlandish furnishings, ranging from 
mock Georgian upholstery to mock Victorian lampshades, which were offered by the 
various manufacturers, were ditched in favour of the Underground's own design, 
which was plain and functional and was embodied in the sample control trailer built 
by Gloucester. The design, both internal and external, remained the standard for 
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several batches of cars ordered between 1923 and 1930.  
Motor cars to match the new Standard Stock trailers were based on the design of the 
Cammell Laird converted Gate Stock cars with double doors in the car centre 
separated by a central pillar (Figure 42). The difference here was that the end door of 
the new cars was not sliding but hinged and it was only used by the guard. As 
mentioned above, at this time there was a guard at each end of a standard 6-car train, 
controlling the doors on his half of the train (formed M-T-CT) so his doorway would 
not be used by passengers. They had only the centre doorway.  
The logic behind this decision was, in the author’s view, because it was cheaper not to 
fit a door engine and controls to the doors at the guard’s positions since, at the busiest 
times when full length trains were running, guards occupied these positions at both 
ends of the train. If a 3-car train was operated, the guard was originally located in the 
control trailer cab when the motor car was leading, so the control trailer cab had to be 
provided with door controls too. The doors of the unused guard's position at the rear 
of the motor car were locked out of use. There was little need for more than one 
passenger doorway on the motor car since the trains were running in the short 
formations only during off-peak periods. 
There were detail bodywork variations in the batches over the years up to 1930 
(Hardy, 1986) but the most significant was the removal of the central pillar in the 
doorways of the 1929 order (Hardy, 1986, p. 46). The removal of this obstruction 
further improved the loading/unloading times. 
Figure 42: General arrangement of 1925 Cammell Laird-built Standard Stock motor car. All motor 
cars of the 1923 to 1928 period were built to this profile and had a pair of central double doors divided 
by a structural pillar. The first batch of cars to appear without the central pillar was built in 1929. The 
trailing end was used only by the guard, who was provided with a hinged door, which was locked when 
out of use. Note the mostly longitudinal seating layout. Collection: Author. 
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7.10 Central London Conversions 
The huge operational advantages of remotely controlled, powered, sliding doors led to 
a search for ways of getting them on every tube line as quickly as possible. The two 
options were replacement or conversion, with conversion as the preferred choice as it 
was thought to be cheaper. Conversion meant enclosing the gate entrances of existing 
cars and altering the bodysides and roof to take sliding doors. The roof of the older 
cars was a particular problem because it had the clerestory down its centre and the 
side sections had a rather flat profile. This would make the top of a door curve 
inwards very sharply. The problem was resolved on new vehicles by arching the roof 
at doorway positions. 
Figure 43: A CLR control trailer car 
after its conversion to air operated 
doors. The end platforms were fully 
enclosed and two single doorways were 
cut into each body side. The conversion 
of these wooden-bodied cars was much 
easier than for the steel-bodied LER 
cars. The doors were controlled through 
a compressed air control pipe operated 
from the guard’s position by a special 
valve, rather like a brake valve. 
Collection: Author. 
The Central London was an early 
target because most of stock had wooden bodies and could be converted 
comparatively easily. One trailer was experimentally done in 1925. It had the gate 
ends enclosed and single doorways cut into the body sides at roughly one third and 
two thirds distance along the length, in a design similar to one of the proposals put 
forward, and then rejected, for the Cammell Laird Stock in 1919. The experimental 
car was tested in service on the Central London and worked well enough, so the 
whole fleet was converted at Feltham (Figure 43) (Electric Railway Journal, 1926, p. 
1050).  
The steel Gate Stock of the LER lines was also examined for its conversion 
possibilities. There was some tinkering with various cars over the next three years 
when several were sent for experimental conversions at Feltham and Birmingham but, 
by this time, the stock had over 20 years in service and was showing signs of its age. 
The technology was outmoded, with old traction motors, manual acceleration, 
Westinghouse air brakes and open end entrances. The need for improved traction and 
braking performance and the huge savings accruing from the elimination of gatemen - 
meant that Gate Stock replacement was viable financially. At first it was proposed 
that only car bodies would be replaced and that electrical equipment would be 
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salvaged from the gate stock. A similar process had been chosen by the District when 
it bought new motor car bodies and fitted them with traction equipment from old 
bodies in the early 1920s but this idea was soon discarded by the LER in favour of 
complete replacement with new motors and control gear (LER, 1927). Deliveries of 
replacement Standard Stock began in 1928 and were completed in 1930. 
7.11 Longer Bodies 
The pressure for improvements to tube car body design was unrelenting throughout 
the 1920s. The need to increase capacity to cope with the rising traffic levels 
generated by the Hampstead and C&SLR extensions to Edgware and Morden and the 
plans to extend other lines, pushed the Underground towards more radical car body 
design solutions. There was the need to keep dwell times down by providing lots of 
doors and by the need to squeeze in as many people as possible. There was little space 
available and what there was had to be maximised. Both these factors led to a push for 
longer cars.  
Figure 44: A trailer of Standard 
Stock built in 1931, seen in new 
condition at Ealing Common 
depot. The 1931 and 1934 
batches of this stock, built for 
the Piccadilly Line, were longer 
than the earlier versions and the 
trailers had single end doors 
added. The body ends were 
slightly tapered to allow the 
longer cars to negotiate the tight 
curves on some of the tunnel 
sections. Photo: LT Museum. 
 
The combination of a single track, small diameter tunnel and some sharp curves 
meant that the LER tube car was basically restricted to a 50ft length and 8ft 8in width. 
Any lengthening of the body would force a narrowing of the width so it could still get 
round the sharp corners at places like South Kensington and Piccadilly Circus. 
Narrowing the width throughout the car length was not considered ideal so a 
compromise solution was implemented where the width was retained but the length 
was increased by tapering the car ends inwards so that the structure gauge would not 
be infringed. The taper was very subtle, almost invisible but it was sufficient to allow 
an extra 10ins at each end of the vehicle. This extra length provided room for 2ft 3in 
end doors and their engines to be added whilst allowing the two pairs of double doors 
to be retained as well. The door service was increased by 30% with this layout (Figure 
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44). A pair of cars with the design were introduced onto the Piccadilly Line in 1930 as 
part of an experimental train being trialled before a bulk order was placed for new 
stock to work the extensions to Cockfosters, Hounslow and Uxbridge (Hardy, 1986, p. 
48).  
The experimental train comprised two motor cars and four trailers. Two of the trailers 
had the additional end doors but the other two retained the existing two double door 
arrangement but they were widened to 5ft 3ins in place of the 4ft 6ins of the older 
cars. Some observations on the efficiency of both types seems to have been done 
when this train entered service and it must have become obvious that more doors 
rather than wider doors was the answer. All subsequent tube cars were provided with 
end doors, so these two prototype cars provided a template for all tube cars built 
since. The design, which has been perpetuated for the 2009 Tube Stock for the 
Victoria Line (built 2008-11), will last for over 100 years. 
More than 40 years after it first appeared, the tapered body concept was developed 
further on the 1973 Tube Stock, when the 52ft car was stretched to give a 58ft car 
(Figure 45). Improved geometry for the setting of the bogie centres, the overhang of 
the body ends, the suspension and the extended tapering of the body shell allowed the 
extra length without loss of width. It also allowed a 6-car train formation to replace 
the 7-car formation used on most tube lines from the mid-1930s.  
Figure 45: A Piccadilly Line 1973 Tube Stock car, showing the extended tapered car ends that allow 
longer cars round the tight curves in tube tunnels. This train is at Ealing Broadway (District), working 
a special service in connection with engineering works in December 2013. Photo: Kim Rennie. 
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The new 6-car ’73 Stock train was 17ft shorter than the older 7-car type. This gave a 
reduction in capacity of about 5%, not what the passenger might think is desirable at 
08:15 in the morning between South Kensington and Knightsbridge (the busiest 
section of the Piccadilly Line) but the number of passenger journeys in London had 
been falling almost every year for the previous 20 years (Chymera, 2014) and it was 
already more than 10% down in real terms. Logic dictated that capacity could be 
reduced without increasing the discomfort for passengers.  
Figure 46: Schematic outline of modern tube car demonstrating the spatial relationship between the 
wheels and car body. It also demonstrates the limits for the provision of doorways. The doorways 
cannot be positioned where the wheels protrude through openings in the car body underframe. The 
openings are protected by the seat box built over them. This means that all tube cars built to date have 
to have longitudinal seats over the bogies. Drawing by Author. 
7.12 Wrong Footed 
The trend towards minimalism for rolling stock design on the Underground continued 
to the mid 1980s. Fleets were reduced in size and train design reflected a belief that 
traffic would continue to fall and that equipment could be reduced accordingly. When 
new stock was designed for the District line in the late 1970s, the long car philosophy 
introduced on the Piccadilly line was continued. The D78 Stock, as the new fleet was 
known, was a surface stock version of the 1973 Tube Stock, both in form and 
equipment. The only major difference was in the door arrangement. Each car had four 
single-leaf doors on each side (  
Figure 47). The doors were only 1200mm wide but this was thought sufficient in an 
era of diminishing loadings. A single-leaf door design was also introduced on some 
new tube cars bought a few years later, the 1983 Tube Stock. It proved to be a 
mistake. 
In 1981-3, a series of political and legal manoeuvres (Carvel, 1983) resulted in fares 
on the London Underground being reduced and in the introduction of a ‘Travelcard’, 
allowing the purchaser to travel unlimited trips within a zone without additional 
payment. These Travelcards also became attached to commuters’ season tickets, 
allowing additional lunchtime or evening trips at no extra cost (Grayling & Glaister, 
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2000, pp 9-10). Despite London Transport’s attempts to restrict this initiative, on the 
basis that it had been downsizing for years and that it no longer had the resources, 
materially or staff-wise to cope with the predicted traffic increases, it was pushed 
ahead by the ruling political regime and it resulted in an explosion of additional 
travel. The Underground was completely wrong-footed and began a rapid back-
pedalling in their rolling stock policy, even having to re-instate trains already 
withdrawn from service for scrapping (Connor, 1989, p. 114). Ever since, the 
Underground has been struggling to cope with ever increasing traffic levels and has 
had to relearn the skills needed to cope with large numbers of passengers under both 
normal and disrupted conditions.  
Figure 47: Schematic of the District 
line D78 Stock showing the seating 
plan of a motor car and the positions 
of the single leaf 1200mm doorways 
introduced with this stock. This 
allowed half the number of door 
engines compared with the C Stock 
then being used on the Circle and 





The first air-doored tube stock, the 1920 Cammell Laird Stock was fitted with 
recycling doors, i.e. the doors re-opened if they struck anything while they were 
closing. The idea that passengers should be protected against being hit by closing 
doors was firmly embedded in the corporate mind after the difficult experiences on 
the District in 1905-8. Recycling doors seemed to offer an excellent solution. 
Engineering drawings seen by the author in the 1980s (since believed lost in a flood) 
and described in his book, Air Door Equipment on the London Underground Train 
(Connor, 1981, Pp. 15-17), showed that each door leaf was fitted with a sensitive 
leading edge as described by Collins (1945). The edge consisted of a 3½-inch deep 
canvas cover fitted over a vertical rod. The rod was linked, through the waist of the 
door, to a reversing valve mounted over the door engine. If the rod was struck, the 
action of the door engine was reversed and the door would immediately re-open.  
As is sometimes the result of such innovative ideas, whilst theory was excellent, it 
soon presented serious problems in the execution. To begin with, the equipment was 
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mechanical, complicated and unreliable and then passengers quickly discovered its 
major weakness. They could prevent door closing by using the system to wait for 
lagging friends and sundry latecomers, especially if the latecomer happened to be an 
attractive lady. A simple tap on the door edge as it closed would allow it to reopen, 
thus securing the gratitude of the lady in question and affirming your status as a 
gentleman - admirable behaviour in polite society but disastrous for the operator 
trying to run a high density urban railway service.  
Delays to the train soon became endemic and the recycling system was quickly 
abandoned and replaced by rubber door edges and sprung arms as described above. 
The name ‘sensitive edge’ however, has stuck and remains to this day.  
Until recently, recycling has remained dormant but it was re-awakened for the recent 
Bombardier-built stocks on the Victoria and Sub-Surface lines under what is 
sometimes described as ‘intelligent’ door control. A door trying to close will retract 
slightly if it hits an obstruction and then it will try to re-close. This happens three 
times, after which the door will close. The stocks also have an anti-dragging system. 
If pressure on the door edge from a dragging object or person could be detected, an 
electronic signal provides an emergency brake application. Teething troubles and 
reliability soon became an issue, particularly on the 2009 Tube Stock. After extensive 
modifications, in which the author was involved, the system seems to have settled 
down to a more reliable level. 
7.14 Surface Stock Bodies 
Figure 48: Metropolitan Railway 
driving motor car introduced in 
1913 as seen at Neasden in March 
1934. Note the centre doors. These 
cars were equipped with two sets of 
traction equipment and four traction 
motors. They were powerful enough 
to allow an 8-car train to operate 
with only two motor cars, one at 
each end. The Metropolitan never 
normally ran trains with more than 
two motor cars. Photo: LT Museum. 
Surface stock development generally followed the tube car pattern. The original 
surface stock, without the structural limitations of the tube lines, could have all the 
traction equipment under the car floors. The design also imported the US style of 
clerestory roofed body on both the District and Metropolitan Railways. The District, 
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being under the same ownership as the Tube lines, tended to follow a similar 
development path where possible but the Metropolitan took a different direction. 
While the District soon adopted steel bodywork, the Met. stayed with the traditional 
wooden framed body (Figure 48) until 1932, just a couple of years before its takeover 
by the LPTB. It also split its rolling stock into long distance and short distance types.  
The Metropolitan’s first production orders for electric stock consisted of saloon-type 
cars with open, gated end platforms (Benest, 1964, p. 53). They were very similar to 
the original Sprague-equipped cars built for the Chicago South Side Elevated. Later 
batches had enclosed ends and the earlier ones were converted to match to overcome 
complaints of cold and draughts. Unlike the District, centre doors were not provided 
at first. This proved to be a mistake and the Metropolitan began fitting additional 
doors into existing cars from 1911 (Benest, 1964, p. 90). There were a couple of trials 
with different door sizes and positions but the final solution was a double-door 
configuration, similar to the District’s in many respects. They had realised, like the 
District and Tube lines, that dwell time management was critical and that 
improvements to the entrance/exit system were essential to this management. 
Figure 49: Metropolitan 
Railway 3rd Class Saloon Stock 
trailer car no 103 of 1921, as 
seen at Neasden in March 1934. 
Like the contemporary District 
stock of 1920 (The F Stock), this 
design had three sets of double 
doors. After 15 years of 
operating a high volume urban 
railway, the Underground 
companies realised that more 
doors were needed to keep 
station dwell times down to a 
reasonable level. Photo: LT Museum 
At the time, the Met. used both saloon and compartment stock and some trains were 
run with a mixture of both. Some people within the organisation were becoming 
convinced that compartment stock, with swing doors to each compartment, was better 
at loading and unloading passengers than trains with sliding doors. To test their 
theory, they introduced swing doors to a set of rebuilt saloon-bodied cars with 
rearranged seating and put it into service in 1919, calling it the “Hustle Train” 
(Benest, 1966, p.150). They were so proud of it they even invited the District and 
LER management to have a look at it but those who attended the viewing reported 
 
Managing Technical & Operational Development PhD Thesis 
 
Piers Connor 140 
 
back that they did not think it offered any significant benefits over sliding door stock. 
Evidently, the Met management agreed with them, since their next orders for new cars 
reverted to sliding doors – with three sets, very similar to the arrangement on the 
District’s F Stock (Figure 49). 
During this time, the Met still specified compartment stock for its longer distance 
services, mostly steam hauled. When they needed new electric stock following the 
opening of the Watford branch and the extension of electrification to Rickmansworth, 
they went for compartment stock, which was eventually to become known as the 
T Stock (Bruce, 1983, pp. 72-75). They knew that their long distance passengers 
preferred compartments and lots of seats but that passengers on the inner suburban 
and Circle services would have to put up with saloon stock having less seats and more 
standing space if they were to get on the trains at all.  
7.15 Footboards and Flares 
A feature of all the pre-1936 surface stocks was a wooden footboard mounted along 
the outside of the bodysides at floor level. It was designed to ‘oversail’ the platform 
edge. It was added to the original District Railway cars soon after electrification to 
prevent accidents where passengers slipped between the platform edge and the car 
body.  
Figure 50: Traditional and modern 
designs seen at Croxley on the 
Metropolitan line’s Watford branch 
about 1961. On the left is a 
compartment type T Stock train of a 
design originally dating back to 1910 
while, on the right is a P Stock train, 
introduced in the late 1930s. The flared 
bodyside skirt of the P Stock was 
designed to replace the footboard of the 
older designs but to retain a cover over 
the gap between the train floor and the platform edge. Collection: B.R. Hardy.  
Unfortunately, it led to a number of accidents in its own right. Doors were sliding but 
manually operated by the passengers and they were not locked while the train was 
moving. Indeed, during the warmer weather, they were often left open to aid 
ventilation; perhaps not what we would have in mind today as a means of ‘cooling the 
tube’. Back in the days of hand-worked doors, some of the livelier passengers, 
anxious to catch a departing train, took to jumping onto the footboard and clinging to 
the door handles while they struggled to open the doors. Occasionally, they fell or 
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were injured when they were hit by the tunnel wall or bits of equipment as the train 
left the station. If they were spotted, the guard would stop the train, but this would 
cause a delay. In a novel idea to eliminate these problems, Graff-Baker came up with 
a scheme which eventually became an icon for rolling stock design.  
The idea was to flare out the bottom edge of the door so that it covered the footboard. 
This made it impossible to stand on the step. The body panels along the rest of the car 
were flared out to match so that the oversail feature was retained along the whole car 
and the gap between the train and platform was still protected. A feature was that the 
bodyside slope at floor level was duplicated at the top of the windows in the covers 
for the glazed ventilators (Moss, 2000, pp. 68-75). The unique symmetry of this 
design became a feature of the Underground’s surface stock for the next 35 years. The 
design was provided on 811 vehicles built between 1937 and 1959 and was only 
superseded by the introduction of the A Stock, with its wider body profile, in the early 
1960s (Moss, 2000, pp. 93-95). 
Figure 51: Side elevation of A Stock trailer car of 1960. The three sets of double doors were a 
return to a 1920s design adopted on both the Metropolitan and District railways. Drawing 
TfL (2003). 
The second generation of sub-surface stock built in the late 1930s were given the 
same body/door configuration as the contemporary tube cars. This arrangement 
survived after the second world war until the arrival of the replacement stock for the 
Metropolitan line known as the A Stock, introduced between 1960 and 1964. 
Although the driving cars retained the traditional arrangement, the trailer car design 
reverted to the early 1920 design with three sets of double doors per side (Figure 51). 
This was followed by the C Stock of 1969 (much disliked by the author for its poor 
driver amenities and dreadful handling), which had four sets of double doors per car 
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7.16 Refurbishment 
A feature of London Underground rolling stock is longevity. The 1938 Tube Stock 
lasted almost 50 years in passenger service and the current 1972 Tube Stock on the 
Bakerloo line is now (2017) 45 years old. The 1972 Stock is currently going through a 
refurbishment programme to correct structural problems resulting from its age. It is 
also being modified to comply with Rail Vehicle Accessibility Requirements 
(RVAR). This project offers an example of the use of historical knowledge to inform 
the development of the project and to reduce the expected cost of the work. 
7.17 Space Train 
In the drive to maximise the capacity available on the deep level tube lines, engineers 
on LU began looking at a concept design for a new tube train that could carry 40% to 
45% more passengers within the existing tunnel profile. At the time, the initial view 
was that the Victoria Line should be tackled first because the 1967 stock was already 
30 years old and was earmarked for replacement within the next 10 years. It was also 
a stand-alone line, with no service connections with other lines to complicate matters 
during the replacement phase. 
The new train design was called ‘Space Train’ (Moss, 2000, pp. 218-222). The Space 
Train concept looked to articulation to open out the floor area of the train and to 
provide open gangways between cars to aid passenger circulation and improve 
ventilation. The Victoria Line version was to have 12 articulated cars mounted on 13 
bogies, giving a train length of 137·6 m. The Victoria Line’s 1967 Stock had a length 
of 129·8 m for 2 x 4-car units. It was envisaged that, with fully-automatic operation 
and platform screen doors, it would be possible to fit 24 double-doors, each with a 
clear opening of 1664 mm, inside the 132·6 m distance available at platforms. 
Figure 52: Model of the 
Underground’s Space Train concept. 
The idea was to widen the car body 
shape to match more closely the 
tunnel diameter. Car bodies were to 
be articulated with wide car 
connections. There was also an idea 
that the positive current collection 
would be at roof level and the return 
through the running rails. Photo: 
London Underground. 
Two other important features of the Space Train were the cross sectional shape of the 
cars and the lower floor. The Space Train was to be wider at the waist level than 
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existing tube cars to more closely match the circular tunnel profile (Figure 52). This 
made it some 436 mm wider at waist height than existing stock. The floor was to be 
set low enough to give level access to and from LU's 520 mm high tube platforms. 
This would have needed some cutting back of platform edges. Much of the increase in 
floor area was to be obtained by having seats set back to exploit the near-circular 
cross-section of Space Train. 
7.18 Standing Room Only 
Space inside metro trains is precious, so careful calculations are used to determine the 
best layouts in terms of maximising capacity. LU assumes an average of seven 
standing passengers per square metre (pax/m2) of available floor space. This is made 
up of 8pax/m2 in the doorway areas and 6pax/m2 in seating areas. Because people do 
not tend to stand that close to each other because of bags and papers, there is also an 
‘observed’ estimate of 5pax/m2. The floor area for standing excludes seats, which are 
counted separately and 300 mm in front of each seat to allow for feet. As a 
comparison, loading in Hong Kong’s metro system is calculated at 10pax/m2.  
The low floor design was a big part of the Space Train concept. The scheme 
originated from the idea of a roof-mounted conductor rail, with running rail return, 
which was to replace the traditional 4-rail traction system. The roof was to be 
flattened slightly to allow a pantograph to be added and the conductor rail was to be 
of an inverted light alloy rail with a stainless steel cap fitted within the 200 mm 
available between train roof and tunnel lining. To accommodate the roof mounted 
current collection and maintain internal height, the floor had to lowered (Figure 53). 
The lowering of the floor reduced the space under the cars for motors, wheels, air 
reservoirs and other equipment. A complete redesign was necessary. 
Figure 53: A photo of two models 
to compare the cross sections of 
(left) a 1996 Tube Stock car and 
(right) the Space Train. The body 
of the Space Train was 218 mm 
wider than the 1996 Tube Stock. 
Photo: London Underground. 
 
Some models of the Space Train were produced (Figure 53) but no further work was 
done after development was killed by the private-public partnership (PPP) proposal 
announced in March 1998. No one could see a private company, appointed to manage 
the maintenance and upgrade of the Underground, paying for the development of a 
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new train design that they could not guarantee would meet the capacity and reliability 
requirements of the PPP contract. Traditional and risk-free design was to be continued 
while the growing need for improvements and for continued knowledge based 
development stopped. 
7.19 The Siemens Initiative 
The PPP scheme was not a success for all sorts of reasons but it was finally killed by 
the absence of the political will to make it survive and by the shaky financial control 
exercised by almost everyone who had anything to do with it. In 2008, ten years after 
the original concept of the PPP and just six years after contracts were first signed, the 
whole edifice started to collapse when Metronet, the company set up to look after the 
Bakerloo, Central and Victoria Lines and the sub-surface routes, went into 
administration and their operation came back under the control of London 
Underground. Tube Lines, who were responsible for the Jubilee, Northern and 
Piccadilly Lines, came back into the fold in 2010.  
Figure 54: A Siemens 
designed mock-up of a 
future tube train, 
suggested another 
articulated design. The 
mock-up was unveiled in 
London on 8th October 
2013. Photo: Kim 
Rennie. 
Just a year after the demise of Tube Lines in 2011, a Siemens initiative revealed a 
new design for tube rolling stock with a concept they referred to as ‘EVO’ (short for 
evolution), to create interest in a new approach to tube car design (Figure 54). They 
offered a distinctively styled cab with a front end deliberately aligned to the LU 
roundel. They also expected to use a form of articulation to reduce the number of 
bogies under the train. To allow this within the small tube dimensions, a ‘tractor-
trailer’ arrangement of car coupling was proposed, so that the bogies would not 
interfere with the walk-through area. Most cars would have only one bogie instead of 
two. This reduced weight but it would mean shorter cars. 
Siemens worked on a novel concept to provide on-board air-conditioning and a 
solution to the problem of dispersing the heat generated by trains, an ever continuing 
challenge within the restricted tube tunnel profile. The proposed system envisaged 
train mounted tanks containing a “phase-changing polymer” (RGI, 2013) that would 
be cooled to below its freezing point while the train was running above ground, while 
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on underground sections, the heat generated from the air-conditioning system would 
be used to melt the polymer again. 
The new train was expected to produce less heat than existing stock, being 30% more 
energy-efficient and 20% lighter than other recent designs. Low-profile LED lighting 
was to be used to help maximise headroom. Other proposals included screens for 
advertising and a smart information system, to provide passengers at stations with 
real-time information on which parts of the next train were least busy. 
Siemens offered a train that could be used under manual driving, automated operation 
with a driver in the cab, automated operation with no cab but with a member of staff 
on-board, or unattended automatic operation. 
The train was designed to be adaptable if automation was to be brought in after the 
stock entered service. The wall separating the cab from the passenger area could be 
removed to create more passenger space.  
Siemens hoped, in vain as it turned out, that invitations to tender for LU's Piccadilly 
Line fleet replacement would be issued in 2012. Orders for the Bakerloo, Central and 
Waterloo & City lines could take the total requirement to around 250 trains.  
7.20 New Tube for London 
The Siemens idea did not lead to a train order from LU but it did have a sequel in 
another design initiative originally known as the ‘Deep Tube Programme’ or DTP but 
it was rebranded as ‘New Tube for London’ (NTfL) early in 2013. The design 
eventually made public on 9th October 2014 (when the author was invited to attend) 
showed a strong affinity to the Siemens concept, not surprising since there is little that 
can be done to a metal tube tightly fitting within a metal tube. The devil is in the 
detail, which was carefully moulded by PriestmanGoode, the design company 
originally founded by Jane Priestman (who was once responsible for design on British 
Rail) and now run by her son, Paul (Figure 55).  
Like the Siemens train, NTfL is designed for eventual unmanned automatic operation 
but will not run with it at first, if at all. It will feature a full driving cab but the units 
will be designed to allow the division between this and the passenger saloon to be 
removed in the future.  
Overall, the cars are shorter than the current designs, with two, wider door openings 
per side and walk through access. In a repeat of a significant design error first seen on 
the 1967 Tube Stock for the Victoria line, there are no cab side doors. Access is from 
the passenger saloon. On the Victoria line, this led to problems where train crew 
 
Managing Technical & Operational Development PhD Thesis 
 
Piers Connor 146 
 
changes taking place at Seven Sisters caused delays to trains because the driver was 
unable to reach the cab quickly as he had to struggle to pass through a crowd of 
standing passengers in the narrow aisle leading between the seats to the cab door. To 
resolve the problem, cab fronts were fitted with handrails and step plates to allow 
access from the platform across the front of the cab to the middle door. A similar 
arrangement had to be adopted on the Bakerloo line, which uses the similarly 
designed 1972 Tube Stock. The absence of cab doors may have to be re-thought if the 
new trains are to be introduced with drivers. 
One area exercising the minds of designers is the motor and drive system. To get the 
low floor, wide gangway system, both the Space Train and Siemens designs showed 
that motors and wheels need to be smaller than the current designs. Smaller motors 
means that there would need to be more of them to match or improve upon existing 
performance and smaller wheels leads to thoughts about how they would perform 
through some of the very sharp curves and tight points and crossing installations on 
the older tube lines.  
Figure 55: Beginning life as the ‘Deep Tube Programme’ (DPT) the ‘New Tube for London’ 
(NTfL) concept included a new train design as shown here. This owes something to both the 
original Space Train concept and the Siemens ‘Inspiro’ in terms of the look of the train but 
the treatment of the detailed design is, in the author’s view, the best of the three. The detail 
work by the design house PriestmanGoode is well done. Photo: TfL. 
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7.21 Aspirations 
The aspirations for the NTfL train include: 
• No fixed on-board staff position; 
• Forward facing cameras and obstacle detection at the front; 
• Shorter, walk-through cars – 10 car bodies would replace an existing 7-car train; 
• Articulation and walk through facilities; 
• Fewer bogies and smaller wheels; 
• An on-board ‘power supply’ to enable it to move forward in case of a traction current 
failure; 
• Remote ‘push out’ capability; 
• Interior air and humidity control; 
• 10% less weight per m; 
• Permanent magnet motors; 
• Some trains equipped with built-in infrastructure monitoring systems. 
It is clear that designing the new stock needed for the Underground will not be a 
simple task if all the aspirations are to be met. A complex series of interacting and 
interfacing engineering and operating issues on the trains are interwoven with equally 
complex infrastructure and control system requirements (TfL, 2014). This means that 
the desire to provide a frequent and reliable service for the passenger will only be 
achieved if a system engineering and integration approach is adopted at all levels. 
London Underground has, despite many attempts by policy makers to interfere from 
time to time, had a fairly successful record in this respect over the last 125 years, as 
the author has attempted to show in this research. And, the London Underground’s 
heritage and reputation for innovation, tempered with the need for reliability, is still 
alive and well, as the new design proposals for the tube lines are showing us today. 
7.22 Summary 
From the author’s research into the development of car body layouts, a clear pattern 
has emerged: That body design improvements were largely capacity driven. The 
passengers’ traditional idea that ‘everyone should get a seat’, was quickly dispelled 
within days of Tube line openings in the early 20th Century. The interiors of cars 
were designed for maximum standing space, particularly near exits and passengers 
soon adopted the idea. As traffic grew, station stop management became important. If 
the number of trains required to carry the traffic offering was to be maintained, dwell 
times had to be reduced. This meant car design had to allow for rapid unloading and 
loading. Seats were sacrificed for entrances and exits and the relationship between 
door location and passenger flows became crucial.  
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Some experience in car layouts on urban railways had been imported from America 
but modifications to their designs included the introduction of centre doors and the 
enclosure of the open gated ends and, from circa 1912, remotely operated doors were 
trialled, followed by more door openings per car, longer cars and the sacrifice of more 
seats. On the tube cars, the low floor required wheels to penetrate the passenger space 
so seating had to be designed to suit and door positions became fixed. By 1930, tube 
car layout and door positions became fixed and they remain the same to this day 
(section 6.10 et seq.).  
Up to the 1970s, the only radical improvement was the provision of four sets of 
double doors per car side for the Circle & Hammersmith line’s C Stock. This was 
easily done on the sub surface lines because of their larger structure gauge. But, by 
the 1970s, some of the drivers for better dwell times were lost as traffic levels fell, 
and this resulted in the reduced door openings provided on the D Stock. Now, after 20 
years of continually rising traffic levels since the recovery of the mid-1980s and 
expectations of further growth (TfL, 2014), dwell time management and its 
relationship with train door design is more important than ever and this must continue 
to drive improvements.  
The next phase of car body design, represented by the New Tube for London, 
attempts to break out of the 1930s body configuration dependency by introducing 
articulation and wide, open walkways between tube cars. It also aspires to all double 
doorways spaced evenly through the train length. In the author’s view however, the 
currently planned absence of side cab doors does not align with the idea that the new 
trains will start operating with drivers (Section 7.19) before conversion to unattended 
automatic operation. This last issue presents a clear example of how corporate 
memory loss can affect the future performance of a railway system and that some 
means of retaining it is essential. 
7.23 Conclusions 
This chapter has demonstrated that bringing a new system into passenger service 
without an adequate trial period or a prototype is bound to lead to trouble. The District 
Railway’s new fleet of trains introduced in 1905 with powered doors proved 
unreliable and even dangerous and had to be withdrawn within three years. The 
LER’s introduction of powered doors in 1920 was more considered and they 
introduced the new system with a prototype train but it showed problems with the 
door recycling system and this feature had to be quickly withdrawn. Although a 
prototype was used then, even by 2009, the lesson had not been learned and an 
expensive and untried “sensitive edge” was installed on the whole fleet of 2009 Tube 
Stock. Over the years since, the author has been involved in some of the various 
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attempts that have been made to get better reliability but they have not proved to be a 
success. 
This chapter also shows that it is wise to moderate radicalisation with prototyping. 
The idea of “evolution not revolution” should not be lost. In particular, the proposals 
for New Tube for London (NTfL), incorporating many new and largely untried 
systems, arguably present a very high risk for a planned production run of 250 trains. 
From his experience, the author would propose that there should be at least two 
prototype trains tried out in passenger service. 
The importance of reliable and adequate door service is another lesson to be learned. 
As an example, the decision to reduce the D Stock door width in order to save on 
equipment and reduce weight was to prove a serious drawback whenever there was a 
higher than normal level of traffic. A similar design was also provided on the 1983 
Tube Stock and this led to its early demise, long before it was life expired. Here, it 
was forgotten that a train is a high investment commitment and has a long life and 
therefore must be designed to cope with a wide range of traffic levels. These lessons 
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8 Bogie Design 
8.1 Introduction 
The interface between the railway wheel and the track that guides it is a crucial part of 
the railway system. If a vehicle is to present anything close to a satisfactory ride for 
its passengers, the arrangement of the suspension and the bogie that acts as the 
interface between the car body and the wheels. This chapter looks at the development 
of the bogie on the London Underground as used for electric traction and seeks to 
show the somewhat difficult progress towards a comfortable and sustainable bogie 
design. From this development story, a number of lessons have been learnt. Some 
others, the author fears, may not have been learnt. 
8.2 US Bogies 
Perhaps the easiest way to understand bogie design development on the Underground 
is to look to the US, where the railway bogie was invented in 1831 by John B. Jervis 
(Shinn et al, 1885) and where a simple version was developed which is now called the 
3-piece bogie (Figure 56). The US-designed bogies that appeared on the Underground 
at the turn of the twentieth century showed their origins in the features of the 3-piece 
design.  
Figure 56: Drawing of 
US 3-piece freight car 
bogie that was the 
foundation for the 
American designs used 
on the early London 
Underground electric 
stock. This diagram is 
useful to see the main 
parts of a bogie. The 
bolster sat on top of the 
bolster springs and carried the car body on the two side bearers. Thus, the whole weight of 
the car body was carried by four sets of bolster springs. The centre pin acted to retain the 
bogie and body in alignment and allowed the bogie to turn to follow curves in the track. In 
this design, the wheelsets were not equipped with springs. On passenger bogies, each 
wheelset axle has springs at each end. Collection: Author. 
The 3-piece bogie became almost universal in North America for freight cars. It did 
not provide a wonderful ride and better versions were developed for passenger cars 
but the freight version has survived to the present day and versions of it are used in 
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Britain on some freight vehicles. Along with this design, more sophisticated bogies 
have been developed for passenger cars. 
It should be mentioned here that the Americans always referred to bogies as ‘trucks’, 
and still do. The Underground, who had adopted the American word ‘car’ instead of 
the British ‘coach’ or ‘carriage’, also called bogies trucks and the author recalls that 
the Underground’s vehicle overhaul works at Acton still had its ‘truck shop’ until it 
was closed in the late 1980s. 
8.3 The Equaliser Bar Bogie 
The next stage of bogie development in the US was the equaliser bar bogie. This was 
developed for passenger vehicles in the 1860s (White, 1978, p. 500) and eventually 
became standardised by the Master Car Builders (MCB) association (now the 
Association of American Railroads or AAR) in America as the ‘ideal’ bogie design 
(Hitt, 1911, p.37). It first appeared in Britain under Pullman cars introduced on the 
Midland Railway in 1874 (Jenkinson, 1996, p. 208). It never really found favour here 
but versions of it were used on various Underground lines in the early years of 
electrification (Figure 57) and a more mature version appeared under British Railways 
coaches in the late 1950s and early 1960s as the ‘Commonwealth’ bogie.  
Figure 57: A District Railway trailer bogie, known as Type K, as built for the new 1905 B 
Stock for electrification. This was an example of the equaliser bar type. The bar (shown in 
light grey) connected the two axleboxes on each side on the bogie. The bogie frame sat on two 
coil springs mounted on the bar. The effect was to try to equalise movement between front and 
rear wheelsets and thus minimise the effect of wheelset movement on the bogie frame. The 
bogie also had a swing bolster. Drawing: Adapted by the Author from an original by the late 
Stuart Harris. 
The equaliser bar bogie was a much more sophisticated design than the 3-piece bogie 
and it incorporated two new developments – the swing bolster and equalised primary 
suspension. On the original 3-piece bogie, the bolster was just one piece but the swing 
bolster arrangement had four main parts – a set of four swing links, a spring plank, a 
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pair of springs and the bolster itself (Figure 58). The spring plank was hung from the 
transoms by steel rods or ‘swing links’ which allowed it to move from side to side 
within the space between the side frames. The plate was thus able to float or swing – 
therefore ‘swing bolster’. The clearance at the ends was quite small – about 2 inches 
or 50mm so there was a limit to the movement but it was sufficient to reduce the 
effects of the sideways movement of the bogie, an effect known as ‘hunting’. The 
spring plank (it was originally wooden, hence the ‘plank’ in the name, which has 
stuck to this day) carried the springs. Then the bolster (which was also wooden in 
some early examples) sat on top of the springs and the car body sat on top of the 
whole assembly.  
Figure 58: This drawing shows a cross section of a bogie with a ‘swing bolster’ suspension 
system. The swing bolster consists of four main elements: The bolster, two sets of leaf springs, 
the spring plank and two sets of swing links. The bolster sits on top of the springs (leaf 
springs in this design), the leaf springs sit on the spring plank, which is suspended from two 
pairs of swing links. The swing links hang down from fixings on the bogie transoms - the two 
cross members (only one is shown here) that are fixed to the bogie side frames. When the car 
body is lowered on to the bogie, it rests on the two side bearers fitted on top of the bolster and 
is located by a pin that fits into the centre pivot. Drawing: Modified by Author from original 
drawing of early American bogie. 
Both the District and Central London adopted the equaliser bar bogie but in different 
guises. The District used it at the trailing positions on its 1905 B Stock (Figure 57) 
while the Central London used it as a motor bogie on the 1903 motor cars (Street 
Railway Journal, 1902, p. 604). The design had two sets of springs. The equaliser bar 
suspension used both coil and laminated springs. They were often used in 
combination. Coil springs tend to be bouncy whilst laminated springs are more 
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sluggish in response. The combination of the two on a bogie work in opposition to 
each other and they provided a means of softening the ride whilst maintaining 
stability.  
Going back to the swing bolster setup, we should note that it was not unique to the 
equaliser bar bogie (Figure 58). It was adopted by most bogie designers both in 
Britain and US. It remained popular until the 1960s when the first examples of solid 
bolsters and air springs began to appear here. The equaliser bar design was always a 
US favourite but it made little impact here, largely because it was considered too 
heavy. Its main use on the Underground was on the District, the Waterloo & City and 
the Central London Railway. The ones on the District had cast steel side frames, with 
the rest of the structure pre-fabricated and assembled with bolts and locknuts. They 
did not wear very well on the District’s poor track and they were gradually replaced 
by a traditional British design. The Central London design lasted the life of the stock 
and then survived until the 1980s, when the author saw them under the tube stock 
electric sleet locomotives. 
8.4 Hedley’s Bogie 
Figure 59: The District and UERL tube lines used a common motor bogie with a cast steel 
frame designed by Frank Hedley of Chicago and New York. The frame sat on coil springs 
placed in ‘spring cups’ fitted to the axleboxes. The standard spring bolster provided the 
secondary suspension. The design was not successful on the District and bogies had to be 
replaced on many cars over the years but it did last on the tube lines. There is much evidence 
to suggest that the poor quality of the District’s track had a lot to do with their bogie 
problems. Drawing: Adapted by the Author from an original by the late Stuart Harris. 
Another US bogie to see service on the Underground was the 1905 District and LER 
motor bogie originally designed for use in Chicago by Frank Hedley (Carlson & 
Keevil, 1976, p. 189). Hedley was one of Charles Yerkes engineers who came to 
London for a short time to assist with the electrification of the District. He had 
designed bogies for both the South Side and North Western elevated lines in Chicago 
 
Managing Technical & Operational Development PhD Thesis 
 
Piers Connor 154 
 
and then went on to become General Superintendent of the Interborough Rapid 
Transit (IRT) subway in New York City. His designs had the standard swing bolster 
arrangement but were quite different from the equaliser bar design in having 
individual axlebox suspension and one-piece cast steel side frames.  
The Underground’s bogie (Figure 59) had a new feature was that the axleboxes had 
extension wings to their castings which formed ‘spring cups’ on either side. These 
carried coils springs upon which the main bogie frame rested, also using spring cups. 
The two axleboxes on a side were connected by a steel strap, fixed to their bases, 
which acted as a stiffener. 
The 1905 Hedley design was used as the motor bogie for all the original London 
Electric Railway (LER) Gate Stock and the District’s B Stock. Almost 400 of them 
were built. The design originated in Chicago and later versions of it appeared in New 
York City when Hedley moved there. The main side frame appears to have been made 
up of a single cast steel piece which rested on the axlebox springs. The casting 
comprised diagonal and vertical members acting as stiffeners to the main longitudinal 
piece so it offered a completely different visual impact compared with the 1903 
version. In fact, from the side, it vaguely resembled the 3-piece freight bogie. 
The bogie, designated type A by the District, gave problems (MDR, 1911). Cracked 
frames were the most common. One suspects this was partly due to quality control but 
it would seem that the condition of the District’s track defeated both the US designed 
bogies which were tried on it and both were eventually replaced with British designs. 
A cast steel frame presents a more rigid structure than say, a riveted frame, so it 
would be more prone to fractures. Its one advantage is that it is generally cheaper to 
produce than the typical British design requiring riveting (Graff-Baker, 1952, p. 320). 
8.5 British Bogies 
The basic difference between the traditional British bogie and the American ‘truck’ 
was that the British used steel plate or pressed steel sections instead of the cast steel 
frames preferred in the US. The pressed steel was formed into wide but shallow 
channel sections to give strength and pieces were riveted together to form the frame.  
On the Underground, the Metropolitan Railway was, as far as bogies were concerned, 
British to the core. They stuck to the traditional design which was standard on almost 
all GB railways (Figure 60). They used the pressed steel format for all the stock built 
from 1904 until a plate frame version appeared under the 1925 motor cars and 
subsequent vehicles (Snowden, 2001). 
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Figure 60: Standard Metropolitan Railway plate-frame trailer bogie (later referred to as 
Type MR) with laminated (leaf) primary springs and coil bolster springs. The leaf springs rest 
on top of the axleboxes and are fixed to the side frame with brackets attached to ‘spring 
hangers’. These spring hangers have to allow for spring movement at the connections so they 
are usually hooked over the spring ends. At the bracket end, it is usual to have an additional 
small ‘hanger bracket’ spring, which can be a steel coil or rubber. The usual sprung bolster 
is provided but with coil springs. A similar but heavier design was used for motor bogies. The 
brake rigging is not included on this drawing, originally by J. Snowdon (2001) and adapted 
by the Author. 
Once the District discovered that the new-fangled American bogies could not hack it 
on their track, they too resorted to the traditional British design. All the bogies 
produced for the District from 1910 onwards conformed to this pattern until the 
appearance of the welded designs of the late 1930s. The LER also adopted British 
style bogies for all cars built after the original Gate Stock of 1905-7. Only the Central 
London went American for a second time when they ordered MCB bogies for the 
1915 Ealing Stock but these were soon replaced by plate-frame bogies when the duty 
cycle on the Bakerloo service to Watford proved too much for them. 
Figure 61: Trailer bogie 
used under the LER stocks 
originally built for the 
Bakerloo, Hampstead and 
Piccadilly lines in 1906-7. 
The design seems very 
flimsy but it lasted the 25-
year life of the stock in 
passenger service and survived another 20 years under some cars used as engineer’s vehicles. 
It must have given quite a harsh ride with such small springs. Note the large castings (in dark 
grey) added to carry the brake hangars. There seems to have been some sort of swing bolster 
but it was in a very tight space. Drawing: Adapted by the Author from an original by the late 
Stuart Harris. 
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8.6 Tube Trailer Bogies 
Because of the very restricted space under tube cars, their trailer bogies were 
compact, to say the least. The original LER Gate Stock bogies had a low slung frame 
but it was a much lighter affair than the designs used for later stocks. There is little 
information about it but photos and drawings show that the frame rested on small coil 
springs mounted on top of the axleboxes (Figure 61). Also, it seems to have been pre-
fabricated from steel parts. Similar versions of it can be seen under the Cammell Laird 
trailers of 1920 but the 1914 built cars for the Bakerloo used plate-framed bogies. 
There are no obvious reasons for this inconsistency.  
By the mid 1920s tube car bogies had miniaturised plate frames designed to fit under 
the car floors (Figure 62). The shape of the side frame reflected this restriction. It was 
dropped low in relation to the axles and the outline at the top followed the wheel’s 
shape so it could fit into the opening in the car floor. Motor bogies (Figure 63) were 
larger and heavier and some were of such robust design that they have lasted to the 
present day under battery locomotives. 
Figure 62: 1927 tube trailer 
bogie known as the W2 
Type used under many 
Standard Tube Stock cars. It 
had a 5ft wheelbase and 
27inch wheels. The design 
was based on traditional 
British principles with a 
riveted frame but it had leaf 
springs for both primary and secondary suspension in an attempt to restrict movement within 
the confined space. The frame was also specially shaped to fit within the low height tube car 
underframe. Drawing: Adapted by the Author from an original by the late Stuart Harris. 
 
Figure 63: The final design 
of Standard Tube Stock 
motor bogie. A heavy plate 
framed design that lasted 
for many years after the 
stock was scrapped. It is 
still in use under some of 
the Underground’s battery 
locomotives. Drawing: Adapted by the Author from an original by the late Stuart Harris. 
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8.7 Welded Frames 
By the mid-1930s, bogie design had settled down to the standard British pattern of 
plate-framed or pressed steel frames, which were broadly in line with the main line 
pattern on the sub surface lines, and to the more compact design required on the tube 
lines. The frames of these bogies were all riveted but riveting is labour intensive, 
requiring a large number of holes to be accurately drilled for the rivets followed by 
the fitting of the rivets. Rivets work loose after time and, because of this, much re-
work was necessary during the maintenance cycles.  
Figure 64: Side view of P & Q38 Stock bogie showing the frame (in grey) and various parts. 
These include the external swing links and the steel coil bolster springs which sit on the 
spring plank and carry the bolster itself. The bolster spring is clearly visible outside the side 
frame. On most designs, it was inside the frame and very difficult to see. The end of the 
bolster can be seen on top of the spring, just below the side bearer roller. Below the spring, 
the end of the spring plank can be seen, hanging from the ends of the swing links. The unusual 
feature of this design was the externally mounted bolster spring. The intention was to widen 
the bolster and so reduce the rocking motion of the body. Also, to improve traction, the 
motored axle was closer to the centre of the bogie than the trailing axle, hence the 
asymmetrical wheelbase. Drawing: Adapted by the Author from an original by the late Stuart 
Harris. 
The Underground’s chief design engineer, W.S. Graff-Baker (1952), wanted to 
improve the design and performance of bogies and he looked to welding as one 
possible answer. He developed welded bogie designs, which were provided under the 
1936/38 Tube Stock and the new surface stocks of the era - the O, P and Q38 Stocks. 
There is no evidence that any pre-service experiments were carried out so it seems 
that, in typical fashion, Graff-Baker went ahead with his proposals and imposed them 
on two large new fleets of rolling stock.  
Unlike most of Graff-Baker’s other innovations, his welded bogies were not a long-
term success. The treatment they got from the rough track on the Underground led to 
cracked joints and fractured frames and a constant cycle of repairs was always on the 
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go. After World War II, riveted frames re-appeared under new trains and remained as 
the norm for another 30 years. In spite of this, the welded design was an interesting 
venture and it also had a novel feature in the design of the bolster, which extended 
outside the side frame alignment in an attempt to improve the stability of the vehicle. 
The surface stock version of this design is shown in Figure 64. 
8.8 Welded Bogie Features 
The bogie is welded where necessary to keep the parts together. Only the horn guides 
are riveted because these had to be removed periodically for relining. Behind them, 
the outline of the strengthening plates added to the bogie frame can be seen (Figure 
64). More strengthening was added in the area behind the bolster spring because the 
depth of the side frame was reduced to allow the bolster to pass over the top of it; an 
obvious source of weakness. This was avoided on the tube version of the bogie 
because, although the bolster and its springs were longer than normal, they were 
contained inside the side frame. This was made possible by angling the frame into a 
‘bay window’ shape around the bolster ends (Figure 65). The author was most 
familiar with this design. 
Figure 65: Schematic of plan of 
1938 Tube Stock bogie showing 
the extended bolster and ‘bay 
window’ in the side frame to 
accommodate it. The idea was to 
widen the bolster so as to improve 
the platform upon which the car 
body sat. It did provide a rather 
soft ride, certainly better than 
earlier trains. What proved 
troublesome for the bogie was the welded construction. Drawing: Author. 
Two more new features that appeared on these bogies were the asymmetrical axle 
positioning and the bogie mounted brake cylinders. The bogie had only one traction 
motor and its axle was positioned so that it was nearer to the bogie centre than the 
trailing axle was, rather like the ‘maximum traction’ bogie adopted on some tramcars. 
This arrangement increased the weight on the axle and gave better adhesion. The 
distances from the bogie centre line of the surface stock version were 3ft 3ins for the 
motored axle and 4ft 7ins for the trailing axle. Up to this time, motor bogies had 
always had two motors, one on each axle. For the next 30 years, all new designs had 
one motor per bogie and the same design of bogie under both motor and trailer cars – 
it standardised the bogie design and lent itself to conversion of trailer bogies to motor 
bogies, as Graff-Baker intended would be done when the traction current power 
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supplies were upgraded to allow all-motor car trains. 
The other new feature was the bogie-mounted brake cylinders. Up to the mid-1930s, 
there was only one brake cylinder per car. The movement of the piston was 
transmitted to the brake blocks at the wheels by a complex system of rods and levers 
called brake rigging. The rigging was supposed to ensure that, when the piston moved 
to apply the brakes, all the blocks hit the wheel treads simultaneously and with the 
same pressure. Getting this to happen with any degree of consistency required a 
careful design of the rigging and then consistent and accurate maintenance and 
adjustment on a regular basis. The complexity of the brake rigging meant that each 
train had a huge number of links and pins, each with their own bushes and split pins. 
Keeping the railway supplied with these created its own cottage industry at Acton 
Works, which supplied depots with parts. 
Figure 66: A 1938 Tube Stock bogie in store at the LT Museum. It shows the brake cylinder units and 
how they are fitted into the cramped frame of the bogie. Each wheel has two brake blocks, one on each 
side. Each block has its own brake cylinder unit, consisting of an air cylinder, operating lever, return 
spring and slack adjuster. Because the space around the motored axle is tight, the brake cylinder unit 
for the inside brake blocks is mounted on the trailer side of the bogie bolster. Note also the ‘bay 
window’ shape for the side frame, which gives space for an extended bolster with side bearers located 
further apart to aid car stability. Photo: Author. 
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Graff-Baker (1952, p. 323) was well aware of the problems with brake rigging. He 
wanted to find a way of getting rid of it but this meant taking the cylinder closer to the 
block and the wheel. There is little room to do this on a conventional bogie and even 
less on a tube bogie. Nevertheless, he managed it. He did it by making the brake 
cylinders smaller and fitting them to the bogie frame. This got rid of the long links 
between the cylinder and the bogies. His first attempt on the surface stock produced a 
design with two cylinders on each bogie. This reduced rigging to a per bogie basis. 
The later version on the tube stock got 8 cylinders under each bogie and completely 
eliminated rigging. He did it by mounting each cylinder in a casting which included 
the operating lever and slack adjuster. The casting was bolted to the bogie frame. It 
was small enough to squeeze between the brake hanger, which held the block, and the 
headstock (or transom). It solved the rigging problem but it required careful 
manufacture to ensure there was enough room between the hanger and the wheel to fit 
a new block. When new, the 1973 and D Stocks both suffered from badly made and 
mounted brake components which made the fitting of new blocks impossible in some 
locations. Some of us unfortunates spent a lot of time running around looking for part 
worn blocks to replace fully worn blocks in places where new blocks would not fit.  
For the surface stock, the 1947 version of the bogie fitted to the new R Stock had 8 
cylinders per bogie. This made re-blocking easier as one did not have to go through 
the rigging adjustment that was still required on the 1937-8 versions of the bogie. 
When an R Stock came in for re-blocking, the car examiner would look along the side 
of the train so see which were R38 vehicles and which were R47 or R49s so they 
could judge what work was involved. One always hoped to see no R38s. 
Figure 67: A schematic of a welded, box frame 
bogie with a fixed bolster forming an H shape. 
There were no headstocks and no transoms. The 
secondary suspension sat on top of the bolster 
ends. This was normally air bags of solid rubber 
blobs. The design first appeared on the D Stock, 
using rubber blobs. Drawing: Author. 
 
8.9 To Weld or not to Weld? 
The problem with a welded bogie is that the stresses occurring in the steel during 
welding can quickly cause fractures in service. This means that the whole frame has 
to be heat treaded to ‘de-stress’ it. Even with this treatment, Graff-Baker’s welded 
frames proved too rigid for working over the sometimes very poor Underground track 
and cracked frames and failed welds were common. Maintenance expenditure on 
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bogies was still very high. In the end, the problems forced the revision of policy the 
author mentioned earlier and the joints between side frames, headstocks and transoms 
of bogies built after World War II went back to rivets so that the de-stressing could be 
avoided and some flexibility was restored to the frame under bad track conditions. 
Welding was retained only for brackets or strengthening elements such as the side 
frames where stiffeners were welded to the top and bottom of the side plates. 
As with much of history, fashions change and welding, as a fashion, has gone in and 
out of favour and is now back in. It first re-appeared in the original D78 Stock bogies, 
which appeared on the District line in 1980 and which the author helped bring into 
service. They were designed with welded, box section side frames and a welded 
bolster to form a solid H shape. It was very simple. There were no headstocks and no 
transoms. Both primary and secondary suspension was solid rubber. The secondary 
suspension was described as ‘diablo’, for some reason which escapes the author, since 
each spring looked like a pair of Christmas puddings placed one above the other, top 
to top. Unfortunately, the bogies were poorly made and the design was most 
unsuitable for London Underground conditions. Fractures began to appear and the 
bogie was so stiff that, under the extreme track conditions, like those that existed at 
Whitechapel before it was rebuilt in 2012, where a combination of difficult vertical 
and horizontal curves occur in complex point and crossing work, the bogie sometimes 
derailed. Severe speed limits were imposed in places and eventually the fleet was 
given new bogies as described below.  
Figure 68: A schematic of the 
flexible frame bogie built by Adtranz 
(now Bombardier) for the 1995 Tube 
Stock and then used to replace the 
original bogies under the D Stock 
and for the 2009 and S Stocks. The 
design provides two ‘T’-shaped main 
frames coupled together by flexible 
bolts and linked to the car body 
through a centre pivot coupled to 
each piece. Drawing: Author. 
 
 
The author recalls that the 1992 Stock also had a welded H frame bogie, supplied by 
Kawasaki but it was rather different from the D Stock version and it also had air bag 
suspension. It too was not a successful design and was replaced by a new design from 
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Siemens in 2010-11. Alstom built their own design of H frame bogies for the ‘96 
Stock but they fitted them with rubber ‘Christmas pudding’ suspension blobs instead 
of air bags. 
In a curious alliance between two rivals (well, curious to the author at least, since he 
worked for one of them for a time and the other one was regarded as serious 
competition), Alstom decided to use bogies designed by Adtranz when they offered 
the 1995 Tube Stock to London Underground. These were specifically designed to 
cope with indifferent track and to avoid the sort of derailment problems suffered by 
the D Stock. They are designated ‘flexible-frame’. This is because the bolster is split 
transversely so that the bogie is actually in two halves. They are connected by rubber 
damped links (Figure 68). This allows the two sides some independent movement and 
can partly compensate for the undulations of the track. The design has been a success 
and a modified version was chosen to replace the D Stock bogies, as mentioned 
above. The replacement bogies were fitted between July 2000 and May 2002. A 
similar design is used under the new S Stock and the Victoria Line’s 2009 Tube 
Stock. 
8.10 Rubber Suspension 
Figure 69: Metropolitan line A Stock 
axlebox suspension unit showing the angled 
rubber packs used as the primary 
suspension. The packs were set inside a 
specially designed yoke. The position of the 
yoke could be adjusted for wheel wear. The 
design was used on most tube and surface 
stock built between 1956 and 1973. 
Drawing: Redrawn by Author from an 
original by the late Stuart Harris. 
 
Steel suspension involves a lot of mechanical interfaces. Brackets carrying spring 
hangers, axleboxes sliding in horn guides, knife edge or bushed bearings for swing 
links, interfaces between springs and plates and the tendency of all these to wear or 
fracture in time. Reducing these or even getting rid of them altogether was a much 
sought after objective. Graff-Baker saw rubber as the solution (1952, p. 337). It was 
sometimes used for spring hangers in earlier times but it first appeared on the 
Underground as the main suspension system in an experiment on a bogie fitted under 
a 1938 Tube Stock car in 1952. This was considered a success and it was forthwith 
adopted as the new standard for the aluminium-bodied trains built from 1956 
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onwards. It went into production on the 1959/62 Tube Stocks and the A Stock. From 
that time, the Underground never went back to steel suspension. 
The rubber suspension consists of packs of rubber and steel made into a chevron-
shaped sandwich. A pack is then fitted on either side of the axlebox at an angle to 
allow some vertical and horizontal movement. The whole unit is contained inside a 
yoke attached to the side frame by a pin at one side and two adjustable bolts, one on 
the other side and one on top. (Figure 69). When it first appeared on the 1956 Tube 
Stock, the rubber pack design was much heralded by the manufacturers Dunlop under 
the name ‘Metalastik’. The Dunlop company’s Metalastik division has since been 
acquired by the Swedish company, Trelleborg Industrial AVS. 
Figure 70: This photo shows the bogie bolster for 
a 1972 Tube Stock motor bogie. It is mounted on 
four secondary suspension packs, fitted at angles 
at each corner of the bolster. A centre pivot is 
provided to locate the rotational point for the 
bogie while two locating pins for the car body are 
mounted at each end of the bolster. Note that the 
bogie transoms are pre-fabricated steel plates 
and it appears that they have recently been 
replaced. The 1972 Stock is the oldest passenger 
stock on the Underground and it is likely to have 
to last another 12-15 years before replacement. 
Photo by author. 
 
The rubber packs were also applied to the bolster suspension. Instead of sitting on a 
plank hung from swing links, the bolster was mounted between the transoms and 
rested on the rubber packs (Figure 70). It was shaped at the ends so it could rest on the 
packs, which were squeezed in at an angle between the transoms. The characteristic of 
the rubber was such that several shock absorbers had to be fitted between the bolster 
and body to soften the frequency of the vibration. The tendency of rubber to bounce at 
high frequency is a price which has to be paid for the lower maintenance requirements 
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Figure 71: A 7-car train of 1959 Tube 
Stock at Woodside Park in the late 1970s. 
A large fleet of these and very similar 
1962 Tube Stocks were built for the 
Central and Piccadilly lines. This was 
the first production stock built with 
rubber suspension. The ’59 Stock began 
moving to the Northern to replace 1938 
Tube Stock when the Piccadilly line 
began getting new 1973 Tube Stock. 
Photo: B.R. Hardy. 
8.11 Air Suspension 
At various times during the 20th century, the Underground has tried to overcome the 
problem of the enormous changes of car weight which occur during the normal 
service day. The difference between an empty car at 5 o’clock in the morning and a 
crush-loaded10 car at 8 o’clock in the morning can be over 50%. This affects adhesion, 
even on dry rails, and if different vehicles in the same train have different loads and 
therefore different weights, it makes braking without skidding the wheels on the 
lightly loaded vehicles quite difficult. One solution lay in the idea of weighing each 
car and adjusting the braking accordingly. This is known as ‘load weighing’. 
 Figure 72: 1973 Tube Stock 
motor bogie. The design is 
typical of the 1960s-70s. The 
side frames were of steel and the 
headstocks of aluminium. 
Rubber packs are used for the 
suspension. Note the negative 
shoe is carried by the board 
seen fitted between the 
headstock and the motor 
suspension tube. Photo: 
Author’s Collection. 
 
                                                
10 “Crush loaded” is a technical term used to mean packed to capacity. If you feel crushed sometimes in 
the rush hour, this is about half what the real “crush loaded” term refers to in terms of numbers of 
passengers. It is rarely reached in practice. 
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8.12 Load Weighing 
Load-weighing of cars, as an idea, has been around for many years. Graff-Baker tried 
it experimentally in the early 1930s on a Standard Stock car but it proved too difficult 
within the constraints of the day and it was not until the late 1960s that the idea 
resurfaced. The author recalls an experiment was tried on an A Stock vehicle (No. 
5218) using air bags in place of the secondary (bolster) suspension. A rubber bag was 
filled with compressed air fed from the train’s main air supply system. The pressure 
was set to a level for tare weight (empty) and then increased as the car was loaded. 
This was done with a link rod fitted between the car body and the bogie frame that 
detected the change in weight and, using a valve connected to the rod, adjusted the 
pressure inside the bag to suit. A fall-back rubber spring was provided as a support in 
the middle of the bag in case it burst. The signals generated by load weighing were 
used to adjust acceleration and braking. 
The new suspension system was fitted to the C Stock as built. The air bag was 
described as the ‘Metacone’ (Bruce, 1983, p. 116). A measuring link was provided on 
each bogie and a combination of the output from the two was transmitted to the 
traction control and braking systems on the car to adjust them accordingly. The idea 
was wonderful but by the time the C Stock was refurbished in 1992-5, the Metacone 
air bags were worn out and the pneumatic control valves were becoming a 
maintenance liability. The system was removed and replaced by ‘diablo’ (Christmas 
pudding shaped) rubber blobs like those on the D Stock.  
Air suspension suffered a setback as a result of the C Stock problems but, one could 
fairly say that it suffered perhaps because it was a pioneer design and little was known 
about the effects of the hammering it was to get from the Underground’s track and the 
very harsh duty cycle of the Circle Line service. It reappeared almost 30 years after 
this first design in a more robust form under the 1992 Tube Stock. However, there 
seem to have been uncertainties about its use in service on the Central Line, perhaps 
more to do with the bogies than the air suspension, and Alstom did not supply it for 
their bogies under the Jubilee Line’s 1996 Tube Stock. It finally returned with the 
Adtranz flexible frame bogies on the 1995 Tube Stock and the 2009 and S Stocks. 
The re-introduction of air suspension brought another problem into the spotlight again 
- stepping distances on and off trains. In order to accommodate the air suspension on 
the ’95TS, the floors are noticeably higher than the 1959 Tube Stock it replaced, 
much to LU’s disgust. This increased the stepping distance. Apart from any safety 
considerations, the greater the stepping distance, the slower the boarding and alighting 
times. On LU’s new Bombardier built stocks, which has very similar bogies, the 
wheels are smaller (700mm instead of 770) so that the floor is lower, even with air 
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suspension (Neil, 2016).  
8.13 Bogies Under Articulated Cars 
For the ‘Space Train’ concept described in Section 7.17, the proposed articulated car 
bodies were to be mounted on three-axle bogies (Figure 73) (Hope, 1998). The idea 
was that two frames linked to the bodies on each side of the bogie would be arranged 
so that all three axles could steer through curves. End bogies would have two axles 
with only the outer wheelset steered. Clearly, two-axle bogies throughout would be 
preferable, but they would have been right on the limit for wheel/rail contact stresses. 
Wheels were to have a diameter of 430mm. AC motors mounted on the underframe of 
the car body would drive the outer axles of each articulated bogie. The centre axle 
would be unpowered because of the reduced space available under the articulation. 
The motors were to be coupled to the axles by cardan drive shafts, like many diesel 
trains today. 
Figure 73: The bogie for the 
Space Train was a novel, 
flexible-framed structure with 
the outer axles driven through 
cardan shafts by body 
mounted motors. The centre 
axle was unpowered. The 
secondary suspension units 
were mounted outside the 
bogie frame and angled 
inwards to support the car body. Photo: Stephen Knight. 
Were this bogie to be constructed with a rigid frame, there is a risk that the 
Underground track would introduce high stresses in the frame or would cause wheel 
unloading on track formations with certain combinations of vertical and horizontal 
curves. The very chequered history of bogie frame performance on the Underground 
has presented a number of lessons that should be retained by the corporate memory. 
8.14 Summary 
The development of bogie design for the Underground largely followed the path set 
by the car body and traction systems in that, apart from the British designed C&SLR, 
it began with American imports and then these were later adapted by or abandoned by 
the Underground according to their experience in service.  
The case of the original, American designed, cast steel motor bogies (Section 8.4) 
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supplied for both the District and LER tube lines in the 1905-7 period is interesting in 
that the differing track design of the two railways seems to have had an influence on 
the performance of the bogies. The District’s track was lightly laid and was already 20 
or more years old when the line was electrified, whereas the LER track was new and 
the sleepers were fixed in concrete. The District bogies suffered serious structural 
problems within a few years of entering service while the tube bogies survived for the 
life of the stock – up to 25 years. In the author’s view, this suggests a clear 
relationship between track quality and bogie design performance. 
Even in recent times, despite over 150 years of development, bogie science is by no 
means understood sufficiently to prevent some serious problems and failures in 
design. Both of the batches of sub-surface stock built in the 1960s-70s, the C and D 
Stocks, have had to have their bogies replaced. Of the tube stocks, the 1983 Stock was 
scrapped early but would have had to have its bogies replaced as they were the same 
as the original D Stock design and the 1992 Stock on the Central line also had its 
bogies replaced by a new design from Siemens. Only the Adtranz designed flexible 
frame bogie appears to have provided a long term solution (Section 8.9), having now 
been supplied as a replacement, or for new stock, over a period of 20 years since 
1995. 
8.15 Conclusions 
In terms of what could be learned from the history of bogie development on the 
Underground after the last 100 or more years, it can be seen that getting a bogie frame 
to fit under a tube car body and provide sufficient ride comfort is difficult enough but 
the historically poor quality of much of London Underground track made getting a 
reasonable ride from the limitations of the suspension in the restricted space even 
more difficult. With the desire to reduce weight and track forces, future bogie systems 
will need to be carefully managed if a reliable design is to reach the same 40-year life 
expected of the car body.  
The evidence from the historical perspective shows that more attention needs to be 
paid to ensuring that bogie design is aligned to the track conditions and its likely 
performance under the stock for which it is designed. In this area in particular, it is 
essential to retain the corporate memory of the lessons learned from the expensive 
bogie replacement programmes carried out over the last 30 years. The difficulties with 
the welded designs of the 1930s and again of the 1980s, demonstrate that to replace 
riveted construction with welding both in a largely traditional bogie design and a 
more modern rigid H-form design, has been found to be inappropriate with poor track 
conditions. Experience has shown that, in any environment with poor track, welded 
bogies perform better in a design with a flexible frame format, provided the flexible 
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system is robust enough. This is a lesson that should not be lost from the corporate 
memory. In future designs, particularly for trains with articulated car bodies, the need 
for flexibility in the bogie frame should be addressed. 
The Circle, District and Central lines have all had bogie replacement programmes at 
approximately the half-life of recent stock, whereas it should be possible to retain a 
bogie frame for the life of the stock – 35 years or more. This truism should not be lost 
on present day railway engineers. 
The author considers that the historical evidence shows the importance of a good 
understanding of the effects of track condition on bogie life and of the need to adopt 
robust designs in mitigation of track deficiencies. It also shows that, despite many 
trials and errors, problems with bogie design continue. In the same vein, management 
attention to track maintenance regimes and their effectiveness in reducing the impact 
on bogie life will be an important factor in reducing the risk of expensive bogie 
replacement programmes. 
Another lesson learned from the Underground’s experience with bogies is that, even 
with prototyping, as was done for the air suspension system applied to the C Stock in 
the late 1960s, the apparent success of the design over a few years of testing may not 
be retained over longer periods.  
It is also essential to consider the impact of a new bogie design on the relationship 
between the train and the structures within which the train moves. The shock 
sustained by the Underground’s operating department, when it realised the 1995 Tube 
Stock had increased stepping distances over those of the stock it replaced, 
demonstrated a serious lack of understanding of the impact of the new suspension 
system on the station operations. 
Perhaps the author might be forgiven for saying that a careful assessment of the track 
and its surrounding structures is essential before adopting a particular bogie design. 
The lack of this assessment has afflicted the Underground throughout its history. 
Since much of the riding qualities of a train must be due to track condition, it can be 
seen that most of the work done by bogies is to try to mitigate the effects of poor 
track. As any permanent way engineer or rolling stock designer will tell you, money 
spent on track is not wasted! 
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This thesis provides a historical narrative on the development of electric rolling stock 
on the London Underground system. The narrative was created from a wide range of 
sources over a long period of research and analysis. The author found that, by 
researching and analysing the history and development of a large and diverse 
technological system, it is possible to produce a readable historical narrative that 
could support decision making in the future development and progress of railway 
projects. The questions arising from this are whether the narrative is needed by the 
industry, whether it offers useful lessons for future projects and whether the narrative 
itself is actually accessible for future projects.  
9.2 Literature 
In the literature review, the author found a number of writers who described the 
building up of the corporate memory in the railway industry, how it was based on the 
need for system continuity and on the desire of staff for secure employment. Some 
companies demonstrated a desire to retain staff as they realised that experience and 
on-the-job training were essential for effective and efficient operation. The literature 
shows that a culture of reliance upon the staff with long service developed and 
succession plans based on long service or experience were common amongst railway 
organisations.  
The literature showed that, in more recent times, moves into privatisation and the 
resulting exodus of experienced staff were to change the long service culture and 
associated succession plans and, with them, there was a loss of corporate memory and 
a reduction in technical understanding. In addition, short term employment contracts 
now so common across industry in general, have reduced the capability of a corporate 
memory to a level where it has caused a reduction in available expertise in the railway 
business.  
The author found that the literature reviewed allowed him to confirm a widely held 
perception that domain knowledge in the railway industry was weak in some 
significant areas and a way of overcoming this problem was needed if new project 
deliveries were to be improved. The author suggested that, if a useful historical 
narrative could be developed for a railway system and its assets, this could be used to 
inform future operational and engineering developments.  
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9.3 Lessons from the Narrative 
A major outcome from the narrative is that information is available on how the 
London Underground railway systems developed. However, time and effort is needed 
to find, extract and evaluate this information so that a readable historical narrative can 
be developed. Nevertheless, from this narrative, a number of important lessons are 
demonstrated and these can have an impact on the railway today and in the future. 
One of the lessons shown in the narrative is the need to allow for adaptability. In 
Chapter 5, the description of the early trials with multiple unit control systems 
demonstrates that possibly the single most important lesson learned during this phase 
of electric traction development was that whilst new ideas might seem to solve a 
problem, it is not always the case when the system is put into service and the engineer 
must be prepared to adapt his design to suit service conditions or even, in extreme 
cases like regeneration, defer it until practical operation has caught up with the theory. 
In parallel, railway clients must expect new systems to require a shakedown period 
and appropriate time and cost should be allocated for it. The complex new systems 
introduced for the London Underground at the start of the 20th Century meant that the 
pioneer engineers and operators were pushed into expanding their experience as their 
system developed. This phenomenon still occurs today when new systems are 
introduced and the author argues that sufficient allowance should be made for it in 
future project plans. 
Another demonstration of the need for adaptability is described in Section 6.5 where 
the Central London Railway was forced to withdraw their newly purchased 
locomotives and replace them with multiple unit motor cars because of the 
widespread vibration caused by the excessive weight of the locomotives. This change 
represented a significant investment increase, forced on the company after only three 
years of operation but it was also seized upon by the CLR as an opportunity to 
increase their train service by 25%. The lesson of the value of adaptability is, this 
example, clearly shown. 
9.4 The Value of Prototyping 
Throughout this narrative, the value of first testing new systems or new technology in 
a prototype format has been demonstrated. In the case of the new door control system 
introduced in 1920 (Section 7.7), a trial took place using one train but it was quickly 
seen that some of the systems did not function under service conditions and, although 
it took several months to modify the new trains, the resulting revisions permitted a 
much more reliable service.  
Similarly, in 1936, a radical new tube car design was introduced (Section 6.11) but 
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both the car body design and the new traction equipment was tested in six prototype 
units before a final selection was made. The result was the iconic 1938 Tube Stock, a 
design which was to survive for new builds with little change until the 1970s.  
Where prototyping was not applied for a radically new system, as in the case of the 
original District Railway door control of 1905 (Section 7.6), serious operational and 
safety problems arose and, within three years, the company withdrew the system and 
converted door operation to manual control. It seems that the value of prototyping was 
understood when the new door control system was tried in 1920. 
In another example, a number of radically new systems were introduced on the 1973 
Tube Stock (Section 6.21)without any prototyping and these caused considerable 
reliability problems that subsequently took 20 years to fully resolve. As a result of 
experiences of this sort, the author argues that all radical new designs or new systems 
should undergo a period of prototyping or significant service testing before being 
accepted for bulk procurement. 
9.5 Learning from Failures 
The narrative shows how lessons can be learned from failures and it shows how 
knowledge from these lessons has been lost in some instances. In the case study on 
the early development of bogie design for the Underground (Chapter 8) it was 
described how bogie design largely followed the path set by the car body and traction 
systems in that it began with American imports later either adapted by or abandoned 
by the Underground according to their experience in service. It showed how there was 
considerable trouble with bogie design, at least on the District Railway version. 
The case of the original, American designed, cast steel motor bogies supplied for both 
the District and LER tube lines in the 1905-1907 period is interesting in that the 
author’s analysis shows that the differing track designs of the two railways seems to 
have had an influence on the performance of the bogies. The poor track of the District 
seriously reduced the bogie life, whereas the LER track was new and the sleepers 
were fixed in concrete and the tube bogies survived for the life of the stock. The 
author argues that this suggests a clear relationship between track quality and bogie 
performance. 
Even in recent times, despite over 150 years of development, bogie science is by no 
means understood sufficiently to prevent serious problems and failures in design. Of 
recent stocks, two were provided with replacement bogie frames that had to be 
specially purchased. Only the Adtranz designed flexible frame bogie appears to have 
provided a long-term solution, having now been supplied as a replacement, or for new 
stock, over a period of 20 years since 1995. 
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The author proposes that difficulties with the welded designs of the 1930s, and again 
in the 1980s, demonstrate that the use of welding both in a largely traditional bogie 
design and in the more modern rigid H-form design, has been found to be 
inappropriate for poor track conditions. Experience in recent years has shown that 
welded bogies perform better on the Underground in a design with a flexible frame 
format, provided the flexible system is robust enough. This is a lesson that should not 
be lost from the corporate memory. In future designs, particularly for trains with 
articulated car bodies, the need for and the design of flexibility in the bogie frame 
should be carefully addressed. 
In terms of what could be learned from the historical narrative on bogie development 
on the Underground after the last 100 or more years, it can be seen that getting a bogie 
frame to fit under a tube car body is difficult enough but the historically poor quality 
of London Underground track made getting a reasonable ride from the limitations of 
the suspension in the restricted space even more difficult. The evidence from the 
historical perspective shows that more attention needs to be paid to ensuring that 
bogie design is appropriate for the track conditions. In this area in particular, it is 
essential to retain the corporate memory of the lessons learnt from the expensive 
bogie replacement programmes carried out over the last 30 years. 
9.6 Access to Historical Narratives 
The writer hopes that his thesis fully justifies the hypothesis that, given suitable 
research, sufficient time and a structured analysis of the resulting data, it is possible to 
produce a readable historical narrative for a railway that provides useful information 
on the railway’s asset development and the resulting performance, both in the past and 
today. In addition, as a demonstration of the power of creating such a narrative, he has 
provided a number of lessons learned over many years that are still relevant today. 
However, a formal process is yet to be developed as to how the information and 
lessons learnt can be stored and accessed in the long term and how they should be 
used. 
Many of the records covering past events and decisions relating to the development of 
a railway are paper based and it requires considerable time and effort to read these, 
evaluate them and then create the narrative. Traditionally, the result was produced in 
the form of a paper or book. With modern word processing, secure data storage and 
electronic transmittal systems available, it is much easier to distribute a readable and 
searchable narrative once it has been created. Thus, the author argues, a narrative 
created today can be made available to a wide audience and may then be used by the 
organisation and, where appropriate, its suppliers in preparing new system designs or 
processes. Relatively recently, Network Rail has established a digital repository for 
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historic information from its archives (Network Rail, 2018), which is accessible to a 
wide range of parties. In a more future orientated approach, Business Information 
Modelling or BIM (Sacks et al, 2010) is being adopted by a number of organisations, 
e.g., to manage the information that arises as a major project or programme is being 
delivered. BIM is powerful because it stores more than just time bound factual 
information, it also includes the necessary narrative. 
A formal method for creating and retaining development narratives must be 
incorporated into any long-lived organisation’s management approaches. Potentially, 
this could be achieved by adopting classical systems engineering techniques. 
9.7 System Engineering as a Corporate Memory Tool 
Much of what has been discussed in this thesis is commonly referred to as corporate 
memory, a term that is known widely but not necessarily understood properly. 
Conventionally, corporate memory has been seen as being founded in the 
accumulated combined knowledge of individuals and in such records as a company 
may have maintained over the years, whether on paper or in electronic form, in 
archives or readily accessible in a database. Corporate memory is described as, “the 
combined knowledge and experience of a company’s employees” (Cambridge 
Dictionary, 2018). A synonym for corporate memory is organisational memory. 
Scalzo (2006) describes organisational memory as “the knowledge and information 
from the organization’s past which can be accessed and used for present and future 
organizational activities”. In reality, few organisations put in place a formal process 
for retaining historic information in a useable format and then maintaining it, i.e., they 
fail to provide structures and processes that ensure that knowledge is not lost and 
remains readily available.  
The author proposes the use of techniques from the domain of systems engineering, 
(discussed in Section 3.14 to develop an organisation’s corporate memory 
systematically and to maintain the relevance of the appropriate historic information 
and narrative in the long term. The process starts with statements of needs that are 
translated into system requirements as part of a requirements capture process. To be 
useful for generating corporate memory and narratives, they must be rich 
requirements, i.e., they must provide full details of all the requirements in well-
defined terms, the associated reasoning and the decisions taken for each of the items 
in the project scope. The requirements are then translated into a specification that is 
agreed with the stakeholders and also forms part of the narrative.  
Change management and rich traceability, two other formal SE tools, can be used to 
ensure that the corporate memory includes both past and current information and its 
change history. Each change must be decided formally and agreed with the relevant 
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parties, recorded in detail, complete with the reasons and evidence (data) that led to it 
and the way in which it was implemented. Rich traceability provides not just a 
decision history but a documentation that includes the reasons for any decision and 
change, as well as the parties involved. This approach could be termed ‘rich 
configuration management’. In the past, paper documents, archives and orally 
transmitted information provided the foundation for maintaining the corporate 
memory. Today, this task must be addressed by digital means, e.g., BIM, as 
mentioned in the previous section. However, digital corporate memory is at risk 
through obsolescence of databases, storage and access processes, a warning given in 
the Systems Engineering Book of knowledge (SEBoK, 2017). 
SEBok (2017) also notes that, in defining requirements, it must be realised that 
stakeholder requirements need to be clarified and translated from statements of need 
into an engineering-based language in order to enable proper definition, design, and 
verification activities that are needed as part of the system requirements analysis. The 
author would add that knowledge obtained from the corporate history database should 
be used to validate the definition and specification of the system requirements.  
9.8 Summary 
The discussion in this chapter has outlined a number of issues and lessons learnt that 
were derived from the historical narratives. The discussion points are generated from 
the case studies on the development of electric traction control systems, the need for 
improvements to the original car body designs and their passenger access systems and 
the various designs of bogies. The discussion examined various lessons learnt in 
rolling stock design and operation over the last 100 or more years and shows the 
possibility for using a detailed historical narrative to add to corporate knowledge and 
to assist understanding of existing assets. The discussion also offers proposals related 
to the use and access of historical narratives as part of a system engineering approach 
to new projects. 
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10 Conclusions 
10.1 The Research Objectives 
This thesis started with a proposition that an accessible historical narrative on past 
engineering and operational development could be developed and then used as part of 
a knowledgebase to support an informed, robust strategy for the future development 
of a railway.  
Given this proposition, the aim of the thesis was to demonstrate that, by researching 
the history and development of a large and diverse technological system like a railway, 
it should be possible to produce a useful historical narrative to support decision 
making in the future development and progress of railway projects and to reduce the 
risk of failings seen in recent times. The historical narrative would be used to aid 
planning for new systems or installations, guide the introduction of future 
technologies or the employment of new operational strategies for the railway and 
provide improved domain knowledge.  
In order to achieve this, a series of objectives were developed as follows: 
1) To establish a view on the status of the current knowledge of railway systems, 
corporate learning and organisational development; 
2) To locate information that relates to how railway systems on the London 
Underground were developed since the start of electric traction; 
3) To analyse the sources and evaluate them for relevance and context, identify trends in 
the ways in which systems were developed, the drivers of development and what the 
results were; 
4) To determine if corporate memory loss and path dependency experiences in the wider 
business and engineering worlds showed any similarity to those the railway industry. 
5) To demonstrate that a useable historical narrative that is sequenced, integrated, 
contextualised and that is accessible, can be produced. 
The research for this thesis was based on detailed case studies of various technical 
aspects of the electric rolling stock on the London Underground railways. Initially, the 
author looked at the literature on the historical development of path dependency, tacit 
knowledge resulting from it and the relationships with railway system development. 
Extensive research has been done to determine the paths of development of train 
design and equipment over the 125 years since electric traction was introduced on the 
City & South London railway in 1890.  
The analysis demonstrated that a useable historical narrative can be produced and 
showed clear examples that demonstrate how the use of domain knowledge and the 
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history of development has provided useful guidance for new projects. The narrative 
demonstrated examples where lessons could have or should have been learned from 
previous circumstances and other examples where they were learned and applied to 
new projects. 
10.2 Final Conclusions 
The thesis demonstrates that a useable historical narrative can be produced. This is not 
a conventional historiographical study and, whilst it draws upon academic literature 
on corporate memory loss, it is not intended as a contribution in this field. The 
principal contribution to knowledge is that it shows clear examples that demonstrate 
how the use of domain knowledge and the history of development has provided useful 
guidance for new projects.  
In the development of this narrative, certain important aspects of historical railway 
development that need to be understood and retained in the corporate memory have 
been shown by the evidence in these case studies to be as follows. 
• The long life of rolling stock results in extended periods of improvement stagnation, 
as shown in car body design (Chapter 7) and traction equipment development 
Chapter 6); 
• Long asset life generates path dependency – once it is known and understood by 
everyone, it is difficult to go outside the comfort zone and get something radically 
new; 
• There is a need to retain long term technical and operational knowledge at all levels 
in a railway organisation; 
• When historical corporate knowledge is available, it can be used to make sensible 
decisions on investment; 
• Aids on choices of future systems can be gained from in-house experience, past 
trends and by the use of lessons learned.  
It is here argued that the conclusions as listed above show direct pointers towards 
what might be applied to future railway system design projects. With the life of a rail 
vehicle under railway conditions that can be as long as 50 years, this points to the 
need for a clear view of the development and use of that vehicle throughout its life so 
that the experience can be used and projected forward for future designs. It is argued 
that this clear view will only be obtained by keeping good records and keeping them 
up to date, and by using in-house experts who know and understand the system and by 
educating those joining the railway. It is essential that continuity is provided and that 
knowledge of the systems is not left to the memories of staff who might easily 
disappear and take that knowledge with them. Railway business management systems 
should be modified to include checks throughout a project life so that at least the 
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following aspects of project management are adequately addressed: Electrical, 
mechanical and civil infrastructure systems integration, rolling stock to signalling 
compatibility, rolling stock mechanical and electrical integration. 
The conclusions in this thesis could be applied to any railway system, although the 
case studies were on London Underground and the work did not attempt to validate 
the conclusions other than the ability to research for and create a useable historical 
narrative. 
10.3 Recommendations 
The author proposes the following recommendations: 
1. The history of assets and of their development should be retained and consulted as 
part of the normal railway business process. 
2. Lessons learned should be published and consulted as part of the normal business 
process up to board level; 
3. New staff should be inducted in the history and development of the railway and its 
technology, with emphasis on the discipline of the individual as appropriate; 
4. Succession planning should include a strategy for long-term staff employment 
including promotion to senior positions for qualified staff; 
5. A risk analysis of a project should incorporate the knowledge developed in the 
historical system analysis and included in the risk register as appropriate; 
6. Organisations must adopt processes that allow the retention of historical narratives 
and other forms of historical information for use in live projects and processes, 
including company standards, design instructions, maintenance instructions, systems 
integration and codes of practice; 
7. Teams managing new projects must adopt formal system engineering approaches to 
ensure that projects absorb historical lessons learned and that generate the knowledge 
that will support future work by their organisation; 
8. New research should be undertaken to validate formally the performance of railway 
projects that adopt the use of a historical narrative to aid the planning, design and 
implementation of ongoing and new projects. 
These recommendations are not yet common practice and therefore, will have to be 
developed, tested and implemented. Only once this has been done can they be tested 
in professional practice. 
Through this case study based research, it is shown how the pattern of railway 
development has shaped the system and technologies and is still doing so today. In 
fact, it is argued that the railway system is vitally dependent on an understanding of 
its past in order to succeed in obtaining the most cost-effective solutions for its future 
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development. It is the conclusion that it is essential for railway engineering and 
operations management to understand the way in which the development of technical 
and operations has progressed on their railway during its history and that railway 
business management needs to have this understanding embedded at all stages in their 
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Appendix 1:  
Auxiliary Equipment on London Underground Trains 
Table 4: Auxiliary Voltages on Current LU Rolling Stock. 
Notes: MAR = Motor Alternator Rectifier; MAR(T) + MAR mounted under 





Output  Auxiliaries Comments 
72 MAR (T) 230V AC 115V AC main lighting 
60V AC rectifier to 50V DC for 
control 
MAR on 4-car 
supplies ½ lights 
on one side of 
unit. 
73 MAR 230V AC 115V AC main lighting 
60V AC rectifier to 50V DC for 
control 
MAR supplies ½ 
lights on one 
side of unit. 
92 Static 
Converter 
230V AC 230V AC for fans; 






230V AC fans, traction cooling 






230V AC fans, traction cooling 






415V AC for compressor, fans, 
traction fans and rectifier to 110V 





230V AC 115V AC main lighting 
60V AC rectifier to 50V DC for 
control 
A 230V AC Fan MA is also 
provided on the trailer of each 
unit. 
MAR supplies ½ 
lights on one 
side of unit.  
S IGBT 
Converter 
415V AC 415V AC for compressor, air con., 
traction fans and rectifier to 110V 
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Appendix 2: Lines of the London Underground 
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